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As a result of the mid-election interference that occurred during the Toronto Civic Election in 
2018, commentators have raised various ways of interpreting the Constitution of Canada, through 
unwritten constitutional principles or otherwise, to protect democratic civic elections. Other 
commentators have suggested amending provincial constitutions, as opposed to the Constitution 
of Canada. In this Thesis, I argue that a formal amendment to the Constitution of Canada is 
required to adequately protect democratic civic elections. Additionally, I take the position that 
truly protecting civic democracy requires constitutional protection of civic legislative and revenue 
raising powers on top of democratic civic elections. In doing so, I discuss living constitutionalism, 
the prevailing theory of constitutional interpretation in Canada, and the constraints thereon. I then 
discuss how the various creative interpretations of the Constitution ignore the constraints on 
constitutional interpretation and create uncertainty within the text of the Constitution and for the 
future of civic democracy.  
 
While I am critical of alternative approaches to a formal amendment, I agree that city councils of 
large Canadian cities play a significant legislative role and are an important level of government 
in Canada. For this and other reasons, such as the majority of the population of Canada living in 
cities, the legislative role of large Canadian cities ought to be protected by the Constitution. I argue 
that the constraints on constitutional interpretation cannot be ignored, rendering a formal 
amendment to the Constitution of Canada the ideal method to adequately protect civic democracy 
within the Constitution. Although I acknowledge a formal amendment of this nature is unlikely, I 
continue to discuss the potential benefits of advocating for a formal constitutional amendment such 
as addressing these issues through the ballot box or influencing constitutional interpretation 
through proposed, partially complete of failed constitutional amendment proposals. Again, 
although I am critical of the alternative approaches to a formal amendment of the Constitution of 
Canada, I accept that constitutional interpretation may be the only realistic method of protecting 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE 
As a result of the mid-election ward destruction that occurred in the 2018 Toronto civic 
election, interpreting the Constitution of Canada1 to protect democratic civic elections has received 
significant attention from academia and the legal profession. In advocating for alternative 
approaches to a formal amendment, scholars and legal professionals have, in my view, disregarded 
the constraints on constitutional interpretation in favour of novel legal arguments that attempt to 
force constitutional protection for democratic civic elections into the current text of the 
Constitution. In addition, while numerous novel interpretations of the Constitution have been 
proposed, the prospect of formally amending the Constitution to protect democratic civic election 
has been largely ignored, likely due to the difficulty of formal constitutional amendment in 
Canada. Further, few scholars or legal professionals have considered whether constitutional 
protection for democratic civic elections is, in and of itself, sufficient to protect civic democracy, 
as defined in 1.1 of this Chapter, without providing city councils with constitutionally entrenched 
legislative and revenue raising powers to ensure city councils have the ability to effectively 
represent their constituents. 
 
By way of background, and as further discussed in 4.2.1, the 2018 Toronto civic election 
began based on a 47-ward structure, however, in the middle of the election period, the Ontario 
legislature passed Bill 5, The Better Local Government Act,2 which reduced the number of wards 
to 25. Not surprisingly, a constitutional challenge was brought to the Superior Court of Ontario 
(“ONSC”) and was subsequently appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal (“ONCA”) and, with 
leave, to the Supreme Court of Canada.3 At the ONSC, Justice Belobaba found that: (1) section 
2(b) of the Charter protects effective representation in municipal elections; (2) the BLGA infringed 
section 2(b) of the Charter; and (3) that the infringement could not be justified by section 1 of the 
 
1 For the purpose of this thesis, reference to the “Constitution” includes both The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B 
to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982] and The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3 
[Constitution Act, 1867] and The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. When this thesis refers to the “Constitution” 
or the “Constitution of Canada”, it does not include provincial constitutions.  
2 The Better Local Government Act 2018, SO, 2018, c 11 [BLGA]. 
3 2018 ONSC 5151, 142 OR (3d) 336 [Toronto v Ontario (ONSC)] rev’d 2019 ONCA 732, 146 OR (3d) 705 [Toronto 
v Ontario (ONCA)] leave to appeal to SCC granted [2019] SCCA No 414 [Toronto v Ontario (SCC Leave Decision)] 
where the SCC granted leave to hear this appeal SCC case # 38921 [Toronto v Ontario (SCC)]. For the purposes of 
this thesis, this line of cases is generally referred to as “Toronto v Ontario” and reference to the appeal proper will be 




Charter and the BLGA was struck down.4 On appeal to ONCA, the majority of the ONCA 
overturned Justice Belobaba’s decision, holding that the Constitution does not protect democratic 
civic elections and, for it to do so, a formal constitutional amendment is required.5 The dissenting 
opinion, as further discussed in 4.2.1, held that the BLGA was an infringement of section 2(b) and 
could not be saved by section 1.6 From these decisions, numerous commentators have suggested 
alternative means of interpreting the Constitution to protect democratic civic elections.  
 
I argue that the alternative approaches based on creative legal arguments have the effect of 
informally, and therefore unconstitutionally, amending the Constitution through unconstrained 
constitutional interpretation. I take the novel view that the majority of the ONCA were correct and 
a formal amendment to the Constitution is required to properly protect civic democracy and respect 
the constraints on constitutional interpretation. In addition, despite the difficult threshold of formal 
constitutional amendment in Canada and current debate surrounding the use of unwritten 
constitutional principles, I further argue that advocating for a formal amendment, as opposed to 
relying on constitutional interpretation, remains beneficial in the event that analogous 
constitutional issues arise in the future, given the Supreme Court of Canada’s willingness to review 
and, in some cases, overturn or distinguish its previous decisions.  
 
Further, the alternative approaches discussed in 5.2 appear to propose constitutional 
protection for democratic civic elections merely because of the high-profile nature of the 2018 
Toronto election. My analysis builds on this and argues that city councils of large cities now 
regulate issues of national significance as opposed to mere local or municipal concerns, and 
therefore, effective representation within a city council and ensuring city councils have the tools 
to effectively represent their constituents is essential to civic democracy. Despite the significance 
of cities, however, they remain “creatures of the province” as provincial legislatures have plenary 
power over “municipal institutions” pursuant to subsection 92(8) of The Constitution Act, 1867.7 
I look beyond civic election interference and consider the role of large cities, and the city councils 
 
4 Toronto v Ontario (ONSC), supra note 3 at paras 40-78.. 
5 Toronto v Ontario (ONCA), supra note 3 at para 94. 
6 Ibid, at para 132-135. 
7 See Rheaume v Ontario (Attorney General), (1989) 48 MPLR 1 at 32, 63 DLR 241 (ONSC), aff’d (1997) 36 OR 




thereof, in arguing that civic democracy ought to be protected by the Constitution. Thus, 
constitutional protection of civic democracy requires more than mere protection of democratic 
civic elections; the democratic legislative role of city councils must be constitutionally protected 
as well, while respecting the constraints on constitutional interpretation. 
 
Currently, most of the literature advocating for a formal constitutional amendment to 
protect municipal institutions have done so in the context of municipal revenue raising powers as 
opposed to civic democracy.8 As discussed next under 1.1, constitutionally entrenched revenue 
raising powers for municipal institutions are only one aspect of civic democracy. In my view, civic 
revenue raising powers must be considered as only one aspect of a formal amendment to the 
Constitution to protect civic democracy. Therefore, a formal amendment to the Constitution ought 
to protect democratic civic elections and legislative heads of power in addition to revenue raising 
powers, amounting to wholesale constitutional reform, to constitutionally recognize large cities as 
an independent and autonomous level of government. Further, and as discussed below, I focus on 
large cities as opposed to municipal institutions, however, given the unlikelihood of a formal 
constitutional amendment to protect democratic civic elections, my analysis remains important to 
advancing civic democracy in Canada and constitutional interpretation generally.  
 
In doing so, I begin with defining civic democracy and outlining what constitutes a large 
city for the purpose of this analysis. Chapter 2 discusses the current constitutional status of cities, 
or lack thereof, including a discussion of the historical context of large cities in Canada and the 
current legislative role that city councils perform within Canada’s national framework. Chapter 3 
discusses the current constitutional treatment of municipal institutions, democracy and the effect 
that the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy may have on municipal acts by analyzing 
whether the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy ought to be able to invalidate laws. In 
Chapter 3 I further outline the predominant theory of constitutional interpretation in Canada and 
the constraints thereon, in order to demonstrate how the alternative approaches discussed in 
Chapter 5 ignore these constraints and inject uncertainty into the written text of the Constitution. 
 
8 See Michael Dewing, W.R. Young & Erin Tolley, “Municipalities, the Constitution, and the Canadian Federal 




Chapter 4 discusses how the lack of constitutional protection for civic democracy has allowed 
provincial governments to interfere with civic elections and elected officials.  
 
As mentioned, Chapter 5 discusses various alternative approaches to a formal amendment 
that have been proposed and how they disregard the constraints on constitutional interpretation. In 
addition, Chapter 5 outlines how the alternative approaches are not sufficient to protect civic 
democracy and why a formal amendment to the Constitution is required. In Chapter 6, I argue that 
a formal amendment to the Constitution is required owing to the uncertainty caused by the 
alternative approaches and Chapter 7 discusses the barriers to a formal constitutional amendment 
to protect civic democracy, including obtaining provincial consent. 
 
In advocating for a formal amendment to the Constitution, Chapter 7 explains the 
expressive function of a formal constitutional amendment as compared to the alternative 
approaches discussed in Chapter 5 and sets out a proposed constitutional amendment based on the 
purposeful interpretation of section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the drafting characteristics 
of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. While I am critical of interpreting the current text of 
the Constitution to protect civic democracy, I acknowledge that an alternative to a formal 
amendment of the Constitution is the most likely method of advancing constitutional protection of 
civic democracy, in whole or in part. Because of this, I discuss how advocating for a formal 
amendment may assist in doing so through a partial constitutional amendment, or through the 
ballot box.  
 
1.1 Defining Civic Democracy  
For the purpose of my analysis, civic democracy is broken down into two essential 
components: (1) democratic civic elections; and (2) ensuring city councils have the necessary tools 
to effectively represent their constituents. In my view, an informal amendment cannot address the 
many democratic shortfalls that result from the exclusion of large cities as a constitutionally 
recognized level of government due to the plenary power of the provincial legislatures over 
municipal institutions. This subchapter defines civic democracy whereas Chapters 2 to 4 elaborate 





The first component of civic democracy is democratic civic elections, which are not 
protected by the current Constitution, and involves constitutional protection for a citizen’s right to 
vote for and be effectively represented within a city council. In contrast, the right to vote in federal 
and provincial elections is protected by section 3 of the Charter and contains the right to effective 
representation within Parliament and a provincial legislature. While the right to vote in civic 
elections is an expressive activity protected by section 2(b) of the Charter,9 I take the position that 
section 2(b) does not adequately protect democratic civic elections as effective representation is 
not protected and section 2(b) is subject to the “notwithstanding clause”. As argued herein, merely 
protecting the right to vote, without protecting citizens’ right to be effectively represented within 
a city council, does little to promote and protect civic democracy.  
 
To ensure effective representation of citizens within a city council, the second component 
of civic democracy, ensuring city councils have the necessary tools to effectively represent their 
constituents, is crucial as Canada is a representative democracy. Therefore, the right to effective 
representation provides citizens with one seat in the deliberations of Parliament or a provincial 
legislature through the right to vote.10 Thus, if the right to effective representation extends to city 
councils, they require the legislative and revenue raising powers to be able to deliberate as an 
autonomous level of government, in order to effectively represent their constituents. Further, to 
ensure that upper levels of government do not interfere or limit the legislative or revenue raising 
powers of a city council, I argue that constitutional protection of these tools is required. As a result 
of Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), where the Ontario Legislature passed a law (which 
has been held to be constitutional) reducing the number of electoral wards from 47 to 25 in the 
middle of an election period, many commentators have argued that the current text of the 
Constitution can be interpreted to protect democratic civic elections. In my view, these 
commentators ignore the second component of civic democracy and the constraints on 
constitutional interpretation. I argue that such interpretations would not provide city councils with 
the required tools to effectively govern in their respective legislative jurisdictions, which dilutes 
 
9 See Simon Archer & Erin Sobat “The Better Local Government Act versus Municipal Democracy” (2021) 34 JL & 
Soc Pol’y 1 at 13 where the authors describe the Attorney General of Ontario’s position in Toronto v Ontario as 
“[s]ection 2(b) protects meaningful freedom of expression, not meaningful expression; there is no guaranteed 
protection of expression that is effective in achieving its objective” [emphasis in original]. 





effective representation of constituents within a city council. Thus, civic democracy extends 
beyond democratic civic elections and includes legislative and revenue raising powers for city 
councils.  
 
Therefore, if the Supreme Court of Canada accepts an alternative approach to a formal 
amendment in Toronto v Ontario, the issues relating to effective representation, legislative powers 
and revenue raising powers may remain unaddressed. In addition, failing to address the plenary 
power of the provincial legislatures over cities would continue to allow for interference with city 
councils, as discussed in Chapter 5, inhibiting the ability of city councils to effectively represent 
their constituents. In my opinion, constitutional protection for effective representation, without 
codified legislative or revenue raising powers, does not provide legal certainty or predictability in 
the text of the Constitution or for civic democracy. As a result, appropriate legislative and revenue 
raising powers are inextricably linked with the democratic right to vote in civic elections and, in 
fact, are required to ensure city councils have the tools to effectively represent their constituents.  
 
1.2 Defining Large Cities 
My analysis focuses on large Canadian cities.11 While I am of the view that citizens in 
smaller cities and municipalities may benefit from constitutionally recognized democratic rights,  
smaller cities and municipalities may not have the same capacity or resources to be grouped in the 
same analysis as large cities. What may benefit large cities, may not necessarily benefit their 
smaller counterparts and vice versa. Although there will be overlap between large cities and their 
smaller counterparts as they are all defined as “municipal institutions” in the Constitution Act, 
1867,12 this analysis focuses on large Canadian cities as defined below. 
 
 It may be argued that no principled line can be drawn between large cities and their smaller 
counterparts as all municipal institutions are similar in the sense that they are democratically 
elected, pass legislation, provide services and act for the benefit of their residents. I argue that this 
is a dated view which no longer reflects the current role of cities in Canada as a result of: (1) the 
 
11 When this thesis refers to “cities” it is referring to “large cities” as defined in Chapter 1. Further, references to city 
councils also refer to the city councils of large cities as defined in Chapter 1.  




dilution of Dillon’s rule, which limits the legislative power of local governments to the express 
powers granted to them by the relevant provincial legislature;13 (2) the urbanization of Canada; 
and (3) the fact that many large cities are currently governed under separate legislation than their 
smaller counterparts, in my view, a distinction must be drawn and, in fact, has already been drawn 
by many provincial legislatures. 
 
In my view, large cities are defined as those that have the tax base and resources to operate 
as an autonomous level of government and contribute to both the provincial and national economy. 
Generally, these are the capital cities of the relevant province;14 however, the term large cities 
would include non-capital cities that fulfil a similar role such as Calgary in Alberta, Saskatoon in 
Saskatchewan, Toronto in Ontario and Vancouver in British Columbia. These large cities have the 
tax base and resources to act as a constitutionally recognized level of government. In addition and 
as will be discussed in more detail shortly, grouping cities with their smaller counterparts, 
including smaller cities and municipalities, dilutes the position that cities are able to act as a 
constitutionally recognized level of government because their smaller counterparts do not have the 
resources to do so. A similar distinction has been drawn in the context of increasing or expanding 
the revenue raising powers of cities and the autonomy of cities.15 Further, provincial legislatures 
have recognized the unique role of cities by adopting city-specific legislation or city charters.  
 
In the context of municipal finance, Enid Slack and Harry Kitchen differentiate large cities 
from smaller cities or municipalities as cities have a much larger population, a “higher 
concentration of population and a population that is more heterogeneous in terms of social and 
economic circumstances.”16 In addition, “large cities are important generators of employment, 
wealth, and productivity growth” and “serve as regional hubs of people from adjacent communities 
who come to work, shop and use public services that are not available in their own communities.”17 
 
13 See Alexandra Flynn “Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal Authority: The case of Toronto’s Ward Boundary 
Review.” (2020) 56:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 271 at 281 [Flynn, “Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal Authority”], 
14 The capital cities in smaller provinces, such as the maritime provinces, and territories which have drastically smaller 
populations than the majority of Canadian provinces may not benefit from this analysis. 
15 See Enid Slack & Harry Kitchen, “More Tax Sources for Canada’s Largest Cities: Why, What, and How?” (Toronto: 
University of Toronto IMGF Papers on Municipal Finance and Governance No. 27, 2016) at 2 [Slack & Kitchen, 
“More Tax Sources”] 
16 Enid Slack & Harry Kitchen, “Financing large Cities and Metropolitan Areas” (Toronto: University of Toronto 





Lastly, Slack and Kitchen explain that the emerging “knowledge based economy” has placed 
innovation as the key to prosperity and that the majority of innovation occurs in large cities, where 
citizens enjoy the benefit of proximity.18 Slack and Kitchen further explain that smaller cities and 
municipalities, “may have to rely more heavily on provincial transfers compared to their larger 
counterparts”19 as smaller cities and municipalities may not have the tax base to accommodate the 
autonomy that comes with constitutional recognition.20 This means that smaller cities and 
municipalities must rely on funding from provincial legislatures, such as revenue sharing, as 
opposed to the revenue raising powers they possess, such as levying property taxes. Thus, smaller 
cities and municipalities undergo a fundamentally different analysis when discussing 
constitutional recognition as increasing the autonomy and legislative powers of smaller cities and 
municipalities may have adverse effects on upper levels of government.  
 
While it is outside the scope of this analysis to undertake an economic analysis on the 
required population size to allow cities to act as a constitutionally recognized level of government, 
I estimate that the line could be drawn at a population of 160,000 citizens, based on Canada’s 
smallest province – Prince Edward Island.21 Thus, whether citizens in municipalities or smaller 
cities ought to be afforded constitutionally entrenched democratic rights undertakes a 
fundamentally different analysis than their smaller counterparts based on population and resources. 
 
Arguments may be made that a distinction based on population may result in population 
fluctuations causing the population of cities to drop below the line drawn above and therefore, 
losing constitutional recognition. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the rising cost of 
housing in cities, the population growth of Canadian cities has slowed; however, they have 
 
18 Ibid. 
19 Slack & Kitchen, “More Tax Sources”, supra note 15 at 2. 
20 Ibid.  
21 See Prince Edward Island “PEI Population Report Quarterly” (2021) Online: Prince Edward Island 
<https://www.princeedwardisland.ca/en/information/finance/pei-population-report-quarterly> which shows that as of 
January 1, 2021 PEI’s population was 159,819. See also Gaetan Royer, FCM should pursue its quest for constitutional 
recognition, (2013) Online (pdf): Municipal World <http://www.timeforcities.ca/uploads/7/4/ 8/0/7480311/constitu 
tional_reform_municipal_world_oct_2013_gaetan_royer.pdf> at 1 where a similar distinction was drawn for 




continued to grow.22 Statistics Canada estimates that the growth of urban regions slowed from 
1.7% to 1.3% from July 1, 2019 to July 1, 2020.23 Further, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
has also affected international immigration to urban regions, or cities, which has affected the 
growth of these areas.24 Statistics Canada further notes that international immigration, despite 
being reduced as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, continued to account for 90.3% 
of growth in urban areas between July 1, 2019 and July 1, 2020.25 Rather, the COVID-19 pandemic 
appears to be pushing city-dwellers to nearby municipalities, resulting in urban sprawl and 
potentially, an increasing number of municipalities growing to cities that meet the threshold drawn 
above.26 Lastly, and as briefly discussed in 7.2.3.1, the increase in the cost of housing in cities is, 
in my opinion, an issue that cities, namely the city councils thereof, would be able to address as a 
constitutionally recognized level of government. Thus, in my view, there is currently no obvious 
reason to expect that the population of cities would be reduced to a level where they would be 
under the population distinction drawn above. 
 
 Secondly, another concern that arises from grouping cities together with smaller cities or 
municipalities is that it may have the unintended consequence of diluting the position cities are 
advocating for.27 For example, in 2004 when the former Prime Minister promised a “new deal for 
communities” as opposed to his originally intended “new deal for cities”, the former Prime 
Minister effectively ignored the distinct legal problems of cities, precipitating “further political 
 
22 See Statistics Canada, “Population growth in Canada’s large urban regions slows, but still outpaces that of other 
regions” (14 January 2021) Online: Statistics Canada <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-
quotidien/210114/dq210114a-eng.htm?HPA=1>. Further, the cities that experienced the largest amount of individuals 
moving to surrounding municipalities were Toronto (-50,375) and Montreal (-24,880), which are both substantially 
above the 160,000 population distinction which, in my view, renders the decrease in population of little concern to 
drawing a population distinction especially when the overall population increased (ibid). Further, the populations of 
Kelowna, Calgary and Saskatoon all increased by 1.9% during the same time period (ibid).  
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, “Freedom of the City: Canadian Cities and the Quest for Governmental Status” 
(2006) 44:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 409 at 413. See also Ran Hirschl, City, State: Constitutionalism and the Megacity 
(Toronto, Ontario: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2020) at 174 [Hirschl, “Constitutionalism and the Megacity”] where 




and legal difficulties for Canadian cities”28 such as creating competition between cities.29 Ron Levi 
and Mariana Valverde explain that:  
 
…the combined failure to recognize cities as legally, economically and socially 
distinct from other municipalities may produce a handful of politically powerful 
cities who will receive a special legal deal from their provincial governments, while 
others are consigned to the small town category. In turn, municipalities as a group 
may find it increasingly difficult to press their case, either provincially or 
federally.30 
 
Meehan, Chiarelli and Major also note that municipalities, even within the same province, do not 
always exercise the same functions,31 rendering the analysis of municipalities more individualistic, 
whereas large cities across Canada exercise similar, albeit not identical, legislative roles based on 
the distinct issues faced by large Canadian cities discussed herein. For example, smaller 
municipalities do not experience the same issues relating to gun crime, immigration and 
transportation as cities. The similarities between municipalities, as explained by Meehan, Chiarelli 
and Major, relate to the services they provide.32 I argue that, while cities play a similar role as a 
service provider,33 the legislative or policy creating role of city councils is much greater than their 
 
28 Levi & Valverde, supra note 27 at 414. See also House of Commons, Speech from the Throne, 37-3 (2 February 
2004) (Right Hon. Paul Martin) at 8. 
29 See Levi & Valverde, supra note 27 at 414. 
30 Ibid at 415.  
31 See Eugene Meehan Q.C., Robert Chiarelli & Marie France Major, “The Constitutional Legal Status of 
Municipalities 1849-2004: Success is a Journey, but also a Destination” (2007) 22 NCJL 1 at 14. 
32 Ibid where Meehan, Chiarelli & Major explain that “most municipalities have been assigned the following tasks: 
roads, streets, sewage systems, the taxation of land and buildings, the regulation of local land use, fire protection, the 
collection and disposal of residential solid waste, water systems, police and social services.”  
33 The service providing role of cities is larger than that of their smaller counterparts. For example, cities are often 
expected to have organics or composting programs, bike lanes, on-street parking, homeless shelters, outdoor 
washrooms, supervised consumption sites, public transportation and other services that are lesser or non-issues in 
smaller cities or municipalities. Further, cities are expected to be “smart cities” providing online payment options, a 
social media presence and resources to their constituents. For example, see Saskatoon “City Council Meeting – 
Preliminary Business Plan and Budget“ (Report on Saskatoon Police Service 2020/2020 Business Plan and Budget: 
25 November 2019), Online (pdf): City of Saskatoon <www.saskatoon.ca> at appendix 2, where City Council 
approved a request from the Saskatoon Police Service for $828,000 additional dollars for the 2020 operating budget 
and $807,600 in the 2021 operating budget as a result of the creation of a supervised consumption site (i.e., needle 
exchange) in the corporate limits of Saskatoon, a total cost of roughly $1.6 million over two years. See also Saskatoon 
(City) v Case, 2017 SKPC 72 at para 35 where the Saskatchewan Provincial Court commented in obiter dictum that 
“the City should… take notice and strive to provide available public facilities where the need is most apparent”. See 
also Levi & Valverde, supra note 27 at 440 where the authors discuss the role of cities in addressing the housing crisis, 
specifically noting that, “[i]t is widely acknowledges that a specific problem faced by cities, and not by most other 
municipalities, is the crisis created by rising house prices, higher rents, and a slowdown (or even a halt) to the provision 




smaller counterparts and extends to issues of national significance,34 resulting in the role of city 
councils or large cities being distinct from municipalities or smaller cities. As a result, cities must 
be separated from their smaller counterparts to acknowledge the distinct legislative role of cities 
in Canada. 
 
 Lastly, many provinces have acknowledged that large cities are unique from their smaller 
counterparts by enacting different and specific legislation for these cities as discussed in Chapter 
2. While all large cities are not characterized by city-specific legislation or a city charter, the cities 
that are governed by their own legislation provide a useful framework for defining large cities. As 
provincial legislatures have acknowledged that many cities require specific legislation, the 
distinction between large cities and their smaller counterparts has arguably already been identified. 
Other provinces, such as Saskatchewan, have adopted an act specifically for cities, however, those 
acts also include smaller cities that do not play the same national role as large cities. Thus, the 
distinction drawn by provincial legislatures is useful in defining large cities, but it is not the only 
criteria. The tax base and resources of the city must also be considered,35 as discussed above.  
  
 
34 See Dewing, Young & Tolley a supra note 8 at 2 and 6 where the writers note that “the problems of our large cities 
are no longer merely municipal or local problems… [t]he national goals of high employment, high growth, stable 
prices, viable international payments’ balance, the equitable distribution of rising incomes must be primarily 
accomplished within our cities.” 
35 For example, based on Royer, supra note 14 at 1, a distinction was drawn based on the population of Prince Edward 
Island. The Territory of Yukon, however, has a population of roughly 42, 507 as of September 30, 2020: see Yukon 
Bureau of Statistics “Population Report First Quarter, 2020” (January 2021) Online: Yukon 
<https://yukon.ca/sites/yukon.ca/files/ybs/population q3_2020_r_0_0.pdf.>. Despite this, the per capita allocation of 
Federal support to Yukon in 2020-2021 was $26,583, for a total of $1.2 billion in federal transfers to Yukon, whereas 
PEI’s per capita allocation of Federal support for 2020-2021 was $4,344 for a total of $731 million in federal transfers: 
see Government of Canada “Major federal transfers” (last modified 2 February 2017) Online: Government of Canada 
>https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/federal-transfers/major-federal-transfers.html>. Thus, 
Yukon relies heavily on Federal funding which makes it difficult to argue that Yukon has the population and resources 
to act as an autonomous level of government. The same can be said for the Northwest Territories, which received 
$32,768 in per capita federal transfers, totaling $1.5 billion and Nunavut, which received $45,205 in per capita federal 
transfers, totaling $1.8 billion (ibid). Thus, the economy and resources of a city must be considered in determining 
whether that city can act as an autonomous level of government. In contrast, Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and 
Saskatchewan received $1,497 in per capita transfers and Manitoba received $3,317, showing that these provinces 




2. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF CITIES 
The Constitution is the supreme law of Canada and all laws, whether federal or provincial, 
must be consistent with the Constitution.36 This Chapter outlines the current treatment of cities 
within the Constitution and discusses how cities, and the constituents thereof, are included in, and 
excluded from, constitutional protection. As this analysis is focused on civic democracy, the rights 
of citizens discussed herein are limited to the provisions of the Constitution that are relevant to 
civic democracy. This Chapter discusses the current lack of constitutional recognition of cities, 
and the city councils thereof, and the historical context that has led to this reality. Further, I argue 
that the changing role of cities has rendered the historical legal principles, that continue to apply 
to cities today, ill-suited to the modern role of cities and city councils. 
 
2.1 The Changing Role of Cities and the Need for Constitutional Protection 
 To understand the current position of cities within Canada’s governmental structure and 
the Constitution, a brief historical context is required. Since cities and smaller municipalities in 
Canada have the same origins and are both defined as municipal institutions pursuant to section 
92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the historical context discussed herein applies to all 
municipalities in Canada, whether a city or otherwise.  
 
 As municipalities in Canada are “the direct descendants of English municipal 
corporations”, an understanding of the role of English municipal corporations is required.37 “In 
Britain, the monarch is the government; everything the British government does is done in the 
name of the monarch.”38 Thus, government in Britain was not always democratic as it acted for 
the Monarch, as opposed to its citizens. As explained by David Marquand, “[d]emocracy came to 
Britain slowly, haltingly and late.”39 Further, Marquand explains that the first general election in 
Britain where every citizen had the right to vote, and only vote once, was in 1950.40 Thus, even 
though municipal institutions were not recognized as government,41 but rather as an “unusual 
 
36 See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1 at s 52.  
37 See Andrew Sancton, Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
2011) at 3-5 [Sancton, “Canadian Local Government”]. 
38 Ibid.  
39 David Marquand, Democracy in Britain (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) at 270. 
40 Ibid  
41 See Sancton, “Canadian Local Government”, supra note 37 at 5 where Sancton notes that municipalities were “quite 




variant of a private business corporation” which acted on their own behalf and that of their 
residents within the limits of their statutory authority,42 they were not originally designed to be 
democratically accountable but to further administrative aims.43 This tradition carried over into 
Canada by virtue of the nineteenth-century doctrine of municipal authority which has become to 
be known as Dillon’s rule.44  
 
Alexandra Flynn aptly describes Dillon’s rule as, “…a relationship between municipalities 
and provinces that is like that of a parent and child, with provinces keeping a “watchful eye” on 
how municipal powers are exercised in concern that they will be inappropriately used.”45 This 
means that municipal authority exists by virtue of provincial legislatures and can only be exercised 
in the manner authorized by statute.46 Dillon’s rule reflects four key principles of municipal 
institutions: (1) they have no constitutional status; (2) they are creatures of statute; (3) they have 
no independent autonomy; and (4) they only have the powers conferred by statute.47 While strides 
 
42 Ibid at 4 and 5.  
43 Ibid at 3 to 5. See also Flynn, “Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal Authority”, supra note 13 at 281, citing 
Meehan, Chiarelli & Major, supra note 31 at 4-5. See also Mariana Valverde “Games of Jurisdiction: How Local 
Governance Realities Challenge the “Creatures of the Province” Doctrine” (2021) 43 JL & Soc Pol’y 21 at 36 where 
the writer, citing the overall thesis in Engin F. Isin, Cities Without Citizens: The Modernity of the City as a Corporation 
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1992), explains that “municipal incorporation in central Canada was invented not to 
empower citizens or create democracy but rather to further colonial administrative aims”. See also Ladore v Bennett, 
[1939] AC 468, [1939] DLR 1, [1939] 2 WWR 566 (PC) where the Judicial Committee held “[s]overeign within its 
constitutional powers, the Province is charged with the local government of its inhabitants by means of municipal 
institutions… If corporation A or B or C is unable to function satisfactorily it would appear to be elementary that the 
Legislature must have the power to provide that the functions of one or all should be transferred to some other body 
or corporation. For this purpose, as the corporation would be created by the province, so it could be dissolved, and a 
new corporation created as a municipal institution to perform the duties performed by the old.” 
44 See, for example, Flynn, “Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal Authority”, supra note 13 at 281. See also Valverde, 
supra note 43 at 34 where the author explains that, the Dillon doctrine of limited, prescribed municipal powers 
dominated Canadian jurisprudence from the 1880’s onward.  
45 Flynn, “Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal Authority”, supra note 13 at 281-2. See also Felix Hoehn “The Limits 
of Local Authority Over Recreational Cannabis” (2019) 50:2 Ottawa L Rev 325 at 337 where the author explains 
“…modern municipal statutes are phrased in a manner that counters the narrow approach of Dillon’s rule, and recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have also endorsed more liberal approaches to interpreting the scope of 
power of local governments.” 
46 See Flynn, “Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal Authority”, supra note 13 at 281-2. 
47 Ibid citing, East York (Borough) v Ontario (Attorney General), [1997] OJ No 3064 at 14, 34 OR (3d) 789 (ONSC) 
[East York (ONSC)], aff’d in Citizens’ Legal Challenge v Ontario (Attorney General), [1997] OJ No 4100, 36 OR 
(3d) 733 (ONCA) [East York (ONCA)], leave to appeal to SCC refused April 2, 1998. where the ONCA held that 
provinces can abolish cities or their powers unilaterally. See also Felix Hoehn & Michael Stevens “Local Governments 
and the Crown’s Duty to Consult” (2018) 55:4 Alta L Rev 971 at 981 where the authors explain that, based on East 
York (ONSC), municipalities and therefore cities, “have no independent autonomy – legislation may abolish or repeal 




have been made, as discussed below, Dillon’s rule is still generally applicable to municipalities 
and cities in Canada despite the significantly increased democratic legislative role of city councils. 
 
 Dillon’s rule, however, is not suited to the current reality faced by city councils. To quote 
David Miller, a former mayor of Toronto: 
 
The demands on cities are more complex than ever before, and yet our powers and 
our revenue sources have not evolved in a parallel way. We need the funding, the 
legislative tools and the autonomy to be able to deal with the opportunities and 
challenges that come with our growth.48 
 
Unlike in the nineteenth century, the majority of the population currently lives in large cities.49 
Meehan, Chiarelli and Major explain that, “[t]he reality today is that urban communities account 
for close to four-fifths of Canada’s population and economic activity.”50 As a result, “the problems 
of our large cities are no longer merely municipal or local problems… [t]he national goals of high 
employment, high growth, stable prices, viable international payments’ balance, the equitable 
distribution of rising incomes must now be primarily accomplished within our cities.”51 To meet 
these national objectives placed on cities, entrenching civic democracy within the Constitution is 
not only eminently desirable, but essential.  
 
 Meehan, Chiarelli and Major further explain that modern local governments are “expected 
to perform the dual roles of “service provider and maker of local public policy”52 noting that, “[i]f 
local governments were to somehow disappear from the scene, most city inhabitants would find 
themselves without access to the most basic necessities: water, waste disposal, fire and police 
 
48 David Miller “Parliament and democracy in the 21st century: a place at the table for cities [Revised speech to the 
Empire Club]” (2004) 27:3 Canadian Parliamentary Rev at 1.  
49 Dewing, Young & Tolley, Supra note 8 at 2. 
50 Supra note 31 at 6 where the author states “Canada is one of the most urbanized countries in the world: close to 
80% live in cities.” The author continues to state “[i]n light of such numbers, one cannot deny the fact that the 
economic destiny of Canada is closely linked and in fact depends on, the fortunes of our urban centres.” (Ibid at 8 to 
9). See also H. Plecher, “Urbanization in Canada 2019” (11 November 2020) Online: Statista 
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/271208/urbanization-incanada/#:~:text=In%202019%2C%2081. 48%20percent 
%20of,in%20Canada%20lived%20in%20cities.> where the author concludes that 81.48% of the total Canadian 
population lives in cities.  
51 Dewing, Young & Tolley, supra note 8 at 2 and 6. 




protection, roads and public transit.”53 Further, Meehan, Chiarelli and Major note that the policy 
role of local governments, as set out in provincial legislation, has expanded to include provisions 
such as “providing good government” and “develop and maintain safe and viable communities” 
or “to be responsible and accountable governments with respect to matters within their 
jurisdiction.”54 
 
To support this dual role, Meehan, Chiarelli and Major advocate for enhanced legal 
authority and fiscal authority for municipal institutions and explains that the recognition of 
municipal institutions as an order of government in the Constitution is an option to allow municipal 
institutions to “…operate more efficiently and to compete with the global economy…”.55 While 
Meehan, Chiarelli and Major raise a formal amendment to the Constitution as a means to an end, 
they conclude that “…what municipalities are seeking is increased consultation/input with other 
levels of government on matters that directly affect them; the legislative tools necessary… and 
new revenue generating tools.”56 This analysis builds upon and distinguishes the position of 
Meehan, Chiarelli and Major, in light of the interference that occurred in Toronto v Ontario, 
demonstrating that consultation, without constitutional protection, has not granted the protection 
that civic democracy requires, including increased legislative and revenue raising powers.  
 
 In addition to growing city populations, upper levels of government have also increased 
the legislative role of city councils by downloading or offloading significant regulation to 
municipal institutions.57 For example, and very recently, upper levels of government have 
 
53 Ibid at 14.  
54 Ibid. Meehan, Chiarelli & Major also explain that local governments, including city councils, are more accountable 
as they are the closest level of government to their constituents and the result of city councils decision making are 
readily apparent in the community, which allows citizens to gauge whether they are being effectively represented or 
not (ibid at 11, 12 and 13). If citizens do not feel they are being effectively represented, this can be dealt with at the 
ballot box. See e.g. The Cities Act, SS 2002 c C-11.1 at s 3(1)(a) [The Cities Act]. See also The City of Toronto Act at 
s 1(1) [The City of Toronto Act]. 
55 Supra note 31 at 35 and 36.  
56 Ibid. This is further supported by Dewing, Young & Tolley, supra note 8 at 1 where the authors state “[t]he 
municipalities’ quest for constitutional recognition has been largely motivated by their search for practical ways of 
meeting the increasing demands upon their fiscal resources. They are not inherently interested in constitutional 
recognition (unlike Aboriginal peoples), but see it as one means of solving their financial problems. Municipalities 
have, however, given clear signals that they would be just as ready to deal with their fiscal situation outside the 
constitutional debate.” 
57 See Dewing, Young & Tolley, supra note 8 at 17 where the authors explain that “[s]ince 1986, the provinces have 





offloaded regulation of transportation network companies ("TNCs”),58 cannabis59 and limited 
handgun regulations60 to municipal institutions. Transportation, gun crime and cannabis all present 
much larger issues for cities, and therefore city councils, than smaller cities and municipalities.61 
Further, as cannabis and handguns were previously, and continue to be, regulated by Parliament, 
it shows the capacity of city councils to regulate issues that are of national significance and the 
desire of upper levels of government for city councils to do so.  
 
2.2 Recognition of the Increased Legislative Role of Cities 
 Parliament, provincial legislatures and the judiciary have recognized the broad legislative 
role of cities in various ways. Whether it be a statement in the House of Commons, codifying broad 
legislative powers in municipal acts or interpreting municipal acts to provide deference to city 
councils, courts and upper levels of government have placed city councils in a position to 
legislatively address or regulate issues of national significance. While the majority of 
jurisprudence combines city councils and their smaller counterparts together for an analysis of 
their legislative role, the legislative role of city councils is distinct. As discussed further, the 
national issues affecting Canadian society such as drugs, guns and immigration have a significantly 
 
municipalities, which in turn pass the costs on to the consumers. This practice is often referred to as downloading. 
Graham, Phillips and Maslove argue that downloading may occur through one of two ways: either the government 
mandates that another level of government provide a specific service and does not provide compensation for doing so; 
or the government simply discontinues the provision of a service, leaving another level of government to fill the gap” 
and that “[t]he most severe example of downloading occurred in January 1997 when Ontario’s Progressive 
Conservative government ‘initiated massive changes to the governing and funding arrangements for education, 
welfare, and a wide range of urban services, consulting neither the municipalities nor their associations.’ The province 
withdrew its funding from a number of areas, including social housing, public transit and ambulance services, while 
maintaining control over the design and implementation of those programs. As a result, municipalities were burdened 
with new responsibilities, but no additional funding or real political autonomy.” 
58 See The Vehicles for Hire Act, SS 2019, c V-3.2. See also Metro Taxi Ltd. et al v Ottawa (City), 2018 ONSC 509 
where a class action lawsuit was certified as a result of regulations relating to transportation network companies. 
59 See The Cannabis Control (Saskatchewan) Act, SS 2018, c C-2.111.  
60 See Bill C-21, An Act to amend certain Acts and to make certain consequential Amendments (firearms),2nd Sess, 
43rd Parl, 2021, (first reading on February 16, 2021) which was tabled by the Federal Government to amend the 
Firearms Act, SC 1995, c 39 to allow municipalities to pass bylaws banning handguns within their jurisdiction, a 
power not previously granted to municipalities or cities. For a further example, see Bill C-6 An Act to Amend the 
Criminal Code (conversion therapy) 2nd Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 (first reading on October 1, 2020) where conversion 
therapy will become a criminal offence (if passed) and cities have taken the initiative to pass bylaws regulating the 
same. For example, see City of Calgary Bylaw No. 20M2020, The Prohibited Businesses Bylaw at section 3 and 
Schedule A with prohibits businesses engaged in certain forms of conversion therapy. This example shows the national 
importance of a city council’s legislative ability.   
61 See Statistics Canada, “Firearm-Related violent crime” (2018) Online: Statistics Canada 
<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/89-28-0001/2018001/article/00004-eng.pdf?st=nikIrPIJ> which shows the 




larger effect on cities than their smaller counterparts. As discussed further in 2.3.1, city councils 
are now democratically accountable to their electorate, and are being granted increased legislative 
roles, resulting in the right to effective representation within a city council being fundamental to 
Canadian democracy.  
 
2.2.1 Parliament has Recognized Cities’ Legislative Role 
While Parliament is generally not directly involved in municipal governance, numerous 
federal political actors have expressed the importance of cities in Canada. Paul Martin, the former 
Prime Minister, in his 2004 Throne Speech stated that: “Canada’s municipalities can play a crucial 
role in helping the Government meet its national priorities – for the integration of immigrants, for 
opportunities for Aboriginal Canadians living in urban centres, for tackling homelessness, and for 
emergency preparedness and response.”62 Further, in 2004, Paul Martin described what he referred 
to as a “new deal for communities” which meant that, “…city hall has a real seat at the table of 
national change.”63 In 2017, the current Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Justin Trudeau 
stated: “[w]e know our country is only as strong as the towns and cities we’re made of. We’re only 
as strong as our rec centres and social housing, our wastewater and public transit. We heard you 
when you said you needed a strong partner in Ottawa.”64 Notwithstanding these comments, little 
has been done by the Federal government to support cities, or the city councils thereof, in fulfilling 
the increased and increasing legislative role they exercise.65 While the Federal government has 
proposed bills to increase municipal autonomy, the other tools required to promote civic 
democracy, such as increased revenue raising powers, have not yet followed.66 In fact, many 
 
62 Martin, supra note 28 at 8. 
63 Ibid.  
64 See Flynn, “Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal Authority”, supra note 13 at 272. 
65 Ibid where the author notes that the comments from the former and current Prime Minister, “suggest that 
municipalities have a direct government-to-government relationship with the federal government. But the remarks lie 
in stark contrast to the tattered 150-year-old pages of the Constitution Act, 1867, where a city or town can do whatever 
the province empowers them to do, but not more.”  
66 See Meehan, Chiarelli & Major, supra note 31 at 8-9 where the authors state that “[w]eak revenue growth of local 
government has been accompanied by federal and provincial downloading of services. The passing of responsibilities 
(decentralization) has been founded on cost-cutting initiatives by upper levels of governments – the provincial and 
federal authorities have passed on to municipalities responsibility for services they no longer wish to fund. If 
responsibilities are passed on, it makes sense they be passed on responsibly – passing a responsibility while 
withholding funding is the literal exact opposite of passing the buck: the responsibility is passed, but not the buck” 
and “[t]he basic problem associated with the downward flow of responsibilities has simply been that it has not been 




federal legislative or policy changes have the, presumably unintended, consequence of 
compounding issues faced by city councils. 
 
 In addition to TNC, cannabis and handgun regulations, federal immigration policies67 have 
led to an influx of newcomers who typically settle in large cities.68 Generally, cities, and therefore 
city councils, are left to accommodate newcomers with little assistance from upper levels of 
government.69 Many newcomers have professional degrees; however, provincial regulations have 
not recognized many foreign educational institutions, nor do they provide “equivalency programs” 
for certain degrees, leaving city councils to identify or create employment opportunities for those 
newcomers.70 Currently, city councils have some tools to do so, such as approving tax abatement 
agreements to attract businesses and create employment opportunities,71 however, these 
agreements result in a reduction of property tax revenue to address issues of national significance. 
Further, when a federal tax deduction for businesses providing downtown parking was removed, 
cities were left to sort out significant street congestion.72 Therefore, federal laws may result in 
unintended outcomes that city councils are left to regulate while the impact on municipalities is 
minimal, if there is any impact at all.  
 
2.2.2 Provinces Have Recognized Cities’ Legislative Role 
Provincial legislatures have also recognized the important and increasing legislative role 
of city councils. In 2002, prior to the Saskatchewan legislature passing The Cities Act, the 
Honourable Mister Osika noted that “city governments are in the best position to make local 
decisions for the benefit of their residents.”73 Provincial legislatures have shown this by: (1) 
 
67 This thesis does not take a position on the current federal immigration policies. Rather, this thesis argues that the 
unintended consequences of Canada’s federal immigration policies have left cities to attempt to identify and create 
employment for these newcomers.  
68 See Hirschl, “Constitutionalism and the Megacity”, supra note 27 at 174.  
69 See Enid Slack & Harry Kitchen “Special Study: New Finance Options for Municipal Governments” (2002) 51:6 
Can Tax J 2215 at 2224 and 2272 [Slack & Kitchen, “New Finance Options”]. 
70 See Hirschl, “Constitutionalism and the Megacity”, supra note 27 at 283 where the author explains that cities may 
be in a better position to create jobs than upper levels of argument. To add to this analysis, cities would require the 
financial and resource capacity to do this, which is why a formal amendment to the Constitution is required.  
71 See e.g. The Cities Act, supra note 54 at s 244(3).  
72 See Dewing, Young & Tolley, supra note 8 at 5. 
73 Saskatchewan “Bill No. 23 – The Cities Amendment Act, 2003” 2nd Reading, Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 
24-3(14 May 2003) (Hon. Mr. Osika) at 1088. See also Hirschl, “Constitutionalism and the Megacity”, supra note 27 




codifying broad legislative power for city councils;74 and (2) granting immunity (or partial 
immunity) for policy decisions made by city councils.75 As a result of these provisions, the 
judiciary’s ability to quash bylaws is generally limited76 as it cannot override a policy decision 
merely because it disagrees with the decision made by a city council.77 Thus, the judiciary cannot 
interfere with a city council’s policy decisions, or ostensibly the effective representation of its 
constituents, as city councils are legislatively protected in making decisions on behalf of the 
electorate. Although provincial legislatures have granted city councils significantly broader 
legislative powers than they once had, provincial legislatures have continued to reserve themselves 
the power to limit, or interfere in, a city council’s legislative role, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
 Provincial legislatures have also recognized a distinction between cities and municipalities. 
This proposition is self-evident as many provincial legislatures have adopted separate legislation 
and regulations for cities as compared to municipalities. Provincial legislatures have done this in 
three ways. First, certain legislatures have adopted general city legislation that applies only to 
cities. In Saskatchewan, for example, municipalities are incorporated and governed by The 
 
74See e.g. The Cities Act, supra note 54 at s 6(1) which states “[t[he power of a city to pass bylaws is to be interpreted 
broadly for the purposes of: (a) providing a broad authority to its council and respecting the council’s right to govern 
the city in whatever manner the council considers appropriate, within the jurisdiction provided to the council by law; 
and (b) enhancing the council’s ability to respond to present and future issues in the city.” See also The City of Toronto 
Act, supra note 54 at s 6(1) which states that “[t]he powers of the City under this or any other Act shall be interpreted 
broadly so as to confer broad authority on the City to enable the City to govern its affairs as it considers appropriate 
and to enhance the city’s ability to respond to municipal issues.” See also Nanaimo (City) v Rascal Trucking Ltd, 2000 
SCC 13 at para 35, [2000] 1 SCR 342 [Nanaimo Trucking] where the SCC held that “municipalities balance complex 
and divergent interests” in decision making. See also Alexandra Flynn “With Great(er) Power Comes Great(er) 
Responsibility: Indigenous Rights and Municipal Autonomy” (2021) 34 JL & Soc Pol’y 111 at 114 [Flynn, 
“Indigenous Rights and Municipal Autonomy”]. 
75 See e.g. The City of Toronto Act, supra note 54 at s 213. See also The Cities Act, supra note 54 at s 322.. Further, 
see Gerald E. Frug, “The City as a Legal Concept” (1980) 93 Harv L Rev 1057 at 1109-20 for a discussion of how 
Dillon’s rule previously required doubt in a city councils exercise of power to be resolved against the exercise of that 
legislative power. 
76 See Meehan, Chiarelli & Major, supra note 31 at 22-26 and the accompanying footnotes for a review of the grounds 
to challenge bylaws. Further, as a result of the SCC’s watershed decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, 44 DLR (4th) 1 [Vavilov] “jurisdiction” is no longer a ground of judicial review, 
but acts as a legal constrains in the Vavilov reasonableness analysis.  
77 See e.g. 232169 Ontario Inc. (Farouz Sheesha Café) v Toronto (City), 2017 ONCA 484 at para 25, 67 MPLR (5th) 
183 [Sheesha Café (ONCA)]. See also the lower court decision 2326169 Ontario Inc. v The City of Toronto, 2016 
ONSC 6221 at para 55, 59 MPLR (5th) 279 [Sheesha Café (ONSC)] where Goldstein J. held “Council therefore made 
a policy choice. The by-law was passed by an overwhelming majority of city councilors. It was an exercise of 
democratic decision making. It is not part of this Court’s function to overturn the will of elected officials by, in effect, 
second-guessing their policy decisions” [emphasis added] and ibid at para 32 where Goldstein J. held, “[r]ules of 




Municipalities Act78 or The Northern Municipalities Act,79 whereas cities are incorporated and 
governed pursuant to The Cities Act. Second, certain legislatures have adopted city-specific 
legislation. Ontario, for example, has passed The City of Toronto Act and The City of Ottawa Act,80 
whereas the smaller cities and municipalities are governed by The Municipal Act.81 Lastly, certain 
legislatures have adopted city charters, which generally have the same purpose and effect as city-
specific legislation.82 City charters in Canada have been passed in Vancouver,83 Montreal84 and 
Winnipeg.85 In addition, the Alberta Legislature has created city charters for Calgary86 and 
Edmonton,87 as regulations to The Municipal Government Act.88 The Calgary Charter Regulation 
and Edmonton Charter Regulation supersede the application of Alberta’s Municipal Government 
Act, which applies to all cities and municipalities in Alberta, in the event of conflicting 
provisions.89 
 
 Evinced by city-specific legislation is the fact that legislatures have attempted to 
accommodate the unique role of cities, although these attempts have not been overly successful. 
For example, after substantial revisions to The City of Toronto Act in 2006, Ontario’s Minister of 
Municipal Affairs stated, seven-years later, that: 
 
[t]here were moments when we were having a beer during the more casual side of this 
process, and we were dreaming about just the incredible things that could potentially come 
from this… To be honest with you, here we are, how many years later, and not too many 
things have come forward.90  
 
78 SS 2005 c M-36.1 [The Saskatchewan Municipalities Act]  
79 SS 2010, c N-5.2. 
80 SO, 1999, c. 14, Sched. E [The City of Ottawa Act]. See also City of St Johns Act, RSNL 1990, c C-17. See also 
City of Mount Pearl Act, RSNL 1990, c C-16. See also City of Corner Brook Act; RSNL 1990, c C-15. See also City 
of Lloydminster Act, SA 2005, c C-13.5. See also City of Hamilton Act, SO 1999 c 14, Sch C. See also The City of 
Flin Flon Act, SM 1989-90, c 72. See also the City of Greater Sudbury Act, SO 1999, c 14, Sch A. See also the City 
of Lloydminster Act, SS 2004, c C-11.2. 
81 SO 2001, c. 25 [The Ontario Municipal Act]. 
82 See Andrew Sancton “The False Panacea of City Charters? A Political Perspective on the Case of Ontario” (2016) 
9:3 SPP Research Papers at 7 [Sancton, “False Panacea”]. 
83 See Vancouver Charter, SBC 1953 C 55. 
84 See Charter of Ville De Montreal, Metropolis of Quebec, 2000, c. 56, Sch. 1; 2017, c. 16, s. 1.  
85 See The City of Winnipeg Charter, SM 2002, c. 39.  
86 See City of Calgary Charter, 2018 Regulation, 40/2018 [Calgary Charter Regulation].  
87 See City of Edmonton Charter, 2018 Regulation, 39/2018 [Edmonton Charter Regulation] 
88 RSA 2000, c M-26 [Alberta’s Municipal Government Act]  
89 See Alberta’s Municipal Government Act, supra note 88 at s 141.5(3). See also Calgary Charter Regulation, supra 
note 86 at s 3. See also Edmonton Charter Regulation, supra note 87 at s 3.  




What is particularly concerning in the context of Toronto, is that the Ontario Legislature, 
commonly referred to as Queen’s Park, amalgamated numerous municipalities to create the current 
“megacity” that is Toronto.91 Thus, Queen’s Park created the largest and most populous city in 
Canada and has not yet granted Toronto the tools it needs to fulfill its nationally significant role in 
Canadian society.  
 
 City-specific legislation or city-charters continue to leave cities subject to the plenary 
power of provincial legislatures.92 Even if additional powers are granted to cities, those powers 
can be repealed by the provincial legislature by majority vote. Although certain provincial 
legislatures have adopted consultation provisions, they have not generally been enforced by the 
courts,93 nor are they enforceable as a constitutional convention.94 For example, The City of 
Toronto Act sets out consultation requirements for matters of mutual interest;95 however, despite 
the lack of consultation in Toronto v Ontario, the mid-election ward boundary alteration was 
upheld by the ONCA.96 Although increased consultation has been identified by Meehan, Chiarelli 
and Major as the main desire of municipal institutions,97 there is considerable doubt that further 
consultation would be effective without constitutional protection as the courts have not struck 
down laws based on a lack of consultation with cities.98 Therefore, while city-specific legislation 





91 This led to the constitutional challenge in East York (ONSC), supra note 47. 
92 Ibid at 1.  
93 See Toronto v Ontario (ONCA), supra note 3 at paras 106-107 for the dissenting opinion on the consultation 
provision in The City of Toronto Act.  
94 See East York (ONSC), supra note 47 at 14. See also Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753 
at 799, 125 DLR (3d) 1 [Patriation Reference] where the SCC holds “[a] close look at some other cases and issues 
raised on the so-called crystallization reveals no support for the contention.” 
95 Supra note 54 at s 1(2) and (3). See also The Cities Act, supra note 54 at s 223 for a similar, but different, provision 
in Saskatchewan’s city legislation.  
96See Toronto v Ontario (ONSC), supra note 3, at para 70.   
97 See Meehan, Chiarelli & Major, supra note 31 at 35.  
98 See East York (ONSC), supra note 47 at 12-13 where the ONSC states “[t]he evidence supports the conclusion that 
Bill 103 simply appears on government’s legislative agenda with little or no, public notice and without any attempt to 
enter into meaningful consultation with those people who would be most affected by it – the more than 2,000,000 
inhabitants of Metro Toronto. Such, however, is the prerogative of government. The court has made it clear that there 
is no obligation on government to consult with the electorate before it introduces legislation. It may exercise its powers 




2.2.3 Courts’ Have Recognized Cities’ Legislative Role 
 Further, although the judiciary continues to recognize cities as “creatures of the 
province,”99 they have acknowledged the broad bylaw making powers of municipal institutions 
and defer to the legislative decisions of city councils. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
commented that modern municipal legislation, which has increased the legislative authority of 
cities, reflects the true nature of modern municipalities and cities: 
 
The evolution of the modern municipality has produced a shift in the proper 
approach to the interpretation of statutes empowering municipalities. The notable 
shift in the nature of municipalities was acknowledged by McLachlin J. (as she then 
was) in Shell Canada Products v Vancouver… The “benevolent” and “strict” 
construction dichotomy has been set aside, and a broad and purposive approach to 
the interpretation of municipal powers has been embraced… This interpretive 
approach has evolved concomitantly with the modern method of drafting municipal 
legislation. Several provinces have moved away from the practice of granting 
municipalities specific powers in particular areas, choosing instead to confer them 
broad authority over generally defined matters… This shift in legislative drafting 
reflects the true nature of modern municipalities which require greater flexibility in 
fulfilling their statutory purposes.100 
 
Combined with the reform of municipal legislation providing that a local governments role is to 
provide “good government” and to “responsible and accountable governments”, United Taxi and 
Catalyst Paper illustrate the important governmental role played by municipalities, especially 
cities, due to the significant portion of the population contained therein. Further, United Taxi and 
Catalyst Paper demonstrate the dilution of Dillon’s rule and supports constitutional recognition of 
cities as an important level of government.  
 
99 As mentioned, this is the result of cities and smaller municipalities both being treated as “municipal institutions” 
pursuant to section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867.  
100 United Taxi Drivers Fellowship of Southern Alberta v Calgary (City), 2004 SCC 19 at para 6, [2004] 1 SCR 485 
[United Taxi]. See also Catalyst Paper Corp. v North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2 at paras 19 and 30, [2012] 1 
SCR 5 [Catalyst Paper] where the SCC explains that city councils, in passing bylaws, may “consider broader social, 
economic and political factors that are relevant to the electorate” which as noted by the Hon Mr. Osika, supra note 73 
at 1088, city councils are in the best position to determine. See also Friske v Arborfield (Town), 2017 SKQB 297 at 
para 27, 67 MPLR (5th) 31 where Turcotte J. held “[t]he Court is to interpret the power of a municipality to pass 
bylaws broadly.” See also Shell Canada Products v Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 SCR 231 at 255, 110 DLR (4th) 1 
[Shell Canada] where McLachlin J.’s dissenting opinion explains that “legislatures introduce clauses such as these for 
the very purpose or permitting municipalities themselves to decide what is the in the best interests of their citizenry” 
which became the majority decision in Nanaimo Trucking, supra note 74 at paras 36-7. See also Flynn, “Operative 





A further example of the judiciary recognizing broad city legislative powers occurred when 
Toronto banned the smoking or vaping of hookah in hookah lounges as a health concern for 
employees and citizens. Regarding this, the ONCA upheld the decision of the ONSC, holding:  
 
The application judge was alive to the hardship the passage of the by-law may 
occasion for the appellants. However, he recognized that it was not the court’s role 
to second-guess the policy decisions made by elected officials. The City of Toronto 
Act specifically immunizes by-laws against judicial review for reasonableness: s. 
213. The application judge was limited to determining the legal validity of the city’s 
bylaw, and he made no errors in doing so.101 
 
Thus, while city councils do not have carte blanche, they are provided with significant discretion 
in passing bylaws, policies and resolutions. This, however, does not prevent provincial legislatures 
from abolishing or limiting the legislative powers of city councils that are currently codified in 
provincial legislation, without consultation.  
 
 Although deference to the policy decisions of government, including city councils, is a step 
in the right direction, it has also worked against cities. In East York (ONSC), the ONSC dealt with 
a challenge to Bill 103, The City of Toronto Act, 1997 (“Bill 103”) which, as discussed in 4.2.2, 
combined numerous municipalities to form the “megacity” of Toronto that exists today.102 In 
reviewing the constitutionality of Bill 103, the ONSC held that, “[i]t is not the role of the court to 
pass on the wisdom of the legislation … [s]pecifically, it is not for the court to determine whether 
the megacity will be good, or bad, for the inhabitants” of Toronto. 103 Thus, deference to legislative 
decision making is a double-edged sword as it has allowed interference with civic democracy, as 
well as promoting it.  
 
 The modern reality is that cities house the majority of the population in Canada, resulting 
in the legislative role of city councils extending beyond mere local concerns. The increased 
legislative role of city councils has been recognized through broad authority to pass bylaws and 
significant discretion in making decisions for the benefit of their residents. While this has been 
 
101 Sheesha Café (ONCA), supra note 77 at para 25. 
102 See East York (ONSC), supra note 47 at 2.  




acknowledged by Parliament, provincial legislatures and the judiciary, a meaningful constitutional 
amendment to protect a city council’s democratic legislative role has yet to occur. This has left 
city councils, and the voters thereof, susceptible to upper levels of government interfering with 
civic democracy. 
 
2.3 Where Cities are Included in the Constitution 
 Cities are included in the Constitution in two ways. First, municipal institutions are 
mentioned in section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Second, municipal institutions have been 
interpreted to be government actors for the purposes of the application of the Charter. As 
mentioned, cities and all other types of municipalities are treated the same under the Constitution, 
as they are universally incorporated in the term “municipal institutions” which appears in section 
92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867.104 Therefore, this analysis applies to large cities, small cities 
and municipalities.  
 
 2.3.1 Section 92(8): The Plenary Power of the Provincial Legislatures 
 Section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides provincial legislatures with plenary 
power over municipal institutions. In 1909, the Ontario Divisional Court considered the term 
“municipal institution” and held that:  
 
[t]he term “municipal institution” appears intended to give compendious expression 
to a state of affairs which exists in a defined populated area, the inhabitants of which 
are incorporated and entrusted with the privileges of local self-government or 
administration responsive to the needs, the health, the safety, the comfort, and the 
orderly government of an organized community… Having created the municipality, 
the Province is able to confer upon that body any or every power which the Province 
itself possess under [section 92]105 
 
While this interpretation of the term “municipal institution” is 112 years old, it continues to outline 
the plenary relationship between provinces and cities to date. In 1998, the ONSC adopted the same 
view, holding that:  
 
 
104 See pages 24-25, below, for more information on this topic.  




Since at least 1896 the law has been clear that s. 92(8) gives provincial Legislatures 
the right to “create a legal body for the management of municipal affairs” which 
includes the amalgamation of such bodies and the establishment of their geographic 
boundaries… Section 92(8) gives the Legislature the power to delegate to 
municipalities any authority which is conferred on it by s. 92 and to withdraw any 
authority previously delegated, and either retain it, or redelegate it to another 
body.106 
 
Further, Ran Hirschl has explained that “‘municipal institutions’ are creatures of provincial 
governments, controlled exclusively by provincial authority (through s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 
1867) alongside ‘charities,’ ‘eleemosynary institutions’ (non-profits), ‘shops,’ and ‘saloons and 
taverns.’”107 The above jurisprudence makes it clear that the Constitution does not treat municipal 
institutions as a level of government, but rather, a creature of provincial legislatures.  
 
In essence, section 92(8) has entrenched Dillon’s rule into the Constitution since 
Confederation,108 and therefore cities exist because provincial legislatures allow them to. 
Provincial Legislatures have the constitutional authority to abolish cities, and the councils thereof, 
in their entirety,109 change election boundaries,110 or even amalgamate various regional districts or 
municipalities to create “megacities”.111 Section 92(8), put simply, constitutionalized the 
“creatures of statute” doctrine, which currently characterizes cities.112 In my view, and as discussed 
in 2.1, Dillon’s rule, and therefore section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867, no longer reflects 
the legislative role of city councils in Canada. 
 
 As a result of the plenary power of provinces over municipal institutions, city councils do 
not have constitutionally enumerated heads of legislative power like Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures. Currently, a city council’s bylaw making powers are set out in provincial legislation 
 
106 East York (ONSC), supra note 47 at 13.  
107 Ran Hirschl, Cities in National Constitutions: Northern Stagnation, Southern Innovation, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto IMGF Papers on Municipal Finance and Governance No. 51, 2020) at 6. 
108 See East York (ONSC), supra note 47  at 14. 
109 Ibid. 
110 See Toronto v Ontario (ONCA), supra note 3 at para 3. 
111 See East York (ONSC), supra note 47 at 10.  
112 See Flynn, “Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal Authority”, supra note 13 at 281 where the author quotes Stanley 
Makuch, Neil Craik & Signe B Leisk, Canadian Municipal and Planning Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 
2004) at 81 to explain that “‘[m]unicipal institutions are within the provinces exclusive authority and have no 
protection against the changes imposed on them by provinces’. It is this constitutional luminosity that have led 
municipalities to be called ‘creatures of the province’, with provincial governments empowered to set rules regarding 




and can be expanded on or limited by the provincial legislatures as they see fit. Without the 
appropriate and constitutionally entrenched tools, such as legislative powers and revenue raising 
powers, civic democracy will continue to be limited and subject to provincial interference. As 
discussed in 7.1.2, amendments to entrench enumerated heads of power and sufficient revenue 
raising powers for city councils are fundamental to promote and protect civic democracy.  
 
 2.3.2 Section 32: Charter Scrutiny for Municipal Institutions 
 Section 32 of the Charter, which states that the Charter applies to, inter alia, “…the 
legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the 
legislature of each province”, has been interpreted to include city councils as government actors.113 
As a result, the legislative role of city councils is subject to Charter scrutiny. Neither the Charter 
nor the Constitution, however, contain provisions designed to protect civic democracy.  
 
In the landmark case of Godbout v Longueil (Ville),114 three justices of the Supreme Court 
of Canada interpreted section 32 of the Charter as including municipal institutions and therefore, 
cities. La Forest J. held that “the ambit of section 32 of the Canadian Charter is wide enough to 
include all entities that are essentially governmental in nature and is not restricted merely to those 
that are formally part of the structure of the federal or provincial governments.”115 As city councils 
are “democratically elected by members of the general public and are accountable to their 
constituents in a manner analogous to Parliament and to provincial legislatures” cities are subject 
to Charter scrutiny in their legislative function and otherwise.116 Therefore, while city councils are 
treated differently than upper levels of government for the purpose of constitutional democratic 
protection, they are treated the same when passing legislation, in the sense that it must be consistent 
with the Charter. 
 
 
113 Supra note 1, at s 32(1)(b). 
114 [1997] 3 SCR 844, 152 DLR (4th) 577 [Godbout] 
115 Ibid at 47.  
116 Ibid at 51. See also Pacific National Investments Ltd. v Victoria (City), 2000 SCC 60 at para 33, [2000] 2 SCR 860 
where Lebel J. held that, “municipal governments are democratic institutions.” See also City of Guelph v Board of 
Health, 2011 ONSC 5981 at para 78, 97 MPLR (4th) 70 where the ONSC acknowledges that cities are local 




 Even though civic democracy is not protected by the written text of the Constitution, there 
is logic to the inclusion of cities in section 32 of the Charter as it prevents provincial legislatures 
from delegating matters to city councils to perform an “end-run” around the constitutionally 
protected rights in the Charter. Treating cities as a level of government for the purpose of Charter 
scrutiny, shows that Dillon’s rule, while still in existence, is being diluted. As mentioned, Dillon’s 
rule treats cities as creatures of statute, whereas subjecting them to Charter scrutiny demonstrates 
that modern cities are more akin to a constitutionally protected level of government.117 The broad 
legislative powers granted to city councils increase their autonomy, attract Charter scrutiny and 
separate cities from the control of the provinces. With the majority of Canadians residing in cities, 
the increased legislative role of city councils and section 32 of the Charter applying to city 
councils, as a matter of logic and principle, city councils, and the voters thereof, require 
constitutionally entrenched democratic protection to fulfill their legislative role. Such 
constitutional protection allows the electorate to be effectively represented within a city council 
and, as discussed further, provides city councils with the legislative tools to be able to effectively 
represent their constituents.  
 
 2.3.3 Conclusion: Where Cities are Included 
 As provincial legislatures have plenary power over cities within their jurisdiction, city 
councils are at the mercy of the relevant provincial legislature and can only legislate in the areas 
the provincial legislature allows them to.118 Despite this plenary power, a city council’s legislative 
role is subject to Charter scrutiny in the same manner as Parliament and the provincial legislatures 
as they are democratically elected bodies that perform a function analogous to upper levels of 
government.119 As the Courts have acknowledged that city councils have an analogous role to 
upper levels of government, effective representation within a city council is crucial to promote 
democracy in Canada. Given the lack of democratic protection in the Constitution for city councils, 
and the voters thereof, however, upper levels of government retain the ability to interfere with 
civic elections and the democratic decision-making process of a city council.120 As effective 
 
117 See chapter 2.1, above, for a further discussion on Dillon’s Rule.  
118 See page 24-25, above, for additional information on the provinces plenary power over municipal institutions.  
119 See page 25-26, above, for further information on this argument. 




representation is granted to citizens through the Charter, in my view, a formal amendment to the 
Constitution is not only necessary but required. 
 
2.4 Where Cities are Excluded 
 Cities and their citizens are excluded from the Constitution in several ways that affect civic 
democracy. First, city councils are excluded from the text of section 3 of the Charter which is 
entitled “Democratic rights of citizens”. Second, the Constitution does not provide city councillors 
with protection analogous to that of parliamentary privilege. Third, cities have no constitutionally 
recognized revenue raising powers or enumerated heads of legislative power. In this section, I 
describe these exclusions and show how each of them negatively affects civic democracy.  
 
 Despite the fact that civic democracy is not constitutionally protected, provincial 
legislatures have codified some democratic protection for city councils in provincial legislation as 
discussed further in this Chapter. In my opinion, this represents a dilution of Dillon’s rule.121 While 
the dilution of Dillon’s rule and the broad and purposive interpretation of municipal powers could 
form an argument that constitutional recognition for city councils, and the voters thereof, is not 
required, the lack of constitutional protection allows provincial legislatures to continue to interfere 
in civic elections and with a city council’s legislative function. Therefore, the dilution of Dillon’s 
rule supports the need for constitutional protection of civic democracy to ensure citizens can be 
effectively represented by their respective city council and that city council has the tools to do so.  
 
In my view, only a formal amendment to the Constitution to protect civic democracy would 
effectively eradicate Dillon’s rule as municipal statutes would flow from the Constitution as 
opposed to provincial legislation. Should the Supreme Court of Canada accept an alternative 
approach in Toronto v Ontario and interpret the current text of the Constitution to protect 
democratic civic elections, cities and city councils would still be at the mercy of the provincial 
legislatures regarding legislative and revenue raising powers. In my view, and as argued further 
below, this could have the opposite effect as intended as, although democratic civic elections 
would be constitutionally protected, provincial legislatures could abolish or limit a city council’s 
legislative role, leaving little for city councils to deliberate on behalf of the electorate. Thus, such 
 




an interpretation could effectively restore the historical application of Dillon’s rule, setting civic 
democracy back as opposed to promoting it.  
 
2.4.1 Democratic Rights 
 Section 3 of the Charter states that, “[e]very citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an 
election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and be qualified for 
membership therein.”122 Thus, voters and candidates in federal or provincial elections have a 
protected Charter right to either vote or run as a candidate, and to be effectively represented within 
Parliament or a legislative assembly, whereas voters and candidates in civic elections are not 
afforded equivalent rights. 
 
 “For many individuals, local government is the most important level of government, 
dealing with matters of direct and immediate concern, and providing the most direct and 
accountable political institution.”123 Given the importance of representation at the local level, 
entrenching democratic civic elections in the Constitution would allow city councils to operate as 
an independent level of government, free from interference from upper levels of government, 
supporting Canadian democracy. Meehan, Chiarelli and Major explain that municipal institutions 
are “truly agents of democracy” as they are the level of government closest to the people and “most 
able to represent local aspirations and needs.”124 Thus, “citizens of a municipality are provided 
with the power to influence and determine the range of service made available to their 
community.”125 While Meehan, Chiarelli and Major are referring to municipal institutions 
generally, I argue that these concerns are more prevalent in cities as city councils govern or 
regulate matters that are beyond mere local concerns, as discussed in 2.1 and 2.2. As a result, 
effective representation for citizens in their city council is, at a minimum, of equal importance as 
 
122 Supra, note 1 at s 3.  
123 Meehan, Chiarelli & Major, supra note 31 at 12.  
124 Ibid at 12 to 13. Further, Meehan, Chiarelli & Major explain that “[l]ocal governments give effect to democratic 
ideals because they are readily accessible to local constituents. Not only do they provide the electorate with an outlet 
to voice their concerns and needs but, because the results of local decisions are readily apparent in the local 
community, citizens can actually evaluate the effectiveness of their government and the degree to which their 
representatives actually fulfill their obligations/pledges.” (ibid at 11 to 12).  




upper levels of government,126 and the municipal electorate can better gauge whether a city council 
is effectively representing their constituents, leading to more accountable local government and 
supporting democracy.  
 
Prior to the promulgation of the Charter, there was no constitutionally entrenched right to 
vote for, or to be effectively represented, in Parliament or a legislative assembly. Despite this lack 
of democratic protection, significant advances in the “right” to vote occurred prior to the Charter 
coming in force. For example, “denial of the right to vote on the basis of gender, religion, race, 
ethnicity and income had been removed from the law, and administrative steps had been taken to 
improve access to the vote for people with disabilities, people away from home on election day, 
and members of the public service and the military serving abroad.”127 The Charter ensured that 
the right to vote for Canadian citizens was constitutionally protected.128 Civic elections are similar 
as there are no restrictions in civic election legislation based on race, ethnicity, gender or any factor 
other than residency and age,129 as provisions of this nature would be likely to infringe the Charter. 
Although the Charter protects citizens from discrimination in voting,130 it does not prevent upper 
levels of government from interfering in civic elections and thus, constitutional protection is 
required to truly protect democratic civic elections. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the right to vote contained in section 3 contains 
the right to effective representation as Canada is characterized by a representative democracy: 
“[e]ach citizen is entitled to be represented in government. Representation comprehends the idea 
 
126 Ibid at 10 where Meehan, Chiarelli & Major explain that “[d]espite the fact that Canadian local governments 
increasingly play an important role at both the international and domestic level they are misperceived as mere 
purveyors of services rather than as governing institutions with an important role in Canadian Society. That urban 
governments are presented as creatures of the provinces inevitably encourages the misperception that they are not on 
equal footing with the federal and provincial governments.” 
127 Elections Canada “A History of the Vote in Canada: Advancing Fairness, Transparency and Integrity, 1982-2020” 
(12 January 2021) Online: Elections Canada Website <https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx? 
section=res&dir=his/chap4&document=index &lang=e>. See also “Section 3 – Democratic Rights” (last modified 25 
January 2021) Online: Government of Canada <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-
ccdl/check/art3.html> for a list o the restrictions on the right to vote set out in section 3 of the Charter. 
128 See Elections Canada, supra note 127.  
129 See Fitzgerald (Next Friend of) v Alberta, 2004 ABCA 184 at para 2, 27 Alta LR (4th) 205, leave to appeal to SCC 
refused [2004] SCCA No 349, where the Alberta Court of Appeal determined that disallowing minors to vote infringed 
the Charter but such infringement was saved under s 1 of the Charter. 
130 For municipal elections, this would be through section 15 of the Charter, as section 3 it only applies to Parliament 




of having a voice in the deliberations of government as well as the idea of the right to bring one’s 
grievances and concerns to the attention of one’s government representative”.131 Therefore, the 
right to vote in a federal or provincial election protects relative parity of voting power.132 If one 
person’s vote is diluted in comparison with that of another’s, the result is uneven and unfair 
representation.133 The Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged that absolute voter parity is 
not possible but goes on to hold that infringements of voter parity are only acceptable if they 
“contribute to better government of the populace as a whole.”134 Therefore, the democratic rights 
protected by section 3 of the Charter protect effective representation as well as the right to vote or 
run as a candidate in a federal or provincial election.  
 
As it is written, section 3 of the Charter does not protect the democratic right to vote or 
run as a candidate in a civic election. The ONSC has agreed with this interpretation, holding: 
 
I agree with the Attorney-General that, prima facie, s. 3 does not apply to the case 
at bar and that the delegation of powers does not make the delegatee [sic] into the 
delegator. The words “legislative assembly” are contained in other sections of the 
Charter where they could not be interpreted as including municipal councils. There 
is no constitutional impediment to a province abolishing municipal councils. If the 
applicant succeeded on its s. 3 argument, the result would be that a province could 
not abolish municipalities. Municipalities are creatures of the province.135 
 
Therefore, the democratic rights contained in section 3 of the Charter do not apply to the electorate 
or candidates in civic elections. There are many reasons why this exclusion is important, as 
discussed in further detail below. The principal reason, however, is that section 3 of the Charter 
provides protection for “effective representation”; in other words, it provides for a vote that 
“retains its impact.”136 Since city councils are excluded from section 3, the right to vote or run in 
a civic election does not protect effective representation. 
 
 
131 Electoral Boundaries Reference, supra note 10 at 184. [Emphasis added]. See also Frank v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2019 SCC 1 at para 25, [2019] 1 SCR 3 [Frank v Canada] where Chief Justice Wagner, speaking for the 
majority, states, “[t]he right of every citizen to vote lies at the heart of Canadian democracy.” 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid.  
134 Ibid. 
135 Rheaume, supra note 7 at 31. See also Baier v Alberta, 2007 SCC 31 at para 39, [2007] 2 SCR 673 [Baier].  




 In Rheaume, as cited in the preceding paragraph, the ONSC held that the terms “legislative 
assembly” contained in section 3 of the Charter does not extend to city councils. There is good 
reason for this. While city councils and provincial legislatures are both democratically elected and 
have democratic legislative roles, city councils are structured differently than a legislative 
assembly. For the most part, city councils are not characterized by “party” politics. Although party 
politics are not inherent in Parliament or provincial legislatures, they have come to be the norm. 
Thus, city councils differ as there is no opposition or “government-in-waiting” that provides a 
necessary check and balance on the party with the most seats.137 As city councils are generally a 
group of independent elected officials, procedural decisions or decisions relating to election 
procedures, may be subject to bias as city councillors may vote their personal interest, as 
distinguished from a financial interest,138 with no opposition to perform the necessary check-and-
balance. As a result, merely expanding the term “legislative assembly” to include city councils 
does not acknowledge or accommodate the different structure thereof. In addition, this alternative 
to a formal amendment would only address the right to vote and effective representation for 
citizens but would not provide city councils the necessary tools to effectively represent its 
constituents.  
 
 In addition, the interference in the 2018 Toronto election could not happen in a federal or 
provincial election as upper levels of government pass the legislation governing their own 
elections.139 While city councils have some control over election procedures,140 the provincial 
legislatures generally pass legislation governing civic elections.141 Federally, neither the House of 
Commons or the Senate of Parliament sit during an election period, as Parliament has been 
 
137 See e.g. Nathalie Des Rosiers “Deference to Legislatures: The Case of 2018 Ontario Better Local Government Act” 
(2021) 34 JL & Soc Pol’y 39 at 43 where author explains that the leader of the opposition provided the “check and 
balance” on the current Ontario government in debating the BLGA stating, “[i]f the provincial government wants to 
start a conversation about how to improve municipal government, I’m all for that. But let’s follow a proper process in 
doing so.” [emphasis added].  
138 See e.g. The Cities Act, supra note 54 at s 115 for the definition of a financial interest in Saskatchewan which 
creates a conflict, whereas a personal interest may not.   
139 See The Canada Elections Act, SC 2000 c 9. 
140 See e.g. City of Saskatoon Bylaw No. 8191, The Election Bylaw, 2012 which outlines the use of permissible voting 
technology, such as optical scanners, and mail-in ballot procedures. See also Toronto Municipal Code, Chapter 53 – 
Elections which authorizes the use of vote-counting equipment. 
141 See e.g. Ontario’s Municipal Elections Act, 1996, SO 1996 c 32 Sched. 2, s 1-10. See also The Local Government 
Elections Act, SS 2015 c L-30.11 [LGEA]. See also The Municipal Councils and School Boards Elections Act, 2005, 
CCSM c M257. See also Local Authorities Election Act, RSA 2000 c L-21. See also the Local Government Act, RSBC 




dissolved.142 Thus, mid-election destruction of federal electoral boundaries cannot be passed 
during an election period. While each province controls their own election procedures through 
legislation, they do not allow the legislative assemblies to meet after the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council (“LGIC”) dissolves the legislative assembly. Thus, provincial legislation governing 
provincial elections cannot be amended during the election period. After dissolution, no legislative 
business can take place until a general election is held, a new legislature is summoned, a speaker 
is elected and the speech from the throne occurs.143 As evinced by the facts of Toronto v Ontario, 
provincial legislatures are free to amend legislation regulating civic elections at any time, including 
during an election period. Thus, without constitutional protection, civic election legislation can be 
amended during an election period, unlike the legislation governing federal and provincial 
elections.  
 
 Notwithstanding the above, provincial legislatures have codified democratic election 
processes for municipal institutions and these democratic processes have been considered as a 
relevant factor in subjecting cities to Charter scrutiny as a governmental entity.144 As provincial 
legislatures continue to have plenary power over cities, they remain in control over the election 
process for city councils and can abolish the democratic process by majority vote. In addition, 
provincial legislatures currently have control over the other legislative tools, such as legislative 
and revenue raising powers, required to ensure effective representation of citizens within their city 
council. Thus, city councils continue to lack the constitutional protection required to fulfill their 
democratic legislative role.  
 
2.4.2 Parliamentary Privilege  
 Parliamentary privilege, in its broadest sense, provides immunity for Members of 
Parliament (“MPs”) or Members of Legislative Assemblies (“MLAs”)145 from civil or criminal 
liability for the statements they make in the course of their legislative duty.146 For Parliament, this 
 
142 See Parliament of Canada “Prorogation Puts Parliament on Hold” (18 August 2020) Online: Senate of Canada 
<https://sencanada.ca/en/sencaplus/how-why/prorogation-puts-parliament-on-hold/>. 
143 See Ontario “The Lieutenant Governor and the Legislature” (2017) Online: Lieutenant Governor of Ontario 
<http://www.lgontario.ca/en/constitutional-role/lieutenant-governor-legislature/>. 
144 See Godbout, supra note 114 at 881.  
145 This term also encompasses the provincial equivalents of MLA’s in other provinces, such as Members of Provincial 
Parliament in Ontario and Members of House Assemblies in Newfoundland.  




privilege is entrenched in section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and recognized in section 4 of 
The Parliament of Canada Act.147 Provincial legislatures are permitted to enact statutes defining 
privilege for MLAs by virtue of section 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982.148 City councillors, on 
the other hand, have no comparable constitutional protection.  
 
Prior to discussing the ramifications of potential civil and criminal liability for statements 
of city councillors made performing their legislative duties, a further analysis of the scope of 
parliamentary privilege is warranted. In 2003, the Speaker of the House of Commons ruled:  
 
We have parliamentary privilege to ensure that the other branches of government, 
the executive and judicial, respect the independence of the legislative branch of 
government, which is this House and the other place. This independence cannot be 
sustained if either of the other branches is able to define or reduce these privileges. 
… The privileges of this House and its members are not unlimited, but they are 
nonetheless well established as a matter of parliamentary law and practice in 
Canada today, and must be respected by the courts. Judges must look to Parliament 
for precedents on privilege, not to rulings of their fellow judges since it is 
Parliament where privilege is defined and claimed.149 
 
Thus, parliamentary privilege grants MPs and MLAs the autonomy to speak freely in performing 
their legislative function without the threat of criminal or civil liability attaching to their comments. 
Further, it protects from both judicial and executive interference in an elected official’s legislative 
function.  
 
The Constitution provides two limits on parliamentary privilege. First, section 18 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 limits the extent of privilege that Parliament may confer on itself as it states 
that privilege cannot be greater “than those enjoyed at the time by the House of Commons of the 
United Kingdom.”150 Second, the preamble limits privilege as the reference to “a Constitution 
similar in Principle of that of the United Kingdom”,151 which in effect provides for a Westminster 
parliamentary system, limiting parliamentary privilege to legislative functions necessary to ensure 
 
147 RSC, 1985, c. P-1. 
148 See Fielding v Thomas, [1892] AC 600.  
149 See Marc Bosc & Andre Gagnon (Eds) “House of Commons Procedure and Practice” (2017) 3rd Ed, Online: House 
of Commons <https://www.ourcommons.ca/About/ProcedureAndPractice3rdEdition/ch_03_3-e.html#footnote-362>. 
150 Bosc & Gagnon, supra note 149 at chapter 3. See also Vaid, supra note 146 at para 38.  




the proper functioning of the Parliamentary House of Commons.152 In Vaid, the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that parliamentary privilege protects: (1) freedom of speech; (2) control by the House 
over debates or proceedings in Parliament, including day-to-day procedure; (3) the power to 
exclude strangers from proceedings; (4) disciplinary authority over MPs or MLAs; (5) disciplinary 
authority over non-members who interfere with parliamentary duties; and (6) immunity for MPs 
and MLAs from being subpoenaed to attend court during a parliamentary session.153 Thus, 
parliamentary privilege provides protection for MPs and MLAs from civil lawsuits; however, the 
judiciary continues to play a limited role in such matters, as discussed below. 
  
Prior to 1982 and therefore the Charter, the Ontario High Court held that the courts had no 
jurisdiction over statements made in Parliament.154 Post-Charter the Supreme Court of Canada has 
held that “courts may determine if the privilege claimed is necessary to the capacity of the 
legislature to function, but have no power to review the rightness or wrongness of a particular 
decision made pursuant to privilege.”155 In Vaid, the Supreme Court of Canada elaborated on this 
holding that parliamentary privilege does not constitute “enclaves shielded from the ordinary law 
of the land.”156 Thus, for privilege to attach, MPs or MLAs must show that their conduct is closely 
connected with their legislative duties and if the application of privilege is established, the 
judiciary cannot interfere.  
 
In addition to providing immunity, parliamentary privilege provides legal certainty of what 
MPs and MLAs can and cannot do in the course of their legislative duty. For example, The 
Legislative Assembly Act157 in Saskatchewan adopts the same privilege and immunity as held by 
the Parliamentary House of Commons,158 however, it goes on to list what is considered a breach 
 
152 See Vaid supra note 146 at para 13 and 38.  
153 Ibid at para 29. See also Bosc & Gagnon, supra note 149 at chapter 3. 
154 See Roman Corporation Limited v Hudson’s Bay Oil and Gas Co., [1971] OR 418 at 7, 18 DLR (3d) 134 (ONSC) 
leave to appeal to ONCA refused, [1972] 1 OR 444, 23 DLR (3d) 292, leave to appeal to SCC refused [1973] SCR 
820, 36 DLR (3d) 413. See also Bosc & Gagnon, supra note 149 at chapter 3.  
155 New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House Assembly), [1993] 1 SCR 319 at 384 to 385, 
100 DLR (4th) 212 [New Brunswick Broadcasting] 
156 Vaid, supra note 146 at para 29.  
157 SS 2008, c L-11.3 [Saskatchewan’s Legislative Assembly Act] 




of privilege159 and what the punishment for the breach may be.160 Thus, there is arguably no need 
for civil lawsuits for statements or conduct that occur in the legislative assembly, as internal 
mechanisms of discipline exist, rendering MPs and MLAs immune from civil liability or ordinary 
criminal prosecution in carrying out their legislative role.161 Despite these provisions, the judiciary 
is still occasionally called upon to determine if parliamentary privilege attaches in a given scenario. 
 
City councillors, on the other hand, have no protection from civil or criminal liability 
beyond that of the ordinary litigant provided by the common law or the provisions of the relevant 
provincial legislation.162 Elected city councillors do not benefit from absolute privilege as they “do 
not have the sufficient safeguards necessary for granting absolute privilege to speech made during 
council meetings.”163 Further, the ONSC has held that “the common law has justified granting 
absolute privilege to legislatures because of their constitutionally protected ability to examine, 
discuss, and judge its own members.”164 Thus, for Parliament and legislatures, the Speaker “has a 
variety of remedies that he or she may employ” including, but not limited to, “an apology, naming 
the members, and ejecting them from the legislature until they retract their comments.”165 City 
councils do not have a constitutionally protected ability to discipline their own members like 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures, nor do city councils have any constitutionally protected 
mechanism for internal discipline.  
 
 
159 Ibid at ss 24(1) and (2). 
160 Ibid at s 25. 
161 Ibid. See also s 26 which codifies  privative clause stating that “[t]he determinations or findings of the Legislative 
Assembly on any proceedings pursuant to this Act are final and conclusive” (ibid at s 26) and s 28 which sets out 
immunity from civil action, prosecution, arrest, imprisonment or damages (ibid at s 27). See also Alberta’s Legislative 
Assembly Act, RSA 2000 c L- 9 at s 13 [Alberta’s Legislative Assembly Act] for an analogous immunity provision. 
See also Legislative Assembly Act, RSO 1990, c. L-10 at s 37 [Ontario’s Legislative Assembly Act] for another 
analogous immunity provision. See also the Legislative Assembly Privilege Act, RSBC 1996 c 529 at ss 4 and 5[British 
Columbia Legislative Assembly Privilege Act] for British Columbia’s immunity provision and the Legislative 
Assemblies power to inquire and punish its members.  
162 See e.g. Prud’homme v Prud’homme, 2002 SCC 85 at para 24, [2002] 4 SCR 663 [Prud’Homme] where the SCC 
states that elected municipal officials are governed by public law.  
163 Gutowski v Clayton, 2014 ONSC 2908 at para 65, 32 MPLR (5th) 7, aff’d 2014 ONCA 921, 124 OR (3d) 185 leave 
to appeal denied [2015] SCCA No 74 [Gutowski].  
164 Ibid.  
165 Ibid. See also Saskatchewan’s Legislative Assembly Act, supra note 157 at s 25(1) which outlines the penalties for 





Although elected city councillors are not protected by absolute or parliamentary privilege, they 
are not entirely unprotected from civil liability. City councillors can rely on the common law 
defamation defence of qualified privilege, which requires the accuser to show that malice is the 
dominant intent of the councillor’s comments.166 Additionally, city councillors may be protected 
by “good faith” immunity clauses contained in their governing legislation.167 Despite these 
protections, the mere threat of damages awards or the cost of defending a civil action may create 
an impediment to open democratic debates at council meetings.168 Lastly, the lack of 
constitutionally protected privilege and internal discipline mechanisms for elected city councillors 
permits interference in city council matters from upper levels of government. 
 
Despite the lack of constitutional protection afforded to city councillors, provincial legislatures 
have amended legislation to grant more tools to city councils to govern themselves. While these 
tools are not protected by the Constitution, they provide city councils a limited ability to discipline 
their members and hold city councillor’s responsible outside of the courts. Modern provincial 
legislation requires city councils169 to appoint integrity commissioners170 and pass a code of 
ethics171 for city councillors allowing for city councils to operate similarly to Parliament or the 
provincial legislatures in terms of internal discipline. Provincial legislatures have thus 
acknowledged the importance of an open democratic debate at city council meetings but, as with 
any power granted to city councils, they exist at the behest of the provincial legislatures and can 
be repealed or amended as the provincial legislature desires. In addition, the threat of civil or 
criminal liability, or the cost of defending such allegations,172 may impede open democratic 
discussions at city council meetings. 
 
166 See Gutowski, supra note 163 at para 5.  
167 See e.g. The Cities Act, supra note 54 at s 317(1).  
168 Anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) legislation may play a role in further protecting city 
councilors from lawsuits relating to statements at city council meetings; however, an in-depth analysis on Anti-SLAPP 
legislation in the context of statements made by city councilors is outside the scope of this analysis.  
169 This applies to councils for other municipalities in many provinces as well. See, for example, The Saskatchewan 
Municipalities Act, supra note 78 at s. 93.1. See also The Ontario Municipal Act, supra note 81 at ss 223.2 and 223.2 
170 See e.g. The City of Toronto Act, supra note 54 at 158. 
171 See e.g. The Cities Act, supra note 54 at s 66.1 and The Cities Regulations, 2003 c C-11.1 Reg 1 at s 3.1 which sets 
out the model code of ethics for city councillors in Saskatchewan. See also The City of Toronto Act, supra note 54 at 
s 157. See also The City of Ottawa Act, supra note 80 at s 223.2. 
172 This is not a concern in Parliament or provincial legislatures as they have absolute immunity clauses. See e.g. 
Saskatchewan’s Legislative Assembly Act, supra note 157 at s 28 which provides immunities for MLAs in 





The increased legislative autonomy granted to city councils to internally govern themselves 
demonstrates a dilution of Dillon’s rule by the provincial legislature. Provincial legislatures are 
consistently increasing the autonomy of city councils and providing them with certain measures to 
act in a similar capacity to Parliament or legislative assemblies. Without a formal amendment to 
the Constitution, however, the measures adopted by provincial legislatures by ordinary legislation 
will only provide city councils with limited protection, as opposed to fully protecting civic 
democracy, and may be removed or limited by provincial legislatures as they see fit.  
 
 2.4.3 Division of Powers 
 Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 set out the areas in which Parliament and 
the provincial legislatures may exclusively legislate. These provisions have become known as the 
“division of powers” as they set out the legislative power and jurisdiction of each constitutionally 
recognized level of government. Constitutionally entrenched legislative powers provide 
Parliament and the legislatures with the tools, such as revenue raising powers, required to exercise 
their democratic role and effectively represent their constituents. Civic democracy requires the 
same. 
 
 Currently, provincial legislatures can delegate any issues falling within their heads of 
legislative power to cities.173 Provincial legislatures also have complete control over the revenue 
raising powers that cities can utilize. While the municipal legislation in each province varies 
slightly, cities are generally entitled to legislate in broad areas that relate to matters respecting the 
city.174 As broad legislative jurisdiction is already granted to cities, it demonstrates that cities play 
an important legislative role that has effects beyond the corporate limits of the relevant city. For 
example, when the City Council for Saskatoon was debating its proposed bylaw to prohibit abusive 
conversion therapy practices, the Councillors acknowledged that the proposed bylaw would likely 
 
Assembly Act, supra note 161 at s 13. See also British Columbia’s Legislative Assembly Privilege Act, supra note 161 
at s 4. Thus, while MLA’s possess legislative immunity, city councilors may still have to defend civil actions if there 
is an argument that they acted in bad faith. See Deren v Saskatchewan Watershed Authority, 2015 SKQB 366 at para 
157, [2020] 5 WWR 731, aff’d 2017 SKCA 104, where Justice Elson sets out the test to determine bad faith in relation 
to a good faith immunity provision. 
173 See East York (ONSC), supra note 47 at 13-14.  




not be enforced but rather a symbolic bylaw,175 sending a message to society at large. Again, this 
demonstrates that the legislative powers of city councils have a similar national, or even 
international,176 impact to that of Parliament or the legislative assemblies. Cities and city councils, 
however, remain subject to the provincial legislature that has created them.  
 
 If provincial legislatures do not agree with the decisions made by city councils under their 
legislative areas, those powers can be repealed entirely or limited by a legislative amendment. In 
addition, and as discussed further in 4.1, certain provincial legislatures have reserved themselves 
the right to limit the powers of city councils by regulation or interfere with the democratic decision-
making process of city councils.  
 
 Civic democracy requires city councils to possess the autonomy and adequate funding to 
effectively represent their constituents.177 This would not be a simple task and would require 
significant consultation with upper levels of government to determine what the appropriate 
legislative and revenue raising powers for a city council would be, without overburdening the tax 
base.178 City councils are generally limited to property taxes, utility or user fees and revenue 
sharing from upper levels of government, which provide a limited means of raising revenue and 
risks overburdening a city’s tax base if increased legislative powers are not coupled with increased 
revenue raising powers.179 While it is not within the scope of this analysis to provide an in-depth 
analysis on the revenue raising issues that plague cities, sufficient revenue raising powers are 
essential to civic democracy. As explained in Chapter 6, calling for an increase in revenue raising 
 
175 See Alex MacPherson “Local conversion therapy ban possible in Saskatoon, but ‘largely symbolic’” (16 April 
2020) Online: Saskatoon StarPhoenix < https://thestarphoenix.com/news/local-news/local-conversion-therapy-ban-
possible-in-saskatoona-but-largely-symbolic> where the writer notes that the bylaw would be difficult to enforce and 
“largely symbolic”, “according to a report from city administrators.”  
176 See Meehan, Chiarelli & Major, supra note 31 at 32 where the authors explain that “[t]he new global order clearly 
presents cities with the opportunity to become international players on the economic front. The scope of policy and 
action of local governments, however, is severely limited by their constitutional position and lack of autonomy – 
municipal governments are not free to design, adopt, and ultimately implement, whatever policies are viewed as locally 
optimal.” 
177 Ibid.  
178 Ibid at 9 and 10 where the authors state, “[p]roperty and business taxes can be increased only so much each year – 
as a responsible, responsive and accountable level of government, municipal authorities cannot, and do not want to, 
overburden local taxpayers.” 
179 Ibid at 31 where Meehan, Chiarelli & Major explain “[t]hat municipalities lack fiscal generating tools to increase 
their revenues seriously constrains and undermines their ability to meet the demands and needs of their constituents. 
Limited funds to meet increased demands impedes the ability of municipal authorities to make responsive choices.” 




powers may increase the difficulty of formally amending the Constitution to recognize and protect 
civic democracy.  
   
 2.4.4 Conclusion: Where Cities are Excluded 
The current text of the Constitution does not provide protection for civic democracy, 
including the right of citizens to vote for, and be effectively represented in, a city council and does 
not provide the tools city councils require to be able to effectively represent their constituents. 
Further, city councils do not benefit from parliamentary privilege or constitutionally entrenched 
heads of legislative power. Because of the lack of constitutionally entrenched powers and 
immunity, provincial legislatures have adopted mechanisms for city councils to internally govern 
themselves and have granted broad bylaw making powers to city councils. Although city 
councillors may still be subject to civil or criminal liability for statements made at city council 
meetings, these provisions demonstrate a dilution of Dillon’s rule and increase the autonomy of 
city councils.  
 
2.5 Conclusion: Chapter 2 
 Provincial legislatures have plenary power in relation to municipal institutions, which 
include cities. Through judicial interpretation, cities and city councils are subject to Charter 
scrutiny pursuant to section 32 of the Charter as they perform government functions and are 
democratically elected. Despite this interpretation, citizens do not have the constitutionally 
protected right to effective representation within a city council. Lastly, unlike Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures, city councils do not possess constitutionally entrenched heads of legislative 
power or revenue raising powers.  
 
 Provincial legislatures have also granted city councils broad bylaw making powers, 
democratic election processes and certain internal mechanisms to govern their legislative role. 
While civil and criminal liability continues to be applicable to city councillors in performing their 
legislative role, the above makes it clear that Dillon’s Rule has been diluted. Given the failure of 
city-specific legislation, city charters or other legislative amendments to accommodate the national 
legislative role of city councils, entrenching civic democracy in the Constitution through a formal 




legislatures, interference from upper levels of government continues to be permitted and, as a 





3. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, DEMOCRACY AND 
LEGISLATION 
 
So far, I have focused on the constitutional treatment of cities and city councils. This 
Chapter sets out the background necessary to understand the role of democracy within the 
framework of the Constitution, the effect it may have on provincial legislation and the actions of 
upper levels of government that interfere with civic democracy. A brief background of the 
principles of constitutional interpretation will precede this analysis.  
 
3.1 Constitutional Interpretation  
 As mentioned, pursuant to section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Constitution is the 
supreme law of Canada and any law inconsistent with it is of no force and effect to the extent of 
the inconsistency. While this proposition seems straight-forward, it has become more complicated 
with the Supreme Court of Canada’s recognition of the “inner architecture” of the Constitution 
and the doctrine of living constitutionalism. This subchapter summarizes both of these doctrines.  
 
 Importantly, in the Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6,180 the Supreme Court of 
Canada “positioned itself as the only body that can constitutionally interpret the Constitution as to 
others and as to itself, a position that could conceivably raise a conflict, but that one could justify 
under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which makes the Constitution of Canada supreme 
and by implication the Court’s interpretation of it as well.”181 Therefore, the Supreme Court of 
Canada is the final arbiter of constitutional interpretation, which renders the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s interpretation of the Constitution as supreme as the written provisions therein. Therefore, 
any interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution by the Supreme Court of Canada, whether 
based on unconstrained constitutional interpretation or not, can invalidate legislation in the same 
manner as the written text. As discussed below, without constraints on constitutional interpretation 
 
180 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 SCR 433 [Supreme Court Reference]. 
181 Richard Albert “The Theory and Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (2015) 41:1 




the Supreme Court of Canada may re-frame the provisions of the Constitution as if they are “empty 
vessels” to be filled with meaning or purpose as the Supreme Court of Canada sees fit.182  
 
 3.1.1 The Inner Architecture of the Constitution 
 In addition to section 3 of the Charter, democracy has been identified by the Supreme 
Court of Canada as an “unwritten constitutional principle”. The alternatives discussed in Chapter 
5 rely on the inner architecture of the Constitution, specifically the unwritten principle of 
democracy, and unconstrained constitutional interpretation to argue that the current text of the 
Constitution can be interpreted to protect democratic civic elections.  
 
In the Reference re Secession of Quebec,183 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
Constitution goes beyond the written text and has an “internal architecture”.184 This internal 
architecture consists of underlying and unwritten principles that breathe life into the provisions of 
the Constitution.185 According to the Supreme Court of Canada, “it would be impossible to 
conceive of our constitutional structure without them” and they “dictate major elements of the 
architecture of the Constitution itself and are as such its lifeblood.”186 Lastly, the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that unwritten principles assist in the interpretation of the text and, inter alia, “the 
role of our political institutions.”187 Thus, unwritten constitutional principles aid in interpreting the 
provisions of the Constitution and breathe life into the written text of the Constitution. As 
discussed later in this Chapter, there is an ongoing debate as to whether unwritten constitutional 
 
182 See Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 SCR 313 at 151, 38 DLR (4th) 161 [Public 
Service Employee Reference] where Justice Major holds that “[i]t follows that while a liberal and not overly legalistic 
approach should be taken to constitutional interpretation, the Charter should not be regarded as an empty vessel to be 
filled with whatever meaning we might wish from time to time. The interpretation of the Charter, as all constitutional 
documents, is constrained by the language, structure, and history of the constitutional text, by constitutional tradition, 
and by the history, traditions, and underlying philosophies of our society.” See also David Mullan “Underlying 
Constitutional Principles: The Legacy of Justice Rand” (2010) 34:1 UNB LJ 73 at 78 -79. See also Roy Millen “The 
Independence of the Bar: An Unwritten Constitutional Principle” (2004) 84:1 La Revue du Barreau Canadien 107 at 
121 where the author states, “[i]t will be appreciated that what one judge sees as ‘rewriting’ or ‘amending’ the written 
constitution will be regarded by another as merely interpreting its ‘rationale’ or ‘basic purpose’.”  
183 [1998] 2 SCR 217, 161 DLR (4th) 385 [Secession Reference]. 
184 Ibid at para 50. See also OPSEU v Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] 2 SCR 2 at 57, 41 DLR (4th) 1 where the 
SCC referred to the internal architecture as a “basic constitutional structure.” 
185 See Secession Reference, supra note 183 at para 50.  
186 Ibid at para 51.  




principles are merely interpretative aids or are hardened doctrinal precedent that can invalidate 
legislation.  
 
 If the alternative approaches to a formal constitutional amendment raised by the parties in, 
or by academics in response to, Toronto v Ontario are adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
the inner architecture of the Constitution will be able to invalidate provincial legislation that is not 
consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of the Constitution. This would mean 
that unwritten constitutional principles, such as the unwritten principle of democracy, and 
unconstrained constitutional interpretation would have the full force of the written text of the 
Constitution. I argue that constitutional interpretation must be constrained by, inter alia, the 
written text of the Constitution, the historical context and precedent. To decide otherwise would 
allow the Supreme Court of Canada to fill provisions of the Constitution with whatever meaning 
the Supreme Court of Canada sees fit, as if they are “empty vessels”. 
 
 3.1.2 Living Constitutionalism 
 The Supreme Court of Canada has accepted living constitutionalism as the predominant 
doctrine of constitutional interpretation. Living constitutionalism requires the Constitution to be 
interpreted in a broad and organic manner, allowing the Constitution and the provisions thereof to 
adapt with the changing of times.188 Four central commitments to living constitutionalism have 
been identified, being: (1) progressive interpretation; (2) use of a purposive methodology; (3) the 
absence of any necessary role for the original intent of the framers of the Constitution; and (4) the 
presence of other constraints on constitutional interpretation.189 
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada has described progressive interpretation as “one of the most 
fundamental principles of constitutional interpretation”.190 Progressive interpretation allows the 
 
188 See Secession Reference, supra note 183 at para 42. See also Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 
SCR 753 at 880, 125 DLR (3d) 1 where the SCC states that “[t[he main purpose of constitutional conventions is to 
ensure that the legal framework of the Constitution will be operated in accordance with the prevailing constitutional 
values or principles of the period.” [emphasis added]. See also W.J. Waluchow, “The Living Tree” Peter Oliver, 
Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers eds, The Oxford Handbook of The Canadian Constitution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017) at 897. 
189 See Bradley Miller “Beguiled by Metaphors: The ‘Living Tree’ and Originalist Constitutional Interpretation in 
Canada” (2009) 22 CANJLJUR 331 at 6. 




Constitution to adapt to changes in society due to the passage of time, without altering the written 
text of the Constitution. For example, in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference, the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that “a head of power must continually adapt to cover new realities.”191 Therefore, 
new ideas, inventions, norms or even technologies can be placed within the heads of power 
enumerated in section 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 or provided Charter protection if 
they fit within the purpose of the written provisions.  
 
In my view, the Supreme Court of Canada’s holding in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference 
is an appropriate use of judicial interpretation. As noted by Miller JA in Toronto v Ontario 
(ONCA), the framers of the Constitution could not have addressed every social or technological 
development as they could not have seen them arising in 1867.192 Miller JA further distinguishes 
this from granting constitutional protection for democratic civic elections noting that “[m]unicipal 
institutions, including municipal governing bodies, long pre-dated 1867, not only in what is now 
Canada, but also in the United Kingdom. The decision was made not to constitutionalize these 
institutions, but rather to put them under the jurisdiction of provincial legislatures.”193 Thus, 
progressive interpretation is limited by the text of the Constitution, the historical context and 
precedent and therefore, cannot grant constitutional protection outside of these constraints.  
 
 Purposive methodology requires the courts to determine the purpose of a provision of the 
Constitution at the current time, as opposed to the purpose when the provision was entrenched 
within the Constitution.194 Thus, when a court is interpreting what a provision of the Constitution 
protects or guarantees it is the purpose of the provision that must be considered. For example, in 
Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (Attorney General),195 the 
Supreme Court of Canada employed a purposive interpretation when looking at section 96 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, which, based on the bare wording, merely codifies the Governor General 
of Canada’s duty to appoint judges to the superior courts of the provinces. The Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the purpose of section 96 is to protect the inherent jurisdiction of the superior 
 
191 Ibid at para 30.  
192 See Toronto v Ontario (ONCA), supra note 3 at para 94. 
193 Ibid.  
194 See Miller, supra note 189 at 6.  




courts from interference by Parliament or the provincial legislatures, which extends to protecting 
access to justice.196 Therefore, using a purposive methodology, the Supreme Court of Canada 
struck down hearing fees that unconstitutionally infringed on a litigant’s access to the inherent 
jurisdiction of a Superior Court. The purpose of a provision, however, must be guided by the 
constraints on constitutional interpretation, otherwise the provisions of the Constitution become 
“empty vessels” to be filled with purpose as the Supreme Court of Canada desires. 
 
 Living constitutionalism does not appear to require Canadian courts to look to the original 
intent of the framers of the Constitution in determining the meaning or purpose of a provision. 
This proposition has led to a debate as to the extent that originalism applies to constitutional 
interpretation in Canada. Ian Binnie, a former puisne justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
stated, “[t]he issue… is not whether the intent of the originating body should be taken into account 
because no one who expects to be taken seriously would argue that it should not be.”197 In contrast, 
the ONCA has held that “[o]riginalism is not a part of the Canadian Constitutional tradition”.198 
To further add to the confusion, the Supreme Court of Canada has referred to the original intent of 
the framers of the Constitution in interpreting the provisions thereof.199 Thus, it appears to be left 
to the discretion of the presiding justice to determine the extent which the original intent of the 
framers applies in interpreting provisions of the Constitution. What is unclear, however, is when 
the failure to consider or place enough emphasis on the original intent of the framers amounts to a 
reversible judicial error.200 
 
196 Ibid at para 30.  
197 Ian Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” in Grant Huscroft & Ian Brodie, eds., 
Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2004) at 348 cited by Miller, supra 
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history of the Charter is admissible to interpret its provisions and the question is what weight a court should give to 
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the Constitution. Rather, in Canada, constitutional interpretation rests on giving a purposive interpretation to the 
wording of the sections.” 
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Constitution Act, 1867 to determine the scope of parliamentary privilege.  
200 See Miller, supra note 189 at 9 where Bradley Miller explains that “at least in some cases, failure to engage with 





 Lastly, the lack of constraints on constitutional interpretation are, “the chief complaint 
levelled against living constitutionalism as it allows for ad hoc and unprincipled constitutional 
interpretation.”201 As explained by David Schneiderman, “[i]f we understand judges as being 
constrained principally by text, precedent, and history, together with practices of judicial propriety 
– the traditional legal tools with which judges reason legally – it can be said that high court 
decision-making operates under few other constraints.”202 Further, constitutional law icon, Peter 
Hogg, has argued that living constitutionalism must be “anchored in the historical context of the 
provision”203 and the Supreme Court of Canada has looked to the historical context of 
constitutional provisions and the original intent of the framers in interpreting them.204 For example, 
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the unwritten constitutional principles identified in the 
Secession Reference have existed since Confederation, therefore, unwritten principles have been 
rooted in the original intent of the constitutional framers by the Supreme Court of Canada.205  
 
 
judicial failure,” but does little to explain in what circumstances this would apply. This proposition, however, when 
viewed through Miller JA’s (who is the Bradley Miller who authored Beguiled by Metaphors as cited in footnote 189) 
decision in Toronto v Ontario (ONSC), supra note 3 at para 94, suggests that if the issue could have been contemplated 
by the original framers, it is not a “gap” to be filled, but rather an intentional decision by the framers. Thus, it would 
be an error to consider the original intent if the constitutional framers could have considered the issue, such as 
democratic municipal elections, and it would not be an error if the issue is one the constitutional framers could “not 
have addressed – like aeronautics or nuclear energy – because they simply could not have seen it coming” (ibid).  
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In addition, the proposition that unwritten principles are interpretative aids that cannot fill 
intentional voids in the text of the Constitution, requires judges to look to the original intent to 
determine whether a void in the constitutional text was an intentional choice by the framers.206 
Failure to consider the original intent of the framers creates uncertainty in whether unwritten 
principles are filling “gaps” in the Constitution that flow “flow by necessary implication” from 
other terms of the Constitution or are creating new protections not intended to be contained within 
the text of the Constitution.207 Thus, unconstrained constitutional interpretation results in the 
provisions of the Constitution being “empty vessels” for the Supreme Court of Canada to fill with 
the purposes they see fit as opposed to filling legitimate gaps. This is supported by Miller JA who 
explains that gaps in the text of the Constitution that flow by necessary implication from other 
provisions of the Constitution are rare.208 As a result, the “gap-filling” purpose of unwritten 
principles is rare and is limited by the purpose of the text of the provisions of the Constitution and 
the other constraints on constitutional interpretation.  
 
 3.1.3 Constitutional Interpretation Applied to Civic Democracy 
 In the context of civic democracy, the current written text of the Constitution is unable to 
provide the democratic protection necessary. City councils are not included in the written text of 
section 3 of the Charter, nor is the right to democratic municipal elections inherent in section 92(8) 
of the Constitution Act, 1867.209 The ONCA held, in Toronto v Ontario (ONCA), that:  
 
Municipal institutions lack constitutional status. Section 3 democratic rights were 
not extended to candidates or electors with respect to municipal councils. These are 
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not gaps in the Constitution – oversights or slips by the framers of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 and the Constitution Act, 1982 that can be addressed judicially. If the 
Constitution is to be amended, the Constitution Act, 1982 provides a mechanism 
for amending it.210 
 
I argue that this is the correct interpretation. Constitutional interpretation, even through living 
constitutionalism, cannot informally amend the purpose or text of the Constitution. Further, the 
alternatives to a formal amendment discussed in Chapter 5 would allow the Supreme Court of 
Canada to use unconstrained constitutional interpretation to informally amend the Constitution as 
the formal amendment procedures contained in the Constitution Act, 1982 would be disregarded. 
Notably, section 52(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982, states that “[a]mendments to the Constitution 
of Canada shall be made only in accordance with the authority contained in the Constitution of 
Canada.”211 Thus, section 52(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982 renders the amendments by judicial 
interpretation unconstitutional; however, as the Supreme Court of Canada is the final arbiter of the 
Constitution pursuant to the Supreme Court Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
interpretation of the Constitution is as supreme as the text of the Constitution itself and therefore, 
any informal amendment would be deemed constitutional by virtue of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s interpretation and, of course, not considered to be an amendment.212 
 
 3.1.4 Conclusion: Constitutional Interpretation 
 Unwritten constitutional principles and living constitutionalism work together to allow the 
Constitution to adapt to the changing of times.213 The Constitution has been held to be a “living 
tree” and thus, must be interpreted to reflect current reality. Living constitutionalism, however, 
must have limits and is constrained by precedent, the historical context and, inter alia, the written 
text of the Constitution.214 Civic democracy does not fit within the current text of the Constitution 
and the precedent set by the Supreme Court of Canada does not support such an interpretation. As 
a result, a formal amendment to the Constitution is required. Even if living constitutionalism and 
unwritten principles could provide constitutional protection for civic democracy through 
constitutional interpretation, the alternative approaches discussed in Chapter 5 would not provide 
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the legal certainty and predictability of the written Constitution, leaving the constitutional 
protection of democratic civic elections in the uncertain hands of unconstrained constitutional 
interpretation.  
 
3.2 Democracy and the Constitution 
Canadian democracy is more complex than a simple right to vote.215 As explained below, 
Canadian democracy includes effective representation for citizens within government and 
providing governments the legislative tools to effectively represent their constituents. As well as 
democratic rights being entrenched in section 3 of the Charter, democracy has been identified as 
one of four unwritten constitutional principles.216 This subchapter sets out the judicial treatment of 
democracy, which leads to a discussion of whether the unwritten principles can invalidate 
provincial laws.  
 
“[T]he democracy principle can be best understood as sort of a baseline against which the 
framers of our Constitution, and subsequently, our elected representatives under it, have always 
operated.”217 The Supreme Court of Canada explains that democracy is not simply concerned with 
the process of government, but it accommodates cultural and group identities.218 Put simply, 
democracy means that Parliament and provincial legislatures, which are at the core of the system 
of representative government, are elected by popular franchise.219 In individual terms, democracy 
provides the right to vote and to have effective representation within government.220 My analysis 
adds to these propositions and argues that democracy also entails providing governments with the 
necessary tools to effectively represent their constituents.  
 
As mentioned, section 3 of the Charter protects the right to vote in Parliament or a 
legislatively assembly, and the right to be effectively represented therein. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has noted that democratic principles are affirmed with particular clarity as section 3 of the 
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Charter is not subject to the notwithstanding clause.221 Thus, infringements of section 3 of the 
Charter cannot be saved by Parliament or a legislature pursuant to the notwithstanding clause, 
whereas infringements of other protected Charter rights may be. As discussed further below, the 
alternative approaches to protecting democratic civic elections in the Constitution would leave 
infringements subject to the notwithstanding clause and would continue to allow interference in 
civic elections. Democracy, in a sense, is also protected by section 2(b) of the Charter - freedom 
of expression.  
 
The unwritten principle of democracy is an underlying value that has been identified in a 
section 2(b) Charter analysis.222 Section 2(b) protects the freedom of expression, which the ONCA 
has held “is one of the features of modern democracy.”223 Thus, any law restricting an expressive 
activity, including an expression that promotes democracy, would infringe section 2(b) of the 
Charter and would be struck down if it did not survive a section 1 analysis. As voting in a civic 
election is an expressive activity, it is protected by section 2(b) of the Charter, but, as previously 
mentioned and further discussed below, the protection afforded by section 2(b) differs from section 
3.224  
 
While both section 3 and section 2(b) of the Charter provide protection for voting in certain 
contexts, there are fundamental differences between these two Charter provisions. First, section 
2(b), which protects voting as an expressive activity,225 does not protect effective representation.226 
The ONCA affirmed this position, holding that “the basic structure of the Charter must be 
respected.”227 Thus, while the protection of certain rights may overlap, “the content of one right 
cannot be subsumed by another, or used to inflate its content.”228 This is a logical conclusion. If 
section 2(b) and section 3 of the Charter provide the same protection for the right to vote, then 
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there would be no need for separate provisions. Further, subsuming section 3 into section 2(b) 
demonstrates the effect of unconstrained constitutional interpretation. In essence, it allows the 
Supreme Court of Canada to treat the provisions of the Constitution as “empty vessels” for the 
Supreme Court of Canada to fill as they see fit, contrary to Justice Major’s holding in the Public 
Service Employee Reference which, as a precedent, acts as a constraint on constitutional 
interpretation.229 
 
Thus, the ONCA was undoubtedly correct in overturning the decision in Toronto v Ontario 
(ONSC) which extended effective representation to the right to vote as an expressive activity. 
Section 2(b) protects the freedom of expression, but not the impact or effect of that expression.230 
In addition, the decision of the ONSC is contrary to Baier, which acts as a further constraint on 
constitutional interpretation, where the Supreme Court of Canada held that “it is not for this Court 
to create constitutional rights in respect to a third order of government where the words of the 
Constitution read in context do not do so.”231 In Baier, a constitutional challenge was brought in 
relation to Alberta legislation that restricted school employees from running for election as school 
trustees in the jurisdiction they were employed.232 The Supreme Court of Canada held that this did 
not infringe section 2(b) as public school boards have “no constitutional status”,233 like cities and 
city councils. As a result, the Supreme Court of Canada has previously considered interpreting the 
Constitution to provide protection to elections outside of those protected by section 3 of the 
Charter234 and determined it was not the Supreme Court of Canada’s place to do so. Baier aligns 
with Justice Major’s holding in the Public Service Employee Reference and, as constraints on 
constitutional interpretation, support the conclusion that section 2(b) and section 3 do not provide 
analogous constitutional protections.  
 
Second, section 2(b) of the Charter is subject to the notwithstanding clause, whereas 
section 3 of the Charter is not. Section 33 of the Charter codifies the notwithstanding clause and 
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allows Parliament or the legislatures to declare that an act or provision of an act shall operate 
notwithstanding section 2 or 7 to 15 of the Charter.235 Although declarations made pursuant to the 
section cease to have effect after five years, they may be renewed indefinitely. This is important 
as section 33 of the Charter does not apply to an infringement of section 3. The notwithstanding 
clause allows provincial legislatures to continue infringing a right to vote protected under section 
2(b), even if it is interpreted to protect effective representation. Therefore, treating section 2(b) 
and section 3 of the Charter the same, would not provide the legal certainty and predictability that 
the written Constitution and civic democracy require. Further, subsuming section 3 into section 
2(b) would not provide city councils with the tools they require to effectively represent their 
constituents. 
 
Mariana Valverde explains that “[e]ven if the Supreme Court were to agree that fair local 
elections under stable rules are a democratic right enshrined in Canadian law, that guarantee would 
be just one element of the far larger, more complex, historically-shaped political-legal assemblage 
that is known worldwide as Canadian democracy.”236 As a result, properly entrenching civic 
democracy in the Constitution must go beyond the right to vote. Effective representation gives 
citizens the right to be represented in government, and to do so city councils must be provided 
with the appropriate tools, including constitutionally protected legislative and revenue raising 
powers, to give them the ability effectively represent their constituents.  
 
 Thus, the right to vote is protected, albeit differently depending on the level of government, 
by both section 3 and section 2(b) of the Charter. The two main differences between section 3 and 
section 2(b) are that section 3 protects effective representation whereas section 2(b) does not, and 
that section 3 is not subject to the notwithstanding clause, whereas section 2(b) is. Therefore, 
interpreting section 2(b) of the Charter to protect effective representation is not a sufficient 
solution to protect civic democracy or recognize the increased and increasing legislative role of 
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3.3 Unwritten Constitutional Principles and Provincial Legislation 
 As previously mentioned in this Chapter, there is an ongoing debate as to whether unwritten 
constitutional principles are interpretative aids or have the full effect of the written text of the 
Constitution.237 This debate was before the Supreme Court of Canada in Toronto v Ontario (SCC) 
and extends to whether laws can be struck down as unconstitutional based on unwritten principles 
as opposed to a written provision of the Constitution.  
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada has held that unwritten principles are interpretative aids that 
breathe life into the written provisions of the Constitution.238 In the very same decision, the 
Supreme Court of Canada also states that “[u]nderlying constitutional principles may in certain 
circumstances give rise to substantive legal obligations (have ‘full legal force’…) which constitute 
substantive limitations upon government action.”239 Further, unwritten constitutional principles 
are “invested with a powerful normative force, and are binding upon both courts and 
governments.”240 In Imperial Tobacco, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the unwritten 
principle of democracy very strongly favours “upholding the validity of legislation that conforms 
to the express terms of the Constitution.”241 Thus, the conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Canada have created uncertainty as to whether unwritten constitutional principles are hardened 
doctrinal precedent that can invalidate laws, or are merely interpretative aids. To date, the debate 
over whether unwritten principles invalidating legislation has not yet been settled; however, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has granted leave on this exact issue. 242 
 
 David Schneiderman’s view is that unwritten constitutional principles were not meant to 
develop into hardened doctrinal precedent but were used strategically to get the Supreme Court of 
Canada out of a jam.243 This is supported by the fact that in both the Secession Reference, where 
the four unwritten constitutional principles were identified, and in the Supreme Court Reference, 
where the Supreme Court of Canada elevated a regular parliamentary statute to constitutional 
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status, had a potentially negative effect on the Supreme Court of Canada. In the Secession 
Reference, the government of Quebec refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
of Canada and Schneiderman explains that, “[t]he legitimacy of the Supreme Court of Canada 
hung in the balance… [t]he Justices would seemingly do whatever it took to maintain, and if need 
be, restore the Court’s reputation.”244 In the Supreme Court Reference, the composition of the 
Supreme Court of Canada hung in the balance. These two cases support the view that the Supreme 
Court of Canada has generally used unwritten constitutional principles strategically, or 
disingenuously, as stated by Schneiderman, to get the Supreme Court of Canada out of a jam and 
were not intended to harden into doctrinal precedent.245 Schneiderman, however, acknowledges 
that this “does not mean that unwritten principles will not evolve into something more legally 
robust having precedential value.”246 While Schneiderman takes the view that unwritten 
constitutional principles ought not to be able to invalidate otherwise valid laws, he acknowledges 
that they may evolve to do so, which exacerbates the uncertainty surrounding the power of 
unwritten constitutional principles.  
 
 In Toronto v Ontario (ONCA), the Court held that “unwritten constitutional principles do 
not invest the judiciary with a free-standing power to invalidate legislation.”247 In my view, this is 
the correct position on the use of unwritten constitutional principles.248 As noted by Richard 
Albert, the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of the Constitution is as supreme and binding 
as the text thereof.249 Thus, if the Supreme Court of Canada uses unwritten principles to interpret 
the text of the Constitution to protect democratic civic elections, the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
interpretation becomes as binding as the text itself. In effect, the Supreme Court Reference, in 
conjunction with unconstrained living constitutionalism, allows the Supreme Court of Canada to 
treat the provisions of the Constitution as “empty vessels” to interpret and fill with purposes as the 
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Supreme Court of Canada sees fit and use its interpretation to strike down otherwise valid laws. 
Further, unconstrained living constitutionalism would create considerable uncertainty for 
legislators, the judiciary and citizens. 
 
In contrast, natural law theorists have supported the idea of permitting unwritten 
constitutional principles to invalidate or strike down laws.250 As noted by Beverley McLachlin, 
“the debate is not about whether judges should ever use unwritten constitutional norms to 
invalidate laws, but rather, about what norms may justify such action.”251 In response to the 
contention that this grants judges a legislative power, Beverley McLachlin states that “[i]t is not 
making the law, but interpreting, reconciling and applying the law, thus fulfilling the judge’s role 
as a guarantor of the Constitution.”252 If the constraints on constitutional interpretation are 
respected, McLachlin’s position is reconcilable with my view, as constitutional interpretation 
would be limited to the purpose of the written provisions of the Constitution, having regard to the 
text, historical context and relevant precedents. To go further and entrench protected rights, such 
as democratic civic elections, that do not exist in the text of the Constitution is an unconstitutional 
amendment pursuant to section 52(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982. As discussed in the next 
Chapter, this is what Toronto is asking the Supreme Court of Canada to do in Toronto v Ontario 
(SCC).  
 
The application of unwritten principles is limited by the same constraints as living 
constitutionalism. Thus, whether unwritten principles support an alleged constitutional 
interpretation is limited by the text, historical context and inter alia, precedent. As a result of this, 
unwritten principles cannot be utilized to fill the provisions of the Constitution as if they are 
“empty vessels” as the alternative approaches discussed in Chapter 5 do. Extending the application 
of unwritten principles beyond these constraints, allows the Supreme Court of Canada to re-frame 
the provisions of the Constitution as they desire, as opposed to informing the interpretation of the 
written text and filling legitimate, but rare, gaps in the constitutional text.253 To decide otherwise, 
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creates significant uncertainty in the application of the Constitution and may open the floodgates 
of constitutional challenges as new constitutional protections would be decided by the Supreme 
Court of Canada and not Parliament and/or the provincial legislatures as the formal amendment 
rules contained in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 require.  
 
In contrast, unconstrained constitutional interpretation could result in the Supreme Court 
of Canada interpreting the Constitution in a manner that would provide protections outside of the 
written text, which then become as binding as the text of the Constitution. Thus, unwritten 
principles in conjunction with unconstrained constitutional interpretation, may lead to 
interpretations that can invalidate laws and arguably render the formal amendment procedures 
meaningless, allowing the Supreme Court of Canada to determine constitutional rights and 
protections in place of the democratic process contemplated by the formal amendment rules.254 
 
3.4 Conclusion: Chapter 3 
 Although the Constitution has been held to be a “living tree”, constitutional interpretation 
must be subject to constraints, such as the written text, the historical context and precedent. These 
constraints do not permit an interpretation to protect democratic civic elections as argued in 
Toronto v Ontario. The exclusion of civic elections from section 3 of the Charter is not an 
oversight that can be addressed judicially, despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s identification 
and application of the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy. To decide otherwise, would 
rely on unconstrained constitutional interpretation, which creates uncertainty in the application of 
the Constitution and disregards the democratic process contemplated by the formal amendment 
rules codified in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982.255 While candidates and voters in civic 
elections are guaranteed limited protection under section 2(b) of the Charter, freedom of 
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expression does not adequately protect democracy in civic elections and continues to allow upper 





4. INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIC DEMOCRACY 
In the previous Chapters, I have explained that civic democracy is not constitutionally 
protected and that the constraints on living constitutionalism do not support the current provisions 
of the Constitution being interpreted to do so. As a result, municipal institutions “are subject to 
the… constant threat of sudden amalgamation, complete restructuring, overturning of locally-
elaborated official plans, and, perhaps most scandalous, the replacement of elected leaders by 
appointed ones.”256 Mariana Valverde goes on to explain that “the province’s legal powers 
continue to hang like swords over all municipalities, and these powers remain available for use by 
future majority governments”.257 The province’s plenary power over cities has allowed provinces 
to interfere with civic democracy in two ways. First, provinces can interfere with elected city 
councillors acting in their legislative capacity and second, provinces have interfered with the 
election process.  
 
4.1 Interference with Elected Officials  
 Interference with elected city councillors can occur one of two ways. First, provincial 
legislation in Canada allows certain provinces to interfere with elected city councillors once they 
are elected to office. Second, interference also occurs by the provincial legislatures plenary power 
“hanging like swords” over city councillors to influence their “democratic” decision making and 
deliberations at city council meetings.  
 
 4.1.1 Interference by Legislative Powers 
 Several provinces have passed legislation that grants the provincial cabinet the power to 
remove a city councillor, or the entire city council, from office. Other provincial legislation allows 
the provincial cabinet to limit the powers of cities if it is in the provincial interest to do so. These 
provisions grant provinces the ability to influence city council decisions, despite the broad 
legislative powers that provincial legislatures have granted to city councils. 
 
 In Saskatchewan, the LGEA codifies a democratic election process for cities and 
municipalities, in theory creating a representative democracy. Despite this ostensibly democratic 
 





process, The Cities Act grants the Lieutenant Governor in Council (“LGIC”) the power to remove 
the Mayor or any other city councillor if it is in the public interest to do so.258 Once the LGIC has 
removed the mayor or a city councillor, the LGIC has the option to appoint a person to replace the 
removed councillor.259 Notably, clause 358.1(1)(b) of The Cities Act allows the LGIC to replace 
“all of the council for a city” providing the LGIC the express authority to remove the entirety of a 
democratically elected city council. Any replacements are vested with the same powers and 
authority of the mayor or councillor and the city must provide remuneration for the replacement.260 
Lastly, if the LGIC makes an order under this section, the minister must also appoint a returning 
officer and fix a nomination period for replacement of the removed councillors.261 Thus, the 
replacements appointed by the LGIC upon removal from office are temporary, until a new 
councillor, mayor or entire city council can be elected.   
 
 Interestingly, clause 358.1(4)(e) of The Cities Act states that the LGEA does not apply to 
the replacement election after a councillor is removed. Rather, The Cities Act vests the power in 
the minister to make any order necessary or that the minister considers appropriate to achieve the 
purposes of the LGEA,262 ensure the election is conducted in accordance with the LGEA,263 or in 
any manner that the minister considers advisable.264 While section 358.1 of The Cities Act has not 
yet been utilized, considerable authority is vested in the LGIC and the minister to exercise control 
over elected city councillors through this provision and the process to replace a removed 
councillor. As discussed further in this Chapter, this provision could allow provincial government 
actors to influence city councillors to align their views with the province or risk being removed 
from office. As a result, city councillors may be prioritizing provincial interests over that of their 
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 While The Cities Act requires the replacement power to be exercised in the “public 
interest”, the power is vested in the LGIC to remove elected officials. Therefore, the public interest 
is effectively the provincial interest, as it is a provincial actor who decides what is and is not in the 
public interest.265 It is likely that this term was chosen as it is intentionally vague and grants the 
LGIC, on the advice of the provincial cabinet, considerable authority to determine what the public 
interest is. In addition, this provision does not mandate any method of investigation, report or 
hearing prior to removal. In other provinces, the procedure to remove elected city officials is more 
robust and requires certain inspections or investigations to be undertaken prior to removal.  
 
 In Alberta, section 574 of Alberta’s Municipal Government Act allows the minister to direct 
city council, the chief administrative officer or a designated officer to do anything the minister 
considers appropriate if the minister concludes, based on certain inspections, the city is being 
managed in “an irregular, improper or improvident manner”.266 Prior to such direction, the minister 
must direct an inspection under section 571 or an inquiry under section 572 of The Municipal 
Government Act.267 If the minister determines that an order pursuant to subsection 574(1) is not 
satisfactorily carried out and the city continues to be managed in an irregular, improper or 
improvident manner, subsection 574(2) permits the minister to, inter alia, dismiss the council or a 
member of it.268 Further, prior to dismissing council or a member thereof, the minister must attempt 
all reasonable efforts to resolve the situation,269 which creates a much more comprehensive 
dismissal procedure than The Cities Act in Saskatchewan. 
 
 
265 See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1 at s 58 states that each Province shall have a Lieutenant Governor who is 
appointed by the Governor General in Council on the advice of the Premier. LGIC’s generally act, however, on the 
advice of the provincial cabinet or executive council in the relevant province. See Government of Saskatchewan “The 
Lieutenant Governor of Saskatchewan” (2021) Online: Lieutenant Governor of Saskatchewan 
<http://ltgov.sk.ca/role/role-responsibilities> which states that the LGIC “…acts on the advice of the Premier and the 
government, but has the right to advise, encourage, and to warn.” See also Government of Alberta “Lieutenant 
Governor in Council” (2021) Online: Lieutenant Governor of Alberta <https://www.lieutenantg 
overnor.ab.ca/CFCMS/roles-of-the-lieutenant-governor/lieutenant-governor-in-council/> which states that “[t]he 
term ‘Lieutenant Governor in Council’ appears in many government documents, such as acts of legislation. Legally, 
it refers to the Lieutenant Governor acting on and with the advice of the Executive Council or Cabinet. When a Cabinet 
makes a decision and is has been approved by the Lieutenant Governor, it is said to have been made by the Lieutenant 
Governor in Council.” 
266 Alberta’s Municipal Government Act, supra note 88 at s 574(1). See also similar provisions in The Municipal 
Government Act, RSPEI 1988, c M-12.1 at s 219 and The Municipal Act, RSY 2002 c 154 at s 337. 
267 Ibid.  
268 Ibid at s 574(2)(h).  




Broadly, section 571 of Alberta’s Municipal Government Act requires the minister to order 
an inspection of the “management, administration or operation of any municipality”, either on the 
minister’s own initiative,270 if requested by city council271 or if the minister receives a petition 
signed by 20% of the population.272 The “management, administration or operation of any 
municipality” includes the affairs of the city,273 the conduct of a councillor, employee or agent of 
the city,274 or the conduct of a person who has an agreement with the city, relating to the conduct 
of the city or the person pursuant to that agreement.275 Section 572 of The Municipal Government 
Act allows the minister, on its own initiative, to conduct an inquiry into the same matters as section 
571.276 On top of the rigorous inquiry or inspection procedures, The Municipal Government Act 
also contemplates procedural fairness for city councillors.  
 
Prior to making an order dismissing a city council or a member thereof, and unlike 
Saskatchewan, the minister in Alberta must give the city notice of the intended order and provide 
14-days to respond.277 While Alberta has many more procedural safeguards in place, the effect 
remains the same. The terms “improvident, imprudent or irregular” as used in Alberta’s Municipal 
Government Act are not defined. This grants considerable leeway to the minister to determine what 
is and is not “imprudent, irregular or improvident.” What is not in the public interest, could also 
be “improvident, imprudent or irregular” rendering the effect of these two provisions the same. 
Either way, it grants the province the ability to interfere with city councils that are elected pursuant 
to a democratic process to represent their constituents.  
 
Ontario has taken a different approach to interfere with elected city councils through 
provincial legislation. The City of Toronto Act allows the LGIC to “make regulations imposing 
limits and conditions on the power of the City under sections 7, 8 and 267 or Part XII.1 or providing 
that the City cannot exercise the power in prescribed circumstances”, if the LGIC considers it in 
 
270 Ibid at s 571(1)(a). 
271 Ibid at s 571(1)(b). 
272 Ibid at s 571(1)(c). 
273 Ibid at s 571(1.1)(a). 
274 Ibid at s 571(1.1)(b). 
275 Ibid at s 571(1.1)(c). 
276 Ibid at s 572. 




the provincial interest to do.278 Sections 7 and 8 of The City of Toronto Act set out Toronto’s natural 
person power and broad bylaw making powers. Despite the fact that section 2 codifies broad 
legislative powers for Toronto’s city council, Queen’s Park has seen fit to grant broad legislative 
powers but retain the ability to limit those powers by regulation, which does not follow the same 
democratic process as the passing of legislation.279 While The City of Toronto Act does not have 
express provisions relating to the removal of elected officials, the LGIC has significant and broad 
authority to limit the legislative powers of Toronto’s city council, overriding the democratic 
process followed by Toronto’s City Council.  
 
As explained by Andrew Sancton, the use of the legislative tools granted to Toronto in The 
City of Toronto Act are ultimately decided by Queen’s Park.280 Like Saskatchewan and Alberta, 
this has the potential to compromise an elected city councillor’s independence in voting for the 
interests of the electorate, diluting a constituent’s effective representation within a city council. 
Unlike Saskatchewan and Alberta, the LGIC in Ontario does not have the legislative ability to 
remove elected city councillors but can limit their powers through regulations, which defeats the 
purpose of providing cities with broad bylaw making powers to act in the interest of their 
constituents. Further, like the definitions of “public interest” and “improvident, imprudent or 
irregular”, the definition of provincial interest is similarly vague. These terms create a moving 
target as it vests complete authority for provincial actors to define and apply them. Thus, what is 
in the provincial interest today, may not be tomorrow. This creates considerable uncertainty for 
city councils and allows provincial actors to impede the democratic process of city councils 
through threats to remove autonomy or to reduce revenue sharing or government transfers to cities. 
 
 4.1.2 Interference by the “Hanging Sword” 
The second form of provincial interference with elected city councillors occurs when 
provincial actors, through conduct, force city councillors to align their views with the provincial 
government. This can occur outside of the legislative context or as a result of legislation, as 
discussed below.  
 
278 See City of Toronto Act, supra note 54 at s 25(1). 
279 Ibid at s 2. In addition, The City of Toronto Act states that “[t]he City may provide any service or thing that the City 
considers necessary or desirable for the public” (ibid at s 8(1)). 




On January 20, 2021, a city councillor in Regina, Saskatchewan brought forth a motion to 
the Executive Committee of City Council to amend the Sponsorship, Naming Rights & 
Advertising Policy to ban fossil fuel companies from sponsoring civic facilities.281 The reasoning 
behind this motion was to support Regina’s local value of sustainable energy. At the Executive 
Committee level, the vote passed 7-4 and was to be voted on at the January 27, 2021 meeting of 
Regina’s City Council.282 After the Executive Committee meeting, but before the meeting of City 
Council, the premier of Saskatchewan gave his thoughts on the motion, as follows:  
 
This motion is a hypocritical attack on the hardworking workers and employers that 





Should this motion pass Regina city council next week, our government will 
seriously consider the future sponsorships to the City of Regina from provincial 
energy companies like SaskEnergy and SaskPower.284 
 
The Premier also called the motion “absurd”285 prior to threatening to pull approximately $33 
million dollars in funding from Regina; funding that is collected by a provincial crown corporation 
from Regina’s residents and remitted to Regina.286 On top of the threat to pull funding, Regina 
City Councillors could also be removed from council pursuant to section 358.1 of The Cities Act, 
although the Premier did not raise this in his comments. Not surprisingly, at Regina’s January 27, 
2021 meeting of City Council, the motion did not pass.287  
 
281 See Alec Salloum, Premier blasts Regina’s executive committee for proposing ban on fossil fuel advertisers (20 
January 2021) Online: Regina Leader Post < https://leaderpost.com/news/local-news/premier-blasts-regina-
executive-committee-for-proposing-ban-on-fossil-fuel-advertisers>. 
282 Ibid. 
283 David Giles, Motion banning fossil fuel advertisements in Regina loses more support (25 January 2021) Online: 
Global News <https://globalnews.ca/news/7597818/motion-fossil-fuel-advertisements-regina/>.  
284 Ibid.  
285 Mickey Djuric, Regina weighs ban of fossil fuel sponsorships, drawing ire of Sask. Premier, (21 January 2021) 
Online: CBC News < https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/city-of-regina-fossil-fuel-advertised-
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 On top of interference from the Premier of Saskatchewan, an MP also weighed in, stating 
he was “outraged” and that the motion showed how “out of touch these councillors were.”288 After 
Regina’s City Council voted against the motion, the MP further stated “[i]t’s a good thing that 
they’ve come to the right position, but it shouldn’t have taken a public backlash for them to know 
how to represent their own constituents.”289 In effect, both the Saskatchewan Premier and the MP 
imposed their views on what is best for constituents in Regina on Regina’s elected officials, 
amounting to interference with elected city councillors and an intrusion into the democratic process 
of city council. Rather than supplanting their own views of what is in the best interests of 
constituents, the Premier and the MP ought to have let the democratic process take its course as 
opposed to using their political positions to interfere with the democratic process. Ironically, 
removing millions of dollars of funding is clearly not in the best interest of Regina residents, yet 
the Premier threatened to do so.  
 
 In addition, other municipal legislation limits the authority of city councillors. For example, 
The Planning and Development Act290 in Saskatchewan states one of its purposes is identifying 
“provincial interests that guide provincial and municipal planning decisions in the development of 
communities.”291 Further, section 8 of the PDA requires every district plan, community plan, 
regional plan, subdivision bylaw or zoning bylaw to be consistent with provincial land use policies 
and statements of provincial interest. Additionally, the minister can direct that a council prepare 
and adopt an official community plan and allows the minister to direct amendments to the plan 
that the council shall adopt.292 Ontario’s legislation contains analogous provisions that allow a 
minister to refuse an amendment to a development plan if it is not in the provincial interest.293 
Thus, a city council’s autonomy under planning and development legislation is limited to that of 
the provincial interest as opposed to that of the electorate, diluting effective representation within 
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 4.1.3 Conclusion: Interference with Elected Officials 
 Interference with elected city councillors can occur through provincial governments 
granting themselves powers to remove city councillors or limit the authority and powers of city 
councils. Further, interference can occur through the conduct of government actors through threats 
to remove city funding or to use the legislative powers discussed in this subchapter as “hanging 
swords” to interfere with the democratic process of city councils. While provincial legislatures 
have seen fit to grant city councils broad legislative powers to do what is best for their respective 
jurisdictions, they have also reserved the right to interfere in city council’s democratic legislative 
role. This can be done by the provincial cabinet removing democratically elected city councillors 
from office and appointing replacements, or by threatening to pull funding if city councils do not 
align their views with the provincial interest. Thus, while Dillon’s rule has been diluted, provincial 
legislatures have also seen fit to continue keeping a “watchful eye” on city councils and interfere 
if they so desire. Such interference is a blatant intrusion into civic democracy as upper levels of 
government are dictating what is best for constituents within cities. 
 
4.2 Interference with the Election Process 
 Provincial governments have also used their plenary power over cities to interfere with the 
electoral process. First, this subchapter will discuss the most blatant example of this, being the 
2018 civic election in Toronto. Second, this subchapter will discuss other examples of interference 
which cities have faced. 
 
 4.2.1 The 2018 Civic Election in Toronto 
 By way of background, the 2018 civic election in Toronto began with the drop of the writ 
on May 1, 2018.294 On this date, the election period commenced based on a 47-ward electoral 
platform.295 Election day was October 22, 2018;296 however, on August 15, 2018, the BLGA was 
passed, which amended the electoral platform to a 25-ward structure.297 The BLGA took immediate 
effect, meaning that after August 15, 2018, candidate’s campaigns were based on an entirely 
 
294 See Toronto v Ontario (ONSC), supra note 3 at para 4. 
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different ward structure than when the election period commenced.298 This increased the number 
of voters in each ward by approximately 50,000 people.299  
 
 The rationale for passing the BLGA was articulated by the Minister of Municipal Affairs 
and Housing, who set out three objectives:  
 
First, they [councillors in support of a 25-ward model] agree that a smaller council will 
lead to better decision-making at Toronto city hall, which would benefit Toronto as a 
whole. They gave an example of the current 44-member council have 10-hour debates on 
issues that would end with the vast majority of councillors voting the same as they would 
have at the beginning of the debate… 
 
Second, they point out that it will save money… 
 
Third, it would result in a fair vote for residents, which was the very reason Toronto itself 
undertook a review of its ward boundaries. The Toronto councillors I referred to earlier 
reminded everyone that the Supreme Court of Canada said that voter parity is a prime 
condition of effective representation. They gave examples of the current ward system, 
where there are more than 80,000 residents in one ward and 35,000 in another. They 
acknowledge that this voter disparity is the result of self-interest, and that the federal and 
provincial electoral district process is better because it is an independent process which 
should apply to Toronto as well. … The wards we are proposing are arrived at through an 
independent process.300 
 
The 2018 Toronto election represents another example of the Provincial legislature supplanting 
their views of what is best for Toronto and its constituents. As noted by Justice Belobaba in 
Toronto v Ontario (ONSC), “[h]ere, there is no evidence that any other options or approaches were 
considered or that any consultation ever took place. It appears that Bill 5 was hurriedly enacted to 
take effect in the middle of the City’s election without much thought at all, more out of pique than 
principle.”301The lack of formal consultation and consideration of other options in this scenario is 
especially concerning as subsection 1(3) of The City of Toronto Act requires the Province to consult 
 
298 See Des Rosiers, supra note 137 at 62 where the writer explains the impact on candidates as follows, “many had 
spent money, devised a strategy, and connected with voters in a ward.”. On top of this, candidates would have had to 
explain the ward changes to voters, which would take away from the impact of the message relating to their electoral 
platform: see Toronto v Ontario (ONSC), supra note 3 at para 31.  
299 See Toronto v Ontario (ONSC), supra note 3 at para 4. 
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with Toronto on matters of mutual interest.302 While some councillors appear to have supported 
the ward change, support was not universal as evidenced by the constitutional challenge of the 
BLGA to the ONSC, the appeal to the ONCA and the subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
 
 Justice Belobaba of the ONSC struck down the BLGA as infringing section 2(b) Charter 
rights “in two ways: (i) because the Bill was enacted in the middle of an ongoing election 
campaign, it breached the municipal candidate’s freedom of expression and (ii) because Bill 5 
almost doubled the population size of City wards from an average of 61,000 to an average of 
111,000, it breached the municipal voter’s right to cast a vote than can result in effective 
representation.”303 In finding that the BLGA infringed freedom expression for candidates, Justice 
Belobaba noted, “[t]he candidates’ efforts to convey their political message about the issues in 
their particular wards were severely frustrated and disrupted. Some candidates persevered; other 
dropped out of the race entirely.”304 Justice Belobaba further held that “where a democratic 
platform is provided…, and the election has begun, expressive activity in connection with that 
platform is protected against legislative interference”.305 Thus, the BLGA substantially interfered 
with freedom of expression of candidates and was not saved by section 1 of the Charter.306 
 
 In regard to the voter’s section 2(b) Charter rights, Justice Belobaba imported the concept 
of effective representation from section 3 of the Charter and extended it to the expressive activity 
of voting protected by section 2(b) of the Charter and struck down the BLGA as unconstitutional.307 
Justice Belobaba held that the concept of effective representation is not rooted in section 3 of the 
Charter as its origins can be traced back to “Canada’s founding fathers”.308 In sum, Justice 
 
302 See The City of Toronto Act, supra note 54 at s 1(3) which requires the Province and City to enter into an agreement 
relating to consultation. This led to the Toronto-Ontario Cooperation and Consultation Agreement which requires 
consultation on any proposed legislation that will have a significant policy impact on the City. See also Toronto v 
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305 Toronto v Ontario (ONSC), supra note 3 at para 37.  
306 Ibid at para 37. 
307 Ibid at paras 40 and 46.  




Belobaba found that, if the province provides a democratic civic election process, then such right 
must be consistent with the Constitution.309 Therefore, the BLGA also infringed the voters section 
2(b) Charter rights and was not saved by section 1 of the Charter.  
 
 Section 1 did not justify the infringement as, according to Justice Belobaba, there was no 
evidence of a pressing and substantial objective.310 No other approaches were considered by 
Ontario and the BLGA was, as mentioned above, “hurriedly enacted to take effect in the middle of 
the City’s election without much thought at all.”311 Further, there was no evidence showing why 
the BLGA must be passed in the middle of an ongoing election.312 Thus, the infringement could 
not be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society and the BLGA was struck down.  
 
Notably, Justice Belobaba did not consider the democratic legislative role of city councils 
in extending effective representation to the expressive activity of voting in a civic election. There 
was no analysis on the current legislative role of cities, living constitutionalism or the constraints 
thereon. Justice Belobaba merely held that Charter rights can overlap313 and there is no “principled 
reason why in an appropriate case the ‘effective representation’ value cannot inform other related 
Charter provisions such as the voter’s right to freedom of expression under s. 2(b).”314 
 
Further, by referring to the origins of effective representation, as discussed above, Justice 
Belobaba relied on the historical context to extend effective representation to section 2(b). 
However, the historical context of effective representation within city councils does not support 
Justice Belobaba’s conclusion. As previously mentioned, Canadian cities are derivative of cities 
 
309 Ibid at para 49. See also Toronto v Ontario (SCC Leave Decision) (Memorandum of Argument of the Intervenor- 
The International Commission of Jurists) cited in Archer & Sobat, supra note 9 at 11 where the author summarizes 
the intervenors argument that “[b]ecause the Province adopted a specific model for democratic municipal institutions 
under section 92(8), the fundamental democratic principles of section 3, as well as the principles of constitutionalism 
and the rule of law, preclude Ontario from undermining free expression in the electoral process.”  
310 See Toronto v Ontario (ONSC), supra note 3 at para 78. See also R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200 
where the SCC set out the test to determine whether a Charter infringement can be saved by section 1 of the Charter, 
as follows: (1) a pressing and substantial objective; (2) rational connection; (3) minimal impairment; and (4) balance 
of convenience.  
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in the United Kingdom and were not designed to be democratically accountable.315 In addition, 
originalism has debatably been rejected by the courts and Justice Belobaba ought to have relied on 
the purpose of section 2(b), in accordance with living constitutionalism, to determine whether 
section 2(b) ought to protect the right to effective representation within a city council. Had Justice 
Belobaba considered the purposive methodology required by living constitutionalism and the 
constraints thereon, it is likely a different conclusion would have been reached as section 2(b) has 
been held to protect the freedom of expression, not the impact or effect of that expression.  
 
 On appeal, the ONCA convened a five-member panel and overturned the decision of the 
ONSC in a split 3-2 decision. For the majority, Miller JA made three important conclusions. First, 
that section 2(b) Charter rights do not guarantee effective representation as “sections 2(b) and 3 
guarantee distinct rights that must be given independent meaning”.316 Second, that “[s]ection 3 
democratic rights were not extended to candidates or electors with respect to municipal councils” 
and that this is not a “gap” that can be addressed judicially.317 Third, that unwritten constitutional 
principles cannot invalidate provincial laws.318 The result of the majority decision in Toronto v 
Ontario (ONCA) confirms the plenary power of the provincial legislatures over cities.  
 
 At the ONCA, Toronto argued that section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 contains an 
unwritten proviso that “the right to democratic municipal elections has been inherent in 92(8) from 
the time of Confederation.”319 The ONCA rejected this argument holding that section 92(8) merely 
set out the legislatures’ law-making authority with respect to municipal institutions;320 there is no 
deeper purpose to such provision. As noted, the ONCA’s decision aligns with the history of 
municipal institutions, including cities, at the time of Confederation as Canadian cities were not 
originally designed to be democratically accountable and if they were, the original framers of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 could have provided constitutional protection, but did not.321 As mentioned, 
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I agree with the decision of Miller JA as he was live to the constraints on constitutional 
interpretation, being, inter alia, the text of the Constitution, the historical context and precedent.322  
 
 In dissent, Macpherson JA would have struck down the impugned provisions of the BLGA 
as breaching freedom of expression noting that section 2(b) of the Charter “safeguards the integrity 
and stability of the democratic foundation on which elections are based.”323 MacPherson JA further 
held that the BLGA represented a substantial attack on the centrepiece of democracy, “in an 
established order of Canadian government – an active election in a major Canadian 
Municipality”.324 MacPherson JA distinguished Baier by pointing out that the BLGA was enacted 
mid-election whereas the legislation in Baier was not, the BLGA did not exclude a class of people 
from running in an election (as the legislation did in Baier) and that Baier was a positive rights 
claim, whereas, in Macpherson JA’s view, Toronto v Ontario was not.325 Regarding the use of 
unwritten principles, MacPherson JA agreed with the majority that they cannot be used to strike 
down validly passed legislation.326 Thus, the dissenting opinion found that the BLGA infringed the 
candidate’s and voter’s freedom of expression and could not be saved by section 1 of the Charter; 
however, the ONCA was unanimous in holding that unwritten constitutional principles cannot 
invalidate laws.  
 
Since the ONCA decision, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has been 
granted three distinct issues. (1) Does section 2(b) of the Charter protect the expression of electoral 
participants from substantial mid-election changes to the election framework rules? (2) Can the 
unwritten constitutional principles of democracy or the rule of law be used as a basis for striking 
down the BLGA? (3) Are municipal electors who are given a vote in a democratic election entitled 
to effective representation?327 As discussed throughout my analysis, the proper application of 
living constitutionalism does not allow the Supreme Court of Canada to accept any of the 
alternative approaches set out in Chapter 5. Should the Supreme Court of Canada accept an 
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alternative approach, however, the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation becomes as binding 
as the text of the Constitution, regardless of whether the constraints on constitutional interpretation 
are respected. Thus, while not ideal, unconstrained constitutional interpretation may provide some 
protection for civic democracy in the absence of a formal amendment.  
 
 4.2.2 Other Examples of Civic Election Interference 
 While Toronto v Ontario is the most blatant example of provincial interference with the 
civic election process, it does not exist in isolation. This subchapter discusses other examples of 
civic election interference that have been challenged through the courts.  
 
 In East York, the Ontario legislature introduced Bill 103, which created the “megacity” of 
Toronto.328 Bill 103 combined the cities of Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, Toronto, York 
and the borough of East York into one body corporate under the name of the City of Toronto.329 
Bill 103 further set out that the city council of the new City of Toronto would be comprised of a 
mayor, elected by general vote, and 56 other members, two from each of the 28-wards.330 On April 
21, 1997, Bill 103 was given Royal Assent and the election was to be held on November 10, 
1997.331 Not surprisingly, an application was brought challenging the constitutional validity of Bill 
103. The applicants argued, inter alia, that Bill 103 violated section 2(b), 2(d), 7, 8 and 15(1) of 
the Charter.  For the purpose of this discussion, the allegations that Bill 103 violated section 2(b) 
of the Charter is important. This argument can be distilled into two parts: (1) that the Ontario 
legislature failed to consult with the affected polities and citizens; and (2) effective representation 
was violated.   
 
Regarding consultation, the ONSC noted that, while hearings took place relating to the 
creation of the “megacity”, none of the hearings constituted, “the type of public consultation which 
should have preceded the introduction of the legislation and in which a democratically elected 
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government should have engaged.”332 Further, regarding the lack of consultation with city 
councils, the ONSC explained that:  
 
The evidence supports the conclusion that Bill 103 simply appeared on the 
government’s legislative agenda with little, or no, public notice and without any 
attempt to enter into any meaningful consultation with those people would would be 
most affected by it – the more than 2,000,000 inhabitants of Metro Toronto. Such, 
however, is the prerogative of the government. The court has made it clear that there 
is no obligation on government to consult the electorate before it introduces 
legislation. It may exercise its powers as it sees fit, subject only to constitutional 
constraints.333 
 
Thus, the ONSC’s power of review is limited to the legal competence of Bill 103 and not the 
underlying reasons for Bill 103, unless an infringement is found, leading to a section 1 analysis. 
 
 Regarding the constitutional argument, the ONSC upheld Bill 103 as “there is nothing in 
the Charter which provides constitutional status to municipalities.”334 The democratic rights set 
out in section 3 of the Charter do not apply to cities and as a result, there was no infringement of 
these provisions.335 As in Toronto v Ontario, the applicants also argued that the legislation violated 
freedom of expression under section 2(b) as Bill 103 established a council of 56 members, which 
“is larger than the council of any of the six municipalities; decreases the ratio of representatives to 
electors; reduces the number of elected officials; and may lead to the establishment of municipal 
political parties.”336 The ONSC held that, despite Bill 103, citizens remain free to vote and that 
there is nothing in section 2(b) of the Charter that “guarantees, or elevates to constitutional status, 
the number of members on a municipal council relative to the number of electors.”337 Thus, 
legislatures are free to alter civic ward boundaries before, during or after a civic election.  
 
 This is distinguishable from provincial legislatures amending provincial electoral 
boundaries within the respective province. First, the ultimate boundaries of the province do not 
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change, just the internal boundaries. In East York, not only did the wards change, but Toronto grew 
in size and population substantially. Secondly, provincial legislatures have an opposition which 
can express concerns relating to any proposed bill. As noted in East York, little consultation was 
done with the impacted cities.338 Lastly, provincial legislatures are protected by section 3 of the 
Charter. Thus, even if provincial electoral boundaries were to be altered, it must be done so in a 
way that does not infringe effective representation, whereas cities and the voters therein are subject 
to whatever the provincial legislature decides to do. Further, and as previously mentioned, 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures can only be dissolved prior to an election period 
commencing. As a result of this, the mid-election destruction of electoral platforms cannot occur 
in federal or provincial elections. Thus, the unique position of cities as “creatures of the province” 
allows for election interference from upper levels of government and without constitutional 
protection, such interference is likely to continue to occur.  
 
4.3 Conclusion: Chapter 4 
 Interference with civic democracy fits into two broad categories. First, provincial 
legislatures have granted provincial government actors the legislative power to remove or 
disqualify city councils or a member thereof. Such removal may require inspections or inquiries 
prior to exercising such power or may merely require the removal to be in the public interest. 
Further, the Ontario legislature has granted itself the power to limit the authority of Toronto’s city 
council by regulation if it is in the provincial interest to do so. These provisions are broadly worded 
and give the relevant province complete authority to determine what is in the public or provincial 
interest.  
 
 Second, interference can occur through the conduct of provincial actors. This may include 
condemning the decision of a city council or a committee thereof or threatening to pull funding 
sources should a motion pass at city council. Both forms of interference force elected city officials 
to align their view with the relevant province, potentially to the detriment of their constituents.  
 
 Providing democratic processes for civic elections shows the increased autonomy of city 
councils as they are responsible to their constituents, demonstrating a further dilution of Dillon’s 
 




rule by the provincial legislatures. Provincial legislatures have also granted broad legislative 
powers to city councils and immunity to the policy decisions of city councils, again diluting 
Dillon’s rule by providing substantial legislative autonomy to city councils. For the time being, 
however, provincial actors or legislatures may still interfere with that autonomy, for the simple 
reason that they do not agree with the decision made by city councils. As argued in Chapter 5 and 
6, a formal amendment to the Constitution is required to protect the democratic legislative role of 





5. ALTERNATIVES TO A FORMAL AMENDMENT 
In the preceding chapters, I have argued that civic democracy requires constitutional 
protection. The two options to achieve this are either through amending the Constitution of Canada 
or through alternatives to formal amendment.  The former is considered in Chapter 6, and the latter 
here in this chapter. 
 
In my opinion, Miller JA on behalf of the majority correctly interpreted the Constitution in 
Toronto v Ontario (ONCA) where he held “[t]he decision was made not to constitutionalize 
[municipal] institutions, but rather to put them under the jurisdiction of provincial legislatures.”339 
Since the ONCA decision was reported, scholars and legal professionals have suggested methods 
in which the Constitution, in their view, could be interpreted to provide protection for democratic 
civic elections, without a formal amendment. This Chapter argues that these alternatives are 
insufficient to protect civic democracy and ignore the constraints on constitutional interpretation.  
 
As mentioned, most of the academic focus on constitutional recognition of cities stems 
from issues relating to revenue raising powers.340 In my opinion, a formal amendment to the 
Constitution can serve a much larger purpose than addressing issues related to municipal financing. 
A formal amendment to the Constitution ought to protect civic democracy, as defined in 1.1, going 
beyond a citizen’s right to vote for and be effectively represented in a city council but also 
addressing issues relating to legislative and revenue raising powers. In short, entrenching citizens 
right to vote for and be effectively represented in city councils in the Constitution, must also be 
accompanied by constitutionally entrenched heads of legislative powers and defined revenue 
raising powers. Thus, advocating for a formal constitutional amendment to protect civic 
democracy advances the position that city councils ought to have constitutionally protected 




339 Toronto v Ontario (ONCA), supra note 3 at para 94.  
340 See e.g. Dewing, Young & Tolley, supra note 8 at 1 where the authors note “[t]he municipalities’ quest for 
constitutional recognition has been largely motivated by their search for practical ways of meeting the demands upon 




While a formal amendment to the Constitution of this nature is bold, there is still merit in 
advocating for such an amendment. An argument could be made that proposed amendments to the 
Constitution ought to carry positive significance for the purposes of common law interpretation as 
opposed to negative significance.341 This principle has become known as a “partial constitutional 
amendment” and allows judicial interpretation to be influenced by proposed, partially complete or 
failed constitutional amendments.342 A full discussion of the benefits of advocating for a formal 
constitutional amendment is contained in 7.3.  
 
5.1 Formal Amendment Procedure 
 The Constitution of Canada has been referred to as one of the most difficult constitutions 
to amend in the world.343 Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 sets out the five formal amendment 
procedures to amend the Constitution, only three of which are relevant to this analysis. First, is the 
“general amendment procedure” entrenched in section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Second, 
it has been argued that section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982 which allows for an amendment 
that affects some, but not all provinces, could be used to grant democratic rights to citizens in civic 
elections on a province-specific basis. Lastly, section 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982 codifies the 
amendment procedure for provincial constitutions.  
 
 The general amendment procedure applies to any amendment to the Constitution unless a 
separate amendment provision applies. This procedure requires the approval of both Parliamentary 
houses and at least two-thirds of the provinces, representing 50% of the population of all 
provinces.344 In addition, Parliament and certain provinces have added requirements in situations 
when the general amendment procedure may be invoked. Federally, Parliament passed the An Act 
Respecting Constitutional Amendments,345 which has been described in the following terms:  
 
The Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments provides that Parliament should 
obtain the consent of Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia, two of the Atlantic 
 
341 See Rosalind Dixon, “Partial Constitutional Amendments” (2011) 13 UPAJCL 643 at 1.  
342 Ibid at 2 and 18.  
343 Ibid at 158. 
344 See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1 at s 38. 
345 SC 1996, c 1 [Regional Veto Law]. See also Richard Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in 
Canada” (2015) 53:1 Alta L Rev 85 at 97 [Albert, “Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment”] for an in-depth 




Provinces comprising at least 50% of the region’s population, and two of the Prairie 
provinces comprising at least 50% of the region’s population, before proposing a 
constitutional amendment in accordance with the [general amendment 
procedure].346 
 
Therefore, in addition to the requirements of the general amendment procedure, Parliament 
arguably must obtain the consent required by this Regional Veto Law prior to tabling a proposed 
amendment.  
 
 At the provincial level, certain provinces have enacted legislation that requires referendums 
to be completed prior to the legislature voting on an amendment to the Constitution. For example, 
in Alberta, The Constitutional Referendum Act347 requires the LGIC to order a referendum before, 
“a resolution authorizing an amendment to the Constitution of Canada is voted on by the 
Legislative Assembly.”348 In Saskatchewan, The Referendum and Plebiscite Act349 allows the 
LGIC to order a referendum where “an expression of public opinion is desirable on any matter of 
public interest or concern”, which may include a proposed constitutional amendment.350 While 
Alberta’s legislation requires a mandatory referendum for amendment proposals, Saskatchewan’s 
legislation is permissive. Thus, the general amendment procedure has additional extra-textual 
requirements that are not mentioned in the Constitution but have been passed by Parliament or the 
legislatures as ordinary statutes. Whether these extra-textual requirements are, in and of 
themselves, constitutional is open for debate,351 however, if they are accepted by the Supreme 
Court of Canada as constitutional, they would become as supreme as the written text of the 
Constitution.352 Thus, should the Supreme Court of Canada adopt the legislated extra-textual 
 
346 Government of Canada “Intergovernmental Affairs: The Canadian Constitution” (25 July 2018) Online: 
Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/intergovernmental-affairs/services/about-canada.html> 
[emphasis added].  
347 RSA 2000, c-C-25 ss. 2(1) and 4 [Alberta Referendum Act]. See also Referendum Act, RSBC 1996, c 400, s. 4. See 
also Constitutional Amendment Approval Act, RSBC 1996, c 67, s 1; see also Referendum Act, SNB 2011, c 23, ss. 
12-13. See also The Referendum and Plebiscite Act, SS 1990-91, c R-8.01, at 3(1) which provides the Saskatchewan 
Legislature with the ability to hold a referendum prior to voting on a constitutional amendment, but it is not mandatory.  
348 Alberta Referendum Act, supra note 347 at s 2(1).  
349 SS 1990-91, c R-8.01. 
350 Ibid at s 3(1). 
351 See Albert, “Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment”, supra note 181 at 177 where Albert explains that “the 
Regional Veto Law as well as the provincial and territorial referenda and plebiscite laws are inconsistent with the 
formal amendment rules insofar as they impose additional requirements for amendment. That inconsistency should be 
sufficient to invalidate them if they are challenged as unconstitutional.” 




requirements adding to the formal amendment rules codified in Part V of the Constitution Act, 
1982,353 the difficulty of formal constitutional amendment would increase as extra-textual 
requirements would negate a formal amendment if it is not followed.  
 
 Another formal amendment procedure is contained at section 43 of Part V of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. This provision follows the same general rules as the general amendment 
procedure; however, section 43 applies to an amendment “in relation to any provision that applies 
to one or more, but not all provinces”.354 Under this procedure, only consent of the affected 
provinces and both Parliamentary houses is required. Thus, if certain provinces were interested in 
amending the Constitution to add a new provision granting constitutional status to cities, 
arguments have been made that this can be done. For example, Alexandra Flynn has suggested 
that section 43 has a great deal of potential in providing constitutional protection for local 
diversity.355 Citing Kathy Brock, Alexandra Flynn argues that section 43 acknowledges and 
recognizes that the “needs and aspirations of all the provinces may vary greatly, and these 
differences may not be understood by all other provinces.”356 While these arguments have been 
made, it is unlikely that section 43 can be used in this manner.  
 
 As noted above, section 43 applies to “any provision that applies to one or more, but not 
all provinces”. What Alexandra Flynn appears to be arguing for is a new provision in the 
Constitution, not an amendment to a “provision that applies to one or more but not all provinces”. 
Section 43 contains wording that is distinct from the other amendment procedures contained in 
Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. For example, the general amendment procedure states that 
“[a]n amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made…”, which does not specifically refer 
to an existing provision like section 43 does. Therefore, it is unlikely that section 43 can be used 
as Alexandra Flynn suggests. Rather, the general amendment procedure would be required to add 
 
353 The decision in Siemens, supra note 225 at para 42, citing Haig, supra note 225 at 1042 suggests this is unlikely as 
the SCC held “[a] government is under no constitutional obligation to extend this platform of expression to anyone, 
let alone everyone. A referendum as a platform of expression is, in my view, a matter of legislative policy and not of 
constitutional law.” [emphasis in the original] 
354 Supra note 1 at s 43. 
355 See Flynn, “Indigenous Rights and Municipal Autonomy”, supra note 74 at 119.  
356 Kathy Brock, “Diversity Within Unity: Constitutional Amendments Under Section 43” (1997) 20:1 Can 




a new provision to the Constitution to recognize civic democracy, even if the new provision does 
not apply to all provinces. 
 
Lastly, section 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982 allows provinces to amend their provincial 
constitutions by ordinary statute.357 Each province’s constitution is different depending on when 
they joined confederation. Therefore, amendments to provincial constitutions would be province-
specific. In my view, section 45 is an option to constitutionally protect civic democracy, however, 
the provincial constitutions of each province will not be discussed in significant detail. As 
discussed in 5.2.2 below, arguments have been made that section 45 is a better and more practical 
option to constitutionally recognize democratic civic elections on a province by province basis; 
however, provincial constitutions have their own unique challenges, as also discussed in 5.2.2.  
 
5.2 Alternatives to a Formal Amendment of the Constitution of Canada 
 In previous Chapters, I have argued that civic democracy requires constitutional protection 
as a result of the increased and increasing legislative role of cities. As discussed in this Chapter, it 
has been argued that constitutional protection of democratic civic elections could be granted 
through alternatives to a formal amendment to the Constitution of Canada. These alternatives fit 
within two broad categories. First, it has been suggested that democratic rights can be “read in” to 
the current text of the Constitution. Second, it has been proposed that provincial constitutions be 
amended as opposed to amending the text of the Constitution of Canada. The “reading in” 
approaches rely solely on constitutional interpretation, largely unconstrained, whereas amending 
provincial constitutions must be done through the provincial legislature, pursuant to section 45 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982.  
 
5.2.1 The “Reading in” Approaches 
 The “reading in” approaches suggest that the Supreme Court of Canada could and should 
reinterpret section 3 of the Charter or section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to give them their 
“proper” scope. Three alternative approaches have been proposed that fit squarely under this 
heading. The first approach involves injecting a new “rule” into section 3 of the Charter, which I 
refer to as the “delegatee approach”. The second approach involves injecting a new rule into 
 




subsection 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which I refer to as the “democratic proviso 
approach”. The third approach involves reading in section 3 rights into section 2(b) of the Charter, 
which I refer to as the “Justice Belobaba Approach”.  
 
 Determining the “proper” scope of section 3 of the Charter and section 92(8) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, depends heavily on whether the constraints on constitutional interpretation 
are respected. Unconstrained constitutional interpretation, as mentioned, allows the Supreme 
Court of Canada to treat the provisions of the Constitution as “empty vessels” to be filled with 
purpose as the Supreme Court of Canada desires. If the Supreme Court of Canada respects the 
constraints on constitutional interpretation, the “proper scope” of the aforementioned provisions 
does not include democratic civic elections. The Supreme Court of Canada is constrained by (1) 
the text of the Constitution, which does not protect civic elections, (2) precedent, which has held 
it is not the Supreme Court of Canada’s role to create a third order of government,358 and (3) the 
historical context, which does not support the assertion that democratic elections have been 
inherent in municipal institutions since Confederation.359 Therefore, I conclude that the reading-in 
approaches are a result of unconstrained constitutional interpretation, circumvent the formal 
amendment procedures in the Constitution Act, 1982 and create significant uncertainty in both 
civic democracy and constitutional interpretation.  
 
5.2.1.1  The Delegatee Approach 
Colin Feasby argues that, “[a] better approach than trying to force the square peg of section 
3 democratic norms into the round hole of section 2(b) would have been to simply ask the Court 
to impose a rule as follows:  
 
Where a government, Federal or Provincial, delegates a legislative role to a 
democratically chosen body or where a government, Federal or Provincial, 
effectively delegates a decision to the electorate in a referendum, section 3 of the 
Charter applies.360 
 
358 See Baier, supra note 135 at para 39. 
359 See Sancton, “Canadian Local Government”, supra note 37 at 3. See also Flynn, “Operative Subsidiarity and 
Municipal Authority”, supra note 13 at 281. 
360 See Colin Feasby, “City of Toronto v Ontario and Fixing the Problem with section 3 of the Charter” Ablawg (28 






As a result of the legislative roles delegated to cities by their respective provincial legislatures, 
cities would attract the democratic rights contemplated in section 3 of the Charter based on this 
approach. Feasby argues that the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy supports this 
approach361 and it aligns with the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada’s comments in 
Godbout where the Supreme Court of Canada specifically contemplated that the Charter may 
apply to entities other than the levels of government enumerated therein.362 In addition to only 
protecting a portion of civic democracy, Feasby’s approach relies solely on unconstrained 
constitutional interpretation.   
 
 In Godbout Justice La Forest was interpreting section 32 of the Charter which uses 
substantially different language than section 3 of the Charter. Section 3 of the Charter specifically 
lists the “House of Commons or… a legislative assembly”.363 City councils are not a house of 
commons or a legislative assembly.364 The purpose of section 32 aims to subject government action 
to Charter scrutiny. Applying the doctrine of living constitutionalism, municipal institutions 
perform government functions and thus, are covered by the purpose of section 32 of the Charter. 
To find otherwise, would be to ignore the express purpose of section 32 of the Charter and allow 
provincial legislatures to delegate legislative functions to municipal institutions to avoid Charter 
scrutiny. The purpose of the written text of section 3, however, does not purport to protect the right 
to vote in an election of city councillors. Thus, interpreting section 3 to include city councils would 
amount to section 3 becoming an “empty vessel” to be filled with purposes as the Supreme Court 
of Canada sees fit, and would bind lower courts and all levels of government. This interpretation 
would also be contrary to Baier,365 which acts as a further constraint on living constitutionalism. 
Lastly, Feasby’s approach entirely ignores the historical context, as cities were not originally 
designed to be democratically accountable.366 The fact that cities may now be seen as 
 
361 Ibid page 4. 
362 See Archer & Sobat supra note 9 at 16 where the author cites Bruce Ryder, “Bill 5, the so-called ‘Better Local 
Government Act, 2018’…” (30 July 2018) Online: Twitter <twitter.com/BBRyder/status/1024043534683398149>; 
Bruce Ryder, “Thoughtful piece by @ColinFeasby…” (28 September 2018), Online: Twitter 
<twitter.com/BBRyder/status/1045745151342247936> in support of this proposition.  
363 Supra note 1 at s 3.  
364 See East York (ONSC), supra note 47 at 16. 
365 Supra note 135 at para 39. 
366 See Sancton, “Canadian Local Government”, supra note 37 at 3. See also Flynn, “Operative Subsidiarity and 




democratically accountable, does not permit the Supreme Court of Canada to re-frame the 
Constitution; rather, a formal amendment is required.  
 
 Further, the “delegatee approach” rests on the assumption that cities will continue to be 
granted democratic civic elections as it only applies to “democratically chosen bodies”. Although 
this would protect existing civic elections, the plenary power of the provincial legislature over 
cities allows for the unilateral abolition of democratic processes for civic elections,367 rendering 
the “delegatee approach” potentially futile. Another shortcoming of the “delegate approach” is that 
it does not provide or protect the safeguards cities require to fully exercise their democratic 
function. City councils would not benefit from any sort of parliamentary privilege or 
constitutionally protected legislative or revenue raising powers as they would remain “creatures of 
statute”. As city councils are structured differently than Parliament and provincial legislatures, and 
remain subject to the plenary power of provincial legislatures, properly protecting effective 
representation in a city council cannot be achieved by merely subjecting city councils to the same 
Charter provision as Parliament or a provincial legislature as discussed in the following paragraph. 
 
 The “delegatee approach” accepts the fact that cities would remain subject to their 
respective provincial legislatures and those provinces would retain the power to restructure civic 
electoral platforms and the legislative powers of city council; it just must be done so in accordance 
with section 3.368 As Canada is a representative democracy which provides citizens with a voice 
in the deliberations of government,369 the removal or amendment of legislative powers from city 
councils may also amount to a breach of effective representation. Thus, the “delegatee approach” 
may also create issues for provincial legislatures as it would be unclear when removing or 
modifying revenue raising powers or legislative powers, may amount to unconstitutional 
interference with effective representation. This concern would be exacerbated if a successful 
candidate’s platform is based on specific election issues requiring certain legislative powers and 
after the candidate is elected, the provincial legislature repeals or limits the civic legislative power 
required to fulfill the election promise. Thus, without constitutional protection for legislative or 
 
367 See East York (ONSC), supra note 47 at 16. 
368 See Feasby, supra note 360 at 5. 




revenue raising powers, it becomes uncertain when the removal or limitation of a legislative power 
would amount to an unconstitutional infringement of effective representation.  
 
Lastly, properly constrained living constitutionalism does not support reading new “rules” 
into existing provisions of the Charter or the Constitution. The “delegatee approach” requires 
living constitutionalism to adopt, in essence, an entirely new purpose of section 3 that is not 
supported by the written text thereof, the historical context, or precedent.370 Not only is this 
contrary to the constraints on constitutional interpretation, but it is contrary to the statement of 
Beverley McLachlin who stated the proper role of the court is “interpreting, reconciling and 
applying the law”,371 not creating it.372 Thus, even if the Supreme Court of Canada holds that 
unwritten principles can invalidate laws, the “delegatee approach” would go beyond interpreting, 
reconciling and applying the law and amount to creating new constitutional protections through 
unconstrained judicial interpretation. 
 
5.2.1.2  The Democratic Proviso Approach  
The “democratic proviso approach” argues that the Supreme Court of Canada ought to 
constitutionalize conventions or provisos and inject them into section 92(8) of the Constitution 
Act, 1867, giving them the ability to invalidate legislation. This approach has been taken in two 
constitutional challenges, being Toronto v Ontario and East York, which, as mentioned, relate to 
the alteration of ward boundaries or amalgamation of cities, respectively. In both cases, these 
arguments were rejected. Even if accepted, like the “delegate approach” this approach relies on 
unconstrained constitutional interpretation which does not provide legal certainty and 
predictability in constitutional protections, unlike the written text of the Constitution.373 
 
 
370 See Public Service Employee Reference, supra note 182 at 151 where the SCC held that “the Charter should not 
be regarded as an empty vessel to be filled with whatever meaning we might wish from time to time. The interpretation 
of the Charter, as of all constitutional documents, is constrained by the language, structure and history of the 
constitutional text, by constitutional tradition, and by the history, traditions and underlying philosophies of our 
society.” 
371 See McLachlin, supra note 251 at 8.  
372 See Millen, supra note 182 at 121 which, as mentioned, explains that what one judge sees as amending the 
Constitution, may be seen by another as merely interpreting it. 




In Toronto v Ontario (ONCA), Toronto argued that democratic civic elections have been 
inherent in section 92(8) since the time of Confederation. The ONCA summarized this argument 
as follows:  
 
[t]he argument, essentially, is that “the right to democratic municipal elections has 
been inherent in s. 92(8) from the time of Confederation” and that s. 92(8), which 
grants the provincial legislatures exclusive lawmaking authority over “municipal 
institutions in the province”, provides authority to courts to invalidate legislation 
that infringes “the principle of fair and democratic elections of municipal councils” 
said to be immanent in this grant of legislative power.374 
 
The ONCA rejected this argument stating that section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 is merely 
a lawmaking authority granted to provincial legislatures that does not constitutionalize any 
particular form of municipal governance.375 The protection that the “democratic proviso approach” 
purports to provide is limited to the civic election process. As this approach does not reference 
section 3 of the Charter, it is also unclear whether effective representation would be 
constitutionally protected. If the Supreme Court of Canada accepts the “democratic proviso 
approach”, it could interpret section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 as protecting effective 
representation; however, it would be the result of the unconstrained constitutional interpretation. 
Neither the text of section 92(8), the historical context or precedent, specifically Baier and 
Rheaume, support the “democratic proviso approach”. 
 
In addition, the “democratic proviso approach” ignores the safeguards and legislative tools 
that city councils require to engage in a full, unfettered democratic process. In Toronto, this is a 
particular issue as, once city council is elected, Queen’s Park can continue to limit city council’s 
legislative decisions if it is in the provincial interest.376 True constitutionally protected democratic 
rights would prevent provincial interference during and after a civic election,377 specifically 
including interference with the democratic legislative role of city councils.378 Importantly, 
 
374 Supra note 3 at para 92. 
375 Ibid. 
376 See Sancton, “False Panacea”, supra note 82 at 1. See also The City of Toronto Act, supra note 54 at s 25(1).  
377 See Archer & Sobat, supra note 9 at 16 where the authors note that the submissions to the SCC in Toronto v Ontario 
(SCC) relating to “gap-filling” would only provide protection for mid-election interference in an ongoing election. 
This analysis applies equally to the “democratic proviso” approach.  




Ontario’s factum to the Supreme Court of Canada seems to support the notion that interference 
with democratically elected councillors after an election, is more disruptive than interference 
during the election.379 Further, as with the “delegatee approach”, if the Supreme Court of Canada 
interprets section 92(8) as protecting effective representation within a city council, it creates 
significant uncertainty as to when the removal or limitation of a city council’s legislative power 
amounts to an infringement of effective representation. Thus, merely injecting a proviso into 
section 92(8), a law-making power, relies on unconstrained constitutional interpretation and, as a 
result, creates significant uncertainty for the future of civic democracy and the application of the 
Constitution. 
 
 Further, the argument that democratic elections have been inherent since Confederation is 
not accurate.380 As discussed previously, Canadian cities are derivative from English law and were 
not designed to be democratically accountable.381 In East York (ONSC), Andrew Sancton provided 
evidence, that:  
 
[T]here are no Canadian local governments that are politically autonomous in any 
meaningful sense. They have no constitutional protection whatever against 
provincial laws that change their structures, functions and financial resources 
without their consent.382 
 
Toronto’s democratic proviso approach relies on originalism. As previously mentioned, 
originalism requires the courts to determine the original intent of the framers of the Constitution. 
While Canadian courts appear to have rejected originalism, it has been held that the historical 
context continues to play a role in interpreting the text of the Constitution.383 Regarding democratic 
 
379 See Toronto v Ontario (SCC) (Factum of the Respondent at para 48) where Ontario argues “[m]oreover, delaying 
reform until after the election would mean that the government would either: (a) need to wait until the October 2022 
municipal election – past even the fixed date for the next provincial election in June 2022 – to realize its policy goals 
of voter parity and a smaller, more effective council; or (b) reduce the size of the council after the election and either 
determine which councillors would remain in office or provide for a fresh election. The former option involved an 
unacceptable, lengthy delay for a government seeking to have a new, more functional Toronto council; whereas the 
latter option would have been more disruptive.” [emphasis added]. 
380 See Toronto v Ontario (ONCA), supra note 3 at para 94.  
381 See Sancton, “Canadian Local Government”, supra note 37 at 3. See also Flynn, “Operative Subsidiarity and 
Municipal Authority”, supra note 13 at 281. See also Toronto v Ontario (ONCA), supra note 3 at para 94. See also 
pages 11-14, above, for an in-depth discussion on this topic.  
382 East York (ONSC), supra note 47 at 14. 
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civic elections, the historical context does not support the argument that democratic elections have 
been inherent in section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 since confederation.384 If Toronto’s 
assertion was historically accurate, the Charter ought to have protected the right to vote for and be 
effectively represented in municipal institutions when democratic rights were entrenched in section 
3 of the Charter in 1982. As noted by Miller JA, “[t]he decision was made not to constitutionalize 
[municipal institutions], but rather to put them under the jurisdiction of provincial legislatures.”385 
Thus, despite the ongoing debate over whether municipal institutions ought to be recognized by 
the Charter, municipal institutions unequivocally remain subject to the plenary power of their 
respective provincial legislatures and the text of the Constitution does not provide citizens with a 
protected democratic right to vote, or be effectively represented by, a city council.  
 
The “democratic proviso approach” may be supported by living constitutionalism given 
the increased and increasing democratic legislative role of city councils. This, however, assumes 
that there are no applicable constraints on interpreting the Constitution in this way. As mentioned, 
living constitutionalism is constrained by the written text of the Constitution, the historical context 
and precedent, as discussed above. The Supreme Court of Canada is not free to add constitutional 
protections to the existing provisions of the Constitution merely because the “times have changed”. 
Appling living constitutionalism in this unconstrained manner, allows the Supreme Court of 
Canada to re-frame the Constitution as the justices see fit, and to favour the unwritten Constitution 
over the written, despite numerous precedents insisting that the written text takes primacy over the 
unwritten.386 Therefore, the “democratic proviso approach” appears to be asking the Supreme 
Court of Canada to create a new protected right, outside of the text of the Constitution, that cannot 
be supported by the historical context, or precedent. As a result, the “democratic proviso approach” 
is not a viable interpretive option, as it relies solely on unconstrained constitutional interpretation, 
which supports the need for a formal amendment to the Constitution.  
 
 
384 See e.g. Toronto v Ontario (ONCA), supra note 3 at para 94.  
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[2015] 3 SCR 511. See also 9147-0732 Quebec, supra note 202 at para 9 where Brown and Rowe JJ hold that “… 
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A similar argument was made in relation to Bill 103, which was challenged in East York 
(ONSC). The applicants argued that Bill 103 was ultra vires the province as it disregarded “the 
local democratic autonomy of municipalities”.387 The applicants argued that consultation prior to 
amalgamating cities or altering wards was a constitutional convention that was not followed, 
rending Bill 103 ultra vires the Ontario legislature. The ONSC held that there is no remedy for the 
failure to follow a constitutional convention388 and the Supreme Court of Canada has held that 
conventions do not crystallize into law.389 While conventions may be used to inform judicial 
interpretation of democratic understandings at a given time, similar to a partial constitutional 
amendment, the same constraints on constitutional interpretation must apply,390 rendering the 
democratic proviso approach an example of unconstrained living constitutionalism.  
 
5.2.1.3  The Justice Belobaba Approach 
 Importing the section 3 right to effective representation into section 2(b) of the Charter is 
another suggested alternative to grant voters and candidates in civic elections the equivalent right 
of those in Federal or provincial elections. This was the gist of Justice Belobaba’s decision at the 
ONSC level of Toronto v Ontario as previously discussed in 4.2.1 and need not be repeated here.391  
 
 This approach fails to recognize the different purposes between section 2(b) and section 3 
of the Charter. As previously mentioned, Justice Belobaba relied predominantly on originalism in 
determining that section 2(b) can protect effective representation for voters in civic elections. 
Originalism is not the prevailing theory of constitutional interpretation in Canada. Instead, living 
constitutionalism requires the court to ascertain the purpose of section 2(b) which protects the 
freedom of expression, not meaningful expression. As noted by the majority of the Supreme Court 
of Canada, “while Charter rights are to be given a purposive interpretation, such interpretation 
must not overshoot (or, for that matter, undershoot), the actual purpose of the right.”392 In order to 
avoid “overshooting” the purpose of a provision of the Charter, primacy must be given to the 
written text, respecting its established “significance as the first factor to consider within the 
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purposive approach”.393 Thus, the “Justice Belobaba approach” not only ignores the constraints on 
constitutional interpretation but, if accepted, it renders the purpose of section 2(b) uncertain and 
unpredictable as it may protect only the freedom of expression in some cases and both the freedom 
and the impact in others. 
 
A further difference between section 2(b) and section 3 of the Charter is that section 2(b) 
is subject to the notwithstanding clause whereas section 3 is not. The notwithstanding clause is set 
out in section 33 of the Charter and allows parliament or the legislature to “expressly declare… 
that [an] Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 
or sections 7 to 15 of [the] Charter”.394 Therefore, to use Toronto v Ontario for example, if effective 
representation exists within section 2(b) of the Charter as held by Justice Belobaba, Queen’s Park 
could expressly declare that the BLGA will operate notwithstanding the infringement of section 
2(b). Civic democracy would not be protected in this instance as the BLGA would still have served 
its purpose for the 2018 election in Toronto, and despite the operation of the notwithstanding clause 
expiring after 5-years, it is renewable indefinitely. An argument could be made that a convention 
against invoking section 33 of the Charter when civic democracy is concerned would provide 
some protection; however, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that constitutional conventions 
do not crystallize into law and, therefore, leaving civic democracy in an uncertain state as cities 
would continue to subject to the plenary power of provincial legislatures.  
 
 Second, protecting democratic civic elections through section 2(b) of the Charter would 
limit the protection to certain forms of interference. At the ONCA, the dissenting opinion would 
have found that the BLGA infringed section 2(b) and could not be saved by section 1 of the Charter. 
MacPherson JA’s dissenting opinion was limited to mid-election destruction of the electoral 
wards: “[f]ree expression in this context would be meaningless if the terms of the election, as 
embodied in the legal framework, could be upended mid stream.”395 Thus, this approach is limited 
to mid-election interference, although it could be extended to other forms of interference through 
constitutional interpretation in subsequent and unrelated cases. As a result of this, every potential 
 
393 Ibid at para 10.  
394 Supra note 1 at s 33(1).  




infringement would have to be dealt with through court processes on a case-by-case basis. There 
would be no legal certainty or predictability in relation to what is and what is not protected unless 
interference was constitutionally challenged in court. 396 This could have the undesirable effect of 
the court limiting civic democracy in future court challenges by finding other forms of interference 
do not infringe section 2(b) or by identifying limitations pursuant to section 1 of the Charter. A 
further discussion of this issues continues in Chapter 6.397  
 
 Third, as with the first two alternative approaches, the provinces would remain entirely in 
control of cities. Provinces could remove the democratic election process for cities altogether to 
avoid constitutional challenges. MacPherson JA’s dissenting opinion held that “a government is 
generally not required to provide platforms for expression, but where it chooses to provide one, it 
must do so in a manner that complies with the Charter.”398 Thus, freedom of expression would 
only be breached if provincial governments continue to provide cities with a democratically elected 
city council. Thus, the Justice Belobaba approach could have the unintended consequence of 
setting the autonomy and democratic legislative role of city councils back as opposed to protecting 
it within the Constitution.   
 
 Merely reading effective representation into section 2(b) of the Charter does not grant city 
councils the safeguards required to truly exercise their democratic function. Cities would continue 
to be creatures of the province in every other regard. Parliamentary privilege or an equivalent 
thereof would not exist and the powers of cities could continue to be limited or abolished by 
provinces.399 In addition, this approach would not stop provincial actors from threatening to 
remove funding from cities if the city council’s views do not align with the provincial interest as 
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5.2.1.4  Conclusion: Reading in Approaches 
While these three reading-in approaches are an attempt to take a step in the right direction, 
they may not serve the purpose which they intend. These approaches may have the adverse and 
unintended effect of provinces limiting the autonomy of cities to retain control, reverting back to 
an undiluted application of Dillon’s rule. To properly protect civic democracy from interference, 
a formal amendment to the Constitution is required to avoid the application of the notwithstanding 
clause and the ability of provinces to entirely abolish city councils or reduce their autonomy. 
Further, these approaches are not supported by living constitutionalism as they are not designed to 
ascertain the purpose of the relevant provisions, but rather to add an additional purpose not 
protected by the written text of the Constitution or the Charter – protecting the right to vote for 
and be effectively represented by a city council. 
 
Should the Supreme Court of Canada adopt one of the reading in approaches discussed in 
this subchapter, its interpretation becomes as binding and supreme as the text of the Constitution. 
Such a decision would allow the Supreme Court of Canada to re-frame the Constitution as it sees 
fit, based on unconstrained judicial interpretation. Consequentially, adopting one of the reading in 
approaches could open the floodgates to constitutionally protected rights that exist outside the text 
of the Constitution, causing significant uncertainty in the text application constitutional provisions. 
As a result, Canadian democracy would be diluted as the difficult, but democratic, formal 
amendment procedures would be subordinated to constitutional challenges to identify new 
protected rights. 
 
5.2.2 Amending Provincial Constitutions 
 Provincial constitutions are subject to the amendment procedure set out in section 45 of 
Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. It has been suggested by Kristin Good, an Associate Professor 
at the Dalhousie University Department of Political Science, that constitutional status could be 
granted to cities through amending provincial constitutions. While amending provincial 
constitutions can be characterized as an amendment to the Constitution, provincial constitutions 
would not provide the same level of constitutional protection as the Constitution of Canada. 
Therefore, amending provincial constitutions is, in my opinion, an inferior alternative approach to 




 Provincial constitutions are not well developed in Canada. Generally, they do not entrench 
rights for citizens in addition to those set out in the Constitution. Nelson Wiseman has stated that 
“[p]rovincial constitutions barely dwell in the world of the subconscious. They are too opaque, 
oblique, and inchoate to rouse much interest, let alone passion.”400 Despite Nelson Wiseman’s 
statement which is, in my view, accurate, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has held that 
protections contained within provincial constitutions are “as much a part of the Constitution of 
Canada as is the Charter.”401 Thus, if civic democracy was protected through provincial 
constitutions, those protections would be as much a part of the Constitution as the Charter, which 
protects democratic rights for citizens in Parliament and legislative assemblies. Pursuant to section 
45 of the Constitution Act, 1982, however, provincial constitutions remain at subject to amendment 
by the relevant provincial legislature by majority vote.  
 
To date, no provincial legislatures have amended their constitution to protect civic 
democracy; however, provincial constitutions have been amended by regular legislation,402 and it 
is indeed a possible approach. Kristen Good has argued that this option is preferable to a formal 
amendment of the Constitution because it is feasible, flexible, respects provincial autonomy, and 
it would permit interference if it is warranted.403 This approach argues that, because cities are 
constituted through provincial laws, it is more appropriate to entrench democratic rights into 
provincial constitutions.404 The gist of this approach is that Canadian provinces could declare that 
municipal acts and city charters are part of their provincial constitutions.405 Among other concerns 
with this approach, amending provincial constitutions still leaves cities vulnerable to provincial 
interference. As provincial constitutions can be amended by a simple majority vote of the 
provincial legislature, it would be difficult to classify civic democracy as “entrenched” in the 
Constitution. All this approach creates is a minor hurdle for provincial legislatures to overcome if 
they want to pass legislation that effects, or interferes with, civic democracy.  
 
400 Nelson Wiseman “Clarifying Provincial Constitutions” (1996) 6:2 National J of Constitutional L 269 at 270.  
401 Saskatchewan v Good Spirit School Division No. 204, 2020 SKCA 34 at para 9, 445 DLR (4th) 179 [Good Spirit]. 
402 See Kristen R. Good, The Fallacy of the “Creatures of the Provinces” Doctrine: Recognizing and Protecting 
Municipalities’ Constitutional Status (Toronto: University of Toronto IMFG Papers on Municipal Finance and 
Governance No. 46, 2019) at 27.  
403 Ibid at 27-28. 
404 Ibid at 15. 
405 See Flynn, “Indigenous Rights and Municipal Autonomy”, supra note 74 at 120 where the author alludes to this 
argument that constitutional status for Toronto could be obtained by creating a City Charter which “would be enshrined 




 This approach further argues that “manner and form” provisions could be used secure the 
constitutional status of cities in provincial constitutions.406 “Manner and form” provisions are self-
imposed limitations on a legislative body’s authority.407 The argument here is that provincial 
legislatures could use a “manner and form” provision to ensure consultation with city councils 
occur prior to amending the relevant provisions of the provincial constitution or the ordinary 
statute that amends the provincial constitution.408 Archer and Sobat explain that manner and form 
provisions can be circumvented through a two step process.409 First, the legislature would repeal 
the manner and form provision and the section subject to the manner and form provision. Second, 
the legislature subsequently makes the substantive amendment it desires.410 Speculation has arisen 
that subjecting a manner and form provision to a manner and form provision may fore-close this 
two step option;411 however, whether these provisions are valid remains uncertain.412 As a result, 
the effectiveness of a “manner and form” provision in provincial constitutions is uncertain and 
may not protect cities from the plenary power of provincial legislatures. 
 
 Quebec’s failed Bill 196, which proposed an amendment formula for Quebec’s provincial 
constitution, is illustrative. While the Bill failed, there was uncertainty as to whether the proposed 
amending formula would bind the legislature and future legislators. Nelson Wiseman explained 
that the, “evolving consensus among constitutional authorities is that special majority and other 
rules, particularly concerning human and minority rights, may indeed be legally binding. This is 
still, however, a disputable notion and not free from doubt”.413 Further uncertainty is created as, 
generally, a legislature attempting to bind a future legislature or government is considered 
impermissible under the British Parliamentary system.414 To some extent, manner and form 
provisions allow legislatures to get around binding future legislatures, however, as Wiseman notes, 
 
406 See Good, supra note 402 at 20. 
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mandatory or directory and the court must determine whether the manner and form provision is mandatory or not.  
413 Nelson Wiseman “The quest for a Quebec constitution” (2010) 40:1 American Rev of Can Studies 56 at 59 
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this is not free from doubt.415 Thus, there is no certainty in the rights granted to candidates and 
voters in civic elections based on this approach. Should this approach be employed, and civic 
democracy be interfered with, it is likely to suffer through a long court battle as in Toronto v 
Ontario, ultimately rendering the interference moot through the passage of time.  
 
 Further, such an approach creates many uncertainties which in turn, raise questions as to 
whether civic democracy would truly be protected. First, simply elevating municipal acts to 
provincial constitutional status also entrenches the provisions that allow certain provinces, or 
agents thereof, to interfere with elected officials. Given that the law has not changed, but merely 
been “elevated” to provincial constitutional status, it is likely that the same forms of interference 
would continue to be constitutional absent an amendment to municipal acts removing these 
provisions. Therefore, the effect of this approach may also include constitutionalizing interference 
with civic democracy in the relevant province.  
 
 In addition, while the LGIC of each province acts on the advice of the provincial cabinet, 
they are appointed by the Governor General pursuant to sections 58 and 59 of the Constitution Act, 
1867. Further, section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which sets out the unanimous formal 
amendment procedure, states that an amendment to the Constitution in relation to the Lieutenant 
Governor “may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of 
Canada only where authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the 
legislative assembly of each province.”416 Despite the fact that the role of the LGIC is set out in 
provincial legislation, the unanimous consent procedure must be followed to constitutionalize the 
role of the LGIC as set out in provincial legislation. Thus, if provincial legislatures were to merely 
ascend municipal legislation to constitutional status, section 45 would not be the only amendment 
procedure that applies, increasing the unlikelihood or desire of provincial legislations to amend 
their provincial constitutions. In addition, provincial legislatures may remove the role of the LGIC 
in removing city councillors and invest that power in a minister, or the legislative assembly, in 
order to avoid section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982, while continuing to allow interference with 
democratic civic elections or elected city councillors.  
 
415 See Wiseman, “Quest for a Quebec Constitution”, supra note 413 at 59.  




 Gerald Frug has explained that, in the context of the unrestrained power of American states 
over cities, “most state constitutions have been amended to grant cities ‘home rule,’ but local self 
determination free of state control is still limited even in those jurisdictions to matters ‘purely 
local’ in nature. These days, little if anything is sufficiently ‘local’ to fall within such a definition 
of autonomy. State law, in short, treats cities as mere ‘creatures of the state.’”417 Further, “[f]irm 
state control of city decision making is supplemented by federal restrictions on city power. The 
Federal Constitution… has been construed to limit city power.”418 Thus, granting protections in 
provincial constitutions may still limit the democratic legislative role of city councils through the 
text of the provincial constitution or through the Supreme Court of Canada interpreting the 
provisions of the Constitution of Canada to limit a city council’s powers as codified in a provincial 
constitution.419  
 
While Gerald Frug made this proposition in 1980, it is still relevant in the American and 
Canadian constitutional context. For example, New York’s constitution provides New York City 
with “home rule” status and the ability to pass its own legislation.420 The legislation passed by 
New York City’s city council, however, can be “repealed, diminished, impaired or suspended only 
by an enactment of a statute by the legislature with the approval of the governor.”421 As in Canada, 
this allows the state to repeal or limit the powers of city councils if it is in the state interest. Thus, 
given the provincial legislatures’ jealous guarding of city councils,422 it is likely that amending 
provincial constitutions would continue to allow them to limit or repeal the legislative powers of 
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5.3 Conclusion: Alternative Approaches 
 The alternative approaches discussed in this chapter are laudable and a step forward in 
attempting to constitutionally protect civic democracy; however, they fall short. While they might 
assist in some aspects of civic democracy, namely democratic civic elections, provinces would 
continue to have plenary power over cities and could remove democratic civic elections and limit 
the legislative powers of city councils. As mentioned, this could have the opposite effect of the 
intention, reverting back to an undiluted application of Dillon’s rule and abolishing or limiting the 
autonomy of city councils. In addition, even if effective representation is protected by section 2(b) 
the notwithstanding clause would permit provinces to continue to interfere with civic democracy. 
 
 In addition, the proper application of living constitutionalism does not support the reading 
in approaches. Instead of ascertaining the purpose of the relevant provision through living 
constitutionalism, the reading in approaches ask the Supreme Court of Canada to read in a new 
purpose that is not reflected in the text of the Constitution or the Charter, respectively. As a result, 
living constitutionalism is constrained and is not a panacea for future constitutional protections. 
Thus, a formal amendment to the Constitution is required to protect civic democracy from 
provincial interference.  
 
Further, as with New York State’s constitution, even if provincial legislatures are willing 
to amend their constitutions to protect civic democracy, it is likely they would continue to jealously 
guard their plenary power over city councils and constitutionalize provisions that allow 
interference with the deliberations and decision making of city councils. Thus, while amending 
provincial constitutions is an option, it would not provide the required legal certainty and 





6. A FORMAL AMENDMENT IS REQUIRED  
 On top of relying on unconstrained constitutional interpretation and circumventing the 
formal amendment procedure contained in the Constitution Act, 1867, there are other reasons why 
alternatives to a formal constitutional amendment would not serve their intended purpose. First, 
alternative approaches do not provide the certainty and predictability that civic democracy 
requires, and the written Constitution provides.423 Second, a formal amendment to the Constitution 
expresses constitutional values whereas the alternative approaches do not. Lastly, the 
constitutional theory of the principle of subsidiarity, which the Supreme Court of Canada has 
adopted, supports a formal amendment to the Constitution. In this chapter, I will elaborate on each 
of these three arguments, in turn, in order to further support my thesis that seeking a constitutional 
amendment is the preferable course of action to address the legislative role of cites and the councils 
thereof.  
 
 6.1 Civic Democracy: Uncertainty and the Supreme Court of Canada 
 “The Supreme Court of Canada in the past few years has demonstrated a remarkable 
willingness to review its own decisions and to reach different conclusions.”424 For example, if 
Toronto is successful in Toronto v Ontario (SCC) and democratic civic elections are protected by 
the Constitution through the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation, there is little assurance 
that those rights would not be limited in the future as a result of subsequent, unrelated 
constitutional challenges. Based on previous cases, there are two ways the Supreme Court of 
Canada could dispose of or limit protection of civic democracy within the Constitution. The first 
involves new evidence that might be presented in the context of a subsequent constitutional 
challenge and the second relates to unrelated cases that may limit the rights originally articulated 
by the Supreme Court of Canada. Both of these result in significant uncertainty in relation to how 
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civic democracy will be treated by the Supreme Court of Canada in the absence of a formal 
amendment of the Constitution.   
 
 Below, I set out two instances where the Supreme Court of Canada has meaningfully 
modified their previous decisions. The cases of RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (Attorney 
General)425 followed by Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp426 and the 
Remuneration Reference followed by Provincial Court Judges’ Association of New Brunswick v 
New Brunswick (Minister of Justice)427 are used to demonstrate how, even if the Supreme Court 
of Canada were to interpret the Constitution to protect democratic civic elections, there would still 
be a danger that the Court would subsequently release a decision effectively overturning their 
previous interpretation. Therefore, a formal amendment to the Constitution is preferable due to the 
certainty and predictability it would create for citizens, provincial legislatures and the judiciary.   
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada has, in the past, come to different conclusions as to whether 
an infringement of section 2(b) can be saved by section 1 of the Charter depending on the factual 
record and the historical context of the litigation. RJR and JTI are illustrative. In RJR, the Supreme 
Court of Canada struck down federal advertising regulations that “broadly prohibited all 
advertising and promotion of tobacco products, subject to specific exceptions, and required 
unattributed warning labels by affixed on tobacco product packaging”.428 The regulations were 
held to be a violation of section 2(b) and could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter as a 
blanket prohibition was not minimally impairing, nor had the government adduced evidence to 
show that less intrusive regulations “would not achieve its goals as effectively as an outright 
ban”.429 As a result, the federal tobacco regulations were struck down.  
 
 Twelve years later, in JTI, the Supreme Court of Canada held that section 1 saved the 
section 2(b) Charter infringement as a result of similar tobacco regulations. Thomson Irvine 
explains the differences between RJR and JTI came down to the evidentiary record:  
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In addition to the technical difference between the first and second federal tobacco 
acts, a key difference was the factual records before the Court in each case. In the 
first case in 1995, the sufficiency of evidence to provide justification under section 
1 was very much in issue. In the second case in 2007, the federal Attorney General 
at trial had produced a voluminous evidential record all aimed at proving the harm 
that tobacco causes, the fact that young people are particularly susceptible to 
picking up the habit, and the clear linkage between tobacco advertising and 
inducing young people and other vulnerable people to start smoking.430 
 
Thus, government action that was found to infringe a Charter right that was not saved under 
section 1 may be saved under section 1 of the Charter, in a subsequent challenge based on the 
factual record in a subsequent constitutional challenge. While JTI does not overrule substantive 
Charter rights, the evidentiary record in Toronto v Ontario raises the same concern as the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decisions in RJR and JTI.  
 
 In Toronto v Ontario (ONSC) Justice Belobaba noted that the Ontario government tendered 
little evidence establishing why the BLGA must be passed in the middle of an election period. 
Summarizing Justice Belobaba’s finding on minimal impairment cannot do it justice: 
 
[76] Dealing with the second objective, voter parity, and giving the Minister the 
benefit of the doubt that he understood the primary concern is not voter parity but 
effective representation, there is no evidence of minimal impairment. The 
Province’s rationale for moving to a 25-ward structure had been carefully 
considered and rejected by the TWBR [Toronto Ward Boundary Review] and by 
City Council just over a year ago. If there was a concern about the large size of 
some of the City’s wards (by my count, six wards had populations ranging from 
70,000 to 97,000) why not deal with these six wards specifically? Why impose a 
solution (increasing all ward sizes to 111,000) that is far worse, in terms of 
achieving effective representation, than the original problem? And, again, why do 
so in the middle of the City’s election?  
 
 [77] Crickets.  
 
[78] I am therefore obliged to find on the evidence before me that the breaches 
of s. 2(b) of the Charter as found above cannot be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society and cannot be saved as reasonable limits under s. 1.431 
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Given the lack of evidence justifying an infringement of section 2(b) under section 1 of the Charter 
in Toronto v Ontario, there is a strong possibility that better and thorough evidence may render a 
different conclusion on a subsequent Charter challenge if the Supreme Court of Canada finds in 
favour of Toronto. Thus, while RJR and JTI did not come to different conclusions on the 
substantive Charter right argument, the effect of the evidence tendered for a section 1 analysis 
may protect democratic civic elections in some contexts, while not in others. For example, 
Macpherson JA’s dissenting opinion in Toronto v Ontario (ONCA) would have found that the 
BLGA infringed section 2(b) and could not be saved under section 1 in the specific context of mid-
election interference.432 Thus, while mid-election interference would be constitutionally protected 
based on MacPherson J’s dissent, it may not be in other subsequent constitutional challenges that 
do not involve mid-election interference. In my view, such context specific interpretation does not 
provide legal certainty or predictability in democratic civic elections and therefore, civic 
democracy.  
 
 Second, the Supreme Court of Canada has provided significant deference to judicial 
compensation commissions only to scale that deference back in subsequent cases. In the 
Remuneration Reference, Chief Justice Lamer held that, “governments were constitutionally 
required to set up commissions on a regular basis to hear submissions on the appropriate level of 
compensation.”433 Justice Lamer went on to hold that the decisions of these commissions were to 
have a “meaningful effect” on the judicial compensation process.434 This means that governments 
would be required to follow the recommendations of the committees unless there was a rational 
basis for departing from the commission’s recommendation.435 If government did not follow the 
commission’s recommendation, it would be required to justify its decision in a court of law and 
show that the government had a legitimate reason for not following the recommendation of the 
committee and that the reason relied on a reasonable factual foundation.436  
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Thomson Irvine explains that Chief Justice Lamer’s strong wording “suggested that only 
very exceptional circumstances could justify a government in refusing to follow the 
recommendations of a judicial compensation commission.”437 Further, Irvine explains that “[i]t 
appeared that the commissions might in practice amount to a form of binding arbitration, which 
governments could only refuse to follow in very rare cases.”438 Lamer J’s hope was that this 
process would depoliticise the issue of judicial compensation.439 In subsequent cases, however, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has pulled back from this deferential approach to judicial compensation.  
 
 In Provincial Court Judges’ Association, the Supreme Court of Canada, unanimously, 
made it clear that the commission process is consultative in nature and that “[g]overnments retain 
the ultimate authority to determine if they will accept the recommendations of a commission.”440 
Further, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that the process set out in the Remuneration Reference 
had not depoliticised the judicial compensation process and, in several provinces, had in fact 
exacerbated friction between the government and judges, leading to litigation.441 Thomson Irvine 
explains that, “[t]he court identified uncertainty about the scope of the powers of government under 
the principles set out in the [Remuneration Reference] as the cause of the litigation.”442 In the end, 
the Supreme Court of Canada held that exceptional circumstances were not required to depart from 
the commission’s recommendation and although the Supreme Court of Canada stated it was 
following the principles set out in the Remuneration Reference, “…the net effect of the decisions 
was to return considerable discretion to the elected branch of government in determining judicial 
compensation.”443 Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada fundamentally scaled back the deference 
owed to judicial compensation commissions based on the uncertainty caused by the decision in the 
Remuneration Reference. 
 
 Notably, in the Remuneration Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada also relied on the 
unwritten constitutional principle of judicial independence, holding that the Constitution has 
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evolved over time and “judicial independence [has] grown into a principle that now extends to all 
courts, not just the superior courts of this country.”444 Further, the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that “judicial independence is an unwritten norm, recognized and affirmed by the preamble to the 
Constitution Act, 1867.”445 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that “an 
unscrupulous government could utilize its authority to set judges’ salaries as a vehicle to influence 
the course and outcome of adjudication”446 infringing judicial independence, an unwritten 
constitutional principle. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Canada relied, at least in part, on an 
unwritten principle to limit government conduct, as Toronto has requested in Toronto v Ontario, 
only to scale back the limitations, and arguably the power of unwritten principles, in Provincial 
Court Judges Association. Further, and as previously mentioned, since the Remuneration 
Reference the Supreme Court of Canada has constrained the use of unwritten constitutional 
principles in, inter alia, Imperial Tobacco, Christie and 9147 Quebec. Thus, in a sense, Toronto v 
Ontario has revived a fairly well-settled debate over the use of unwritten principles and 
constitutional interpretation, which, as a result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s willingness to 
review and overturn its own decisions, creates uncertainty as to whether or not the Supreme Court 
of Canada will uphold those constraints, or accept a broader, unconstrained interpretation of the 
application and effect of unwritten principles.  
 
 As mentioned, applying the alternative approaches discussed in Chapter 5 would cause 
considerable uncertainty in the written text of the Constitution. If the democratic right to vote in a 
civic election, including effective representation within a city council, is read into section 3 of the 
Charter or section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867, provincial legislatures would continue to 
have plenary power over municipal institutions. Like the decision in the Remuneration Reference, 
the uncertainty around what provincial legislatures can and cannot do would be likely to lead to 
further litigation surrounding civic democracy. For example, and as mentioned, the repeal or 
limitation of a legislative power may amount to an infringement of a citizen’s effective 
representation within a city council, particularly when the repeal or limitation affects a city 
councillor’s ability to fulfil an election promise. As in Provincial Judges Association, it is entirely 
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possible that the Supreme Court of Canada could detract from the rights previously granted to 
citizens, investing further discretion in the provincial governments to govern city councils and the 
civic election process, diluting effective representation.  
 
 Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada’s willingness to review, reconsider and disagree with 
their previous decisions creates significant uncertainty for civic democracy in the absence of a 
formal amendment to the Constitution. Past decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada show that 
this is a real concern and that more thorough evidence may result in an infringement of civic 
democracy being saved by section 1 even if effective representation is protected by section 2(b). 
Further, if Toronto is successful at the Supreme Court of Canada, subsequent cases could limit 
citizens right to effective representation based on the uncertainty or effect of the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decision in Toronto v Ontario.  
 
6.2 Expressive Function of Formal Amendments 
 Richard Albert argues that formal amendment rules “serve the underappreciated function 
of expressing constitutional values.”447 An informal amendment to the Constitution, or developing 
provincial constitutions to include civic democracy, does not express the same values as a formal 
amendment to the Constitution. As argued below, formally amending the Constitution to protect 
civic democracy recognizes cities as valuable, or even fundamental, to Canada’s national identity 
and secures the position of cities as a recognized and important level of government.  
 
 Albert’s analysis is limited to the formal amendment rules expressing constitutional values, 
and not formal amendments themselves.448 In my view, entrenching new provisions protecting 
civic democracy in the Constitution through a formal amendment clearly expresses the 
constitutional value thereof. Coupled with the difficulty of the general formal amendment 
procedure, a formal amendment articulates an important message to society at large. In essence, a 
formal amendment shows that written provisions of the Constitution contain significant value as 
they are protected by the formal amendment rules, whereas the alternative approaches discussed 
in Chapter 5 are not. An argument could be made that provincial constitutions are protected by a 
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formal amendment rule, however, as discussed, section 45 of part V of the Constitution allows 
provinces to amend their constitutions through ordinary statutes, which may express value in civic 
democracy, but does little to protect it.  
 
 The proposition in the preceding paragraph is supported by Tom Ginsburg who explains 
that “[t]he symbolic or expressive function of constitutions emphasizes the particularity of 
constitution-making. It is We the People that come together, and so the constitution embodies our 
nation in a distinct and local way different than other polities.”449 Ginsburg goes on to explain that:  
 
The mode by which constitutions carry out these functions is familiar. Constitutions 
work through entrenchment, providing an enduring set of foundational rules, 
structuring and facilitating normal politics in a particularistic way that reflects local 
values.450 
 
Thus, the written text of the Constitution codifies a society’s fundamental ideals and structures.451 
With living constitutionalism as the primary constitutional interpretation doctrine in Canada, the 
written text may broaden to give meaning and purpose to provisions of the Constitution; however, 
it is the written text that expresses Canada’s values. To properly respect the democratic legislative 
role of cities in Canada and the right of citizens to vote and be effectively represented by a city 
council, a formal amendment to the Constitution is required.  
 
In contrast, Mark Tushnet, a Professor of constitutional law at Harvard Law School, has 
noted that “constitutions, both in their entrenched institutional arrangements and in the doctrines 
that emerge from their interpretation, ‘are ways in which a nation goes about defining itself.’”452 
Based on this position, the alternative approaches based on unconstrained constitutional 
interpretation would express the same value as a formal amendment. I argue that it is the role of 
Parliament and the legislative assemblies, whose members are democratically elected by Canadian 
citizens, to define Canada’s national values. To decide otherwise, grants the Supreme Court of 
 
449 Tom Ginsburg, “Written Constitutions and the Administrative State: On the Constitutional Character of 
Administrative Law” in Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L Lindseth, eds, Comparative Administrative Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010) at 118. See also Albert, “Expressive Function of Amendment Rules”, supra note 
254 at 238. 
450 Ginsburg, supra note 449 at 118.  
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Canada a legislative ability that is fundamental to defining Canada’s national values that it should 
not possess.453 In conjunction with the uncertainty of the alternative approaches as discussed in 
Chapters 5 and the willingness of the Supreme Court of Canada to overturn its previous decisions, 
informal constitutional amendments based on judicial interpretation do not express the same 
constitutional values as a formal amendment. In the context of civic democracy, a formal 
amendment not only provides legal certainty and predictability in the application of the 
Constitution but also the certainty required to allow city councils to properly exercise their 
democratic legislative function and effectively represent their constituents. Ironically, should the 
Supreme Court of Canada provide constitutional protection for democratic civic elections in 
Toronto v Ontario, it ignores the democratic process that the formal amendment rules 
contemplate,454 arguably obstructing democracy.  
 
6.3 The Principle of Subsidiarity  
 The principle of subsidiarity was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in a 2001 case 
relating to environmental protection.455 In the writer’s opinion, to properly respect the principle of 
subsidiarity, a formal amendment to the Constitution is required. This subchapter will begin with 
a brief explanation of the principle of subsidiarity, followed by an explanation of why a formal 
amendment is needed.  
 
 In Spraytech the Supreme Court of Canada described the principle of subsidiarity as “the 
proposition that law-making and implementation are often best achieved at a level of government 
that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected and thus most responsive to their 
needs, local distinctiveness, and to population diversity.”456 The Supreme Court of Canada further 
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states that Spraytech arose in an era where governance was often viewed through the lens of this 
principle.457 Since Spraytech was decided in 2001, the legislative and national role of cities have 
only expanded.458 This raises the important question of how the principle of subsidiarity applies 
when interpreting the text of the Constitution.  
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the principle of “subsidiarity does not override 
the division of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867.”459 The Court added that “[s]ubsidiarity might 
permit the provinces to introduce legislation that complements the Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act, but it does not preclude Parliament from legislating on the shared subject of public health.”460 
These holdings limit the principle of subsidiarity to an interpretative tool in determining which 
constitutionally recognized level of government can pass legislation pursuant to the division of 
powers contained in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.461 For example, in the 
Human Reproduction Reference Justices LeBel and Deschamps explained that, “[i]f subsidiarity 
were to play a role in the case at bar, it would favour connecting the rules in question with the 
provinces’ jurisdiction over local matters, not with the criminal law power.”462 Therefore, the 
principle of subsidiarity does little to entrench the role of city councils within the Constitution 
without a formal amendment and applying the principle of subsidiarity without constitutional 
recognition of cities may have unintended consequences, as discussed below.   
 
 Without constitutional recognition and protection of legislative powers for city councils, 
the realistic effect of the subsidiarity principle is increased decentralization or offloading of 
regulation to city councils which may create significant problems. 463 First, the offloading or 
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downloading of regulation to cities is not often accompanied by increased revenue raising 
powers.464 The only current option for cities to raise revenue is increasing property tax rates or 
utility rates or beg for additional funding from upper levels of government. This is not a sustainable 
solution as cities are the closest level of government to roughly 81% of the population and national 
issues have a larger effect on cities than their smaller counterparts. Increasing the legislative role 
of city councils without granting them the tools required to effectively perform this role (or without 
a corresponding agreement by provincial governments to forego tax room), may overburden that 
tax base of cities. Thus, the principle of subsidiarity, in the writer’s opinion, would only benefit 
city councils if the Constitution is formally amended to recognize the legislative role of city 
councils.  
 
 It may be argued that the principle of subsidiarity could be used as an unwritten 
constitutional principle to aid in interpreting the text of the Constitution; however, this argument 
suffers from a fatal flaw. Cities are not a constitutionally recognized level of government, resulting 
in subsidiarity applying only to Parliament and the legislative assemblies based on sections 91 and 
92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 465 Alexandra Flynn explains that “ the idea that power should 
reside at the ‘closest’ level possible cannot be perceived in a technical or absolute manner; it is, 
instead, a substantive term that seeks to find the right ‘fit’ between the activity in question and the 
governing unit.”466 As city councils do not have constitutionally protected heads of legislative 
power, they can not be a “governing unit” that is considered in constitutional interpretation, unless 
the text of the Constitution, and therefore a constraint on living constitutionalism, is ignored. 
Constitutional recognition of city councils would therefore allow the principle of subsidiarity to 
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operate as a useful interpretative tool in a division of power analysis. A prerequisite to this, 
however, is a formal amendment to constitutionally recognize city councils as a level of 
government.  
 
As Canadian democracy is more complex than just the right to vote, a formal amendment 
could address numerous constitutional issues that city councils face such as: (1) limited revenue 
raising powers; (2) unenumerated heads of power; (3) the plenary power of provinces over cities; 
and finally, (4) the lack of democratic protection.467 As mentioned, if the democratic rights of 
citizens to vote for and be effectively represented by their city councils are to be recognized by the 
Constitution, then city councils require the tools to properly exercise that democratic legislative 
function. If constitutional status for city councils is achieved, the principle of subsidiarity could 
determine the right fit for cities in the existing governmental structure based on a federalism 
analysis.  
 
In addition, the alternative approaches discussed in Chapter 5 would provide limited and 
uncertain democratic protection for voters and candidates in civic elections but would not 
constitutionally recognize cities as a third level of government with constitutionally protected 
heads of legislative power. Thus, for the principle of subsidiarity to assist in interpreting 
jurisdiction to enact legislation, a formal amendment to the Constitution is required. As mentioned, 
constitutional interpretation is subject to constraints and ought not be used to read new purposes, 
or levels of government,468 into the written text of the Constitution. To do so, would allow the 
Supreme Court of Canada to continually interpret the purpose of constitutional provisions to 
protect new rights which are not contained in the written text of the Constitution. 
 
6.4 Conclusion: Requirement of Formal Amendment  
 As a result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s willingness to review, reconsider and 
disagree with previous decisions the alternative approaches to a formal amendment create 
significant uncertainty for the future of civic democracy. The Supreme Court of Canada could find 
a previous infringement to be justified in the future, if better evidence is tendered in a subsequent 
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challenge. In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada could limit the right of civic democracy in 
future cases. A formal amendment to the Constitution would express to Canadian society that cities 
are a part of the nations governmental structure and identity, as well as solving numerous issues 
that cities face. 
 
The alternative approaches discussed in Chapter 5 may provide protection, albeit limited 
and uncertain protection, for civic democracy but they do not address the other issues that a formal 
constitutional amendment can address. To properly exercise their democratic legislative function, 
city councils also require the tools necessary, such as constitutionally protected heads of legislative 
power and sufficient revenue raising powers and autonomy to effectively represent their 
constituents. While the principle of subsidiarity has the potential to play an interpretative role in 





7. PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION AND OBSTACLES 
THEREOF 
Formally amending the Constitution to recognize civic democracy is, admittedly, an 
ambitious goal. As discussed, the general amendment procedure requires provincial consent and 
provinces may not want to give up their power over cities. This Chapter discusses the issues faced 
in pursuing a formal amendment to the Constitution and outlines a proposed constitutional 
amendment that would grant democratic rights to city councils and their constituents. As effective 
representation requires city councils to possess the necessary tools, ancillary amendments to the 
Constitution would also be required, increasing the difficulty of a formal amendment. 
 
While a wholesale amendment to the Constitution is, in my opinion, the only way to truly 
protect civic democracy, I go on to discuss the potential benefits of advocating for a formal 
amendment even if it is ultimately unsuccessful. In this regard, advocating for a formal amendment 
may result in civic democracy becoming an issue for the ballot box or in the alternative, may 
influence judicial interpretation similar to the principle of partial constitutional amendment. As 
previously mentioned, a proposed, partially complete or failed constitutional amendment has been 
considered as relevant information relating to democratic understandings that may influence 
judicial interpretation.469 Thus, advocating for a formal amendment, even if it is unsuccessful, may 
influence judicial interpretation to protect civic democracy and, if constitutional protection for 
civic democracy is identified by the Supreme Court of Canada, protect that interpretation from 
being overruled in subsequent cases. In 7.1 of this Chapter, I set out a proposed amendment to the 
Constitution to, in my view, adequately protect civic democracy. Following my proposed 
amendment, in 7.2 of this Chapter I discuss the difficulty of formal amendment and the obstacles 
that may be faced in attempting to formally amend the Constitution.  
 
7.1 Proposed Amendment 
 While an amendment to the provisions contained in the Charter is one method of 
entrenching civic democracy in the Constitution, I argue that, given the unique position of cities 
in Canada, other provisions in the Constitution provide analogous protection that would be more 
 




beneficial for cities and their constituents. First, this subchapter will look at section 96 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 to propose an amendment to 
the Constitution to protect the right of citizens to vote for and be effectively represented in a city 
council.470 Lastly, this subchapter will briefly discuss the ancillary amendments required to ensure 
city councils have the required tools to effectively act as an autonomous constitutionally 
recognized level of government. 
 
 7.1.1 Proposed Provision re Democratic Rights of Citizens 
 As previously discussed, section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 grants the Governor 
General the right to appoint judges to the Superior Courts of the provinces. 471 In Trial Lawyers 
Association, the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the purpose of this provision as protecting 
the inherent jurisdiction of the Superior Courts, and access to justice. In my opinion, section 96 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 and the drafting characteristics of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982 could be used to inform a constitutional provision that protects democratic civic elections.  
 
As mentioned, representative democracy provides citizens with one seat in the 
deliberations of government.472 Thus, interference in the deliberations of a city council would 
infringe a citizen’s right to be effectively represented therein. As the provision proposed below 
protects effective representation of civic voters within a city council, it has the added benefit of 
rendering provincial interference with city council decisions and the removal of elected city 
councillors unconstitutional. In addition, provincial legislatures would not be able to entirely 
remove the democratic civic election process as there would be a constitutional right for citizens 
to elect city councillors. Citizens would be effectively represented by their elected city officials, 
and if provincial actors threatened to pull funding as a result of a certain bylaw or resolution, a 
strong argument could be made that the provincial government has infringed the voters’ right to 
be represented by their city councillor. Thus, entrenching this proposed provision would not only 
 
470 While outside the scope of this paper, there is no reason to believe that constitutional recognition of cities as a level 
of government would affect crown-indigenous relationships. In fact, recognizing cities as a level of government in the 
Constitution may have a positive impact as it may have the effect of settling the law on whether cities have a duty to 
consult. Regarding the uncertainty of the law in this area see Neskonlith Indian Band v Salmon Arm (City), 2012 
BCCA 379 at para 66-73, 354 DLR (4th) 696 and Kwikwetlem First Nation v British Columbia, 2021 BSCS 458 at 
para 22.  
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protect democratic civic elections, but also elected city councillors from interference by upper 
levels of government outside of the election period. 
 
As a result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of section 96 in Trial Lawyers 
Association, Parliament or the legislatures cannot pass laws that interfere with the inherent 
jurisdiction of the Superior Courts and access to justice. A similar constitutional provision could 
be adopted for city councils and to give meaning to the purpose of this provision, effective 
representation would be protected in the same manner that section 96 protects the inherent 
jurisdiction of Superior Courts and the judges thereof. Thus, any federal or provincial laws that 
unreasonably limits a citizen’s right to vote in a civic election, and be effectively represented by 
the elected councillor, would be unconstitutional. This proposed provision would protect the right 
of citizens to vote in civic elections and the right of candidates to be elected through a democratic 
process similar to how section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 protects the Governor General’s 
ability to appoint Super Court Judges and protects the independence of those judges. In sum, 
entrenching democratic civic elections in the Constitution would have no purpose if Parliament or 
the provincial legislatures could “legislate away” effective representation within a city council, the 
same way that section 96 would have no purpose if Parliament or provincial legislatures could 
“legislate away” the inherent jurisdiction of Superior Court judges.  
 
Of course, there may be pragmatic and reasonable limits on such a provision, but there are 
also pragmatic limits that have been read into section 3 of the Charter, such as jurisdictional 
limitations on who may vote in a provincial election.473 This provision would also allow provinces 
to retain some control over civic elections by determining who is a registered voter and provide a 
process for civic elections that is consistent with democracy. As city councils are structured 
differently than Parliament or a legislative assembly, some provincial control over civic elections 
may still be desirable. As mentioned, there is no opposition or government-in-waiting to provide 
a check and balance on elected city councillors. Thus, absent the restructuring of city councils in 
their entirety, this provision respects the democratic rights of citizens and provides the provincial 
legislature with enough control over the civic election process to ensure city councils do not pass 
 




“self-serving” bylaws, while respecting the democratic rights of citizens to be effectively 
represented by a city council.  
 
Further, an argument could be made that protection akin to parliamentary privilege is 
implicit in effective representation and therefore, to give effect to this proposed provision’s 
purpose, privilege would be inherently protected. This argument is supported by Iacobuci J. of the 
Supreme Court of Canada who held that the central purpose of section 3, which protects effective 
representation, was to grant every citizen the right to “play a meaningful role in the selection of 
elected representatives, who, in turn, will be responsible for making decisions embodied in 
legislation.”474 Thus, in order to be effectively represented in a city council, elected city councillors 
must benefit from parliamentary privilege, or an equivalent thereof, free from civil or criminal 
liability and without the potential of being removed from a city council by the LGIC. Thus, 
constitutional interpretation may be used to fill a “gap” relating to parliamentary privilege that 
“flows by necessary implication” from the proposed provision discussed in this subchapter. 
Otherwise, the purpose of effective representation could be defeated.  
 
 Thus, section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides an example of the constitutional 
provision that could influence and support a provision protecting a citizens’ right to vote and be 
effectively represented within their respective city council. That being said, this proposed 
provision must be supplemented with further amendments to ensure that city councils have the 
necessary tools to act as a constitutionally recognized democracy. In addition, the effectiveness of 
this proposed provision would be dependent on future judicial interpretation. Regarding this, the 
drafting characteristics of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides analogous guidance.  
 
 While the purpose of section 35 is not directly applicable to civic democracy, in my 
opinion, the drafting characteristics of section 35 ought to inform the proposed provision 
protecting democratic civic elections in the sense that it would be open to further judicial 
interpretation. By way of background, section 35 of Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes 
the “…existing aboriginal treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.” This section was 
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included in the Constitution in a manner that left the details for later interpretation as it does not 
refer to any specific rights held by aboriginal peoples in Canada other than those that “exist”. 
Richard Ogden argues that “the enactment of section 35 in 1982 was a reconstitutive moment in 
the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous legal systems in Canada, and that this 
enactment resulted in newly recognized rights.”475  
 
 Richard Ogden further explains that the effect of section 35 goes beyond existing rights 
and has resulted in newly recognized rights.476 Richard Ogden’s position is supported by the 
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Delgamuukw v British Columbia477 where the Lamer CJC 
held that “the constitutionalization of common law aboriginal rights by s. 35(1) does not mean that 
those rights exhaust the content of s. 35(1)”.478 The Supreme Court of Canada has further held that 
“[a]lthough s. 35 protects “existing” rights, it more than a mere codification of the common law. 
Section 35 reflects a new promise: a constitutional commitment to protecting practices that were 
historically important features of particular aboriginal communities.”479 Thus, if a formal 
amendment to the Constitution to entrench the right to vote and be effectively represented in a city 
council is successful, many of the details, such as the application of parliamentary privilege, for 
example, could be left for later interpretation much like section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
 
As with section 35, this proposal leaves significant room for judicial interpretation while 
protecting the fundamental purpose of the provision, being the democratic right for citizens to vote 
for and be effectively represented by their city council. With living constitutionalism as the 
prevailing principles of constitutional interpretation, this provision would allow democratic civic 
elections to change with time and allow the Supreme Court of Canada to determine what is and is 
not an infringement. Therefore, the judiciary may impose certain limits on the democratic rights 
held by citizens pursuant to this proposed provision but those limits cannot infringe on the 
underlying purpose of the provision, which is to protect the democratic rights of citizens to vote 
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for and be effectively represented in a city council. Further, this proposed provision would have 
the added benefit of not being subject to the notwithstanding clause or section 1 of the Charter. 
Thus, if a law infringes this proposed provision, it cannot operate notwithstanding the infringement 
or be saved pursuant to section 1.  
 
 Therefore, based on the drafting characteristics of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
and section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Constitution could be amended to grant citizens 
the right to a democratically elected city council and effective representation within a city council. 
Of course, the interpretation of the provision would be left to the courts, which could create 
uncertainty in civic democracy. However, employing a purposive and progressive interpretation, 
as the Supreme Court of Canada did in Trial Lawyers Association and solidified in 9147-0732 
Quebec, would protect the underlying purpose of the provision which is to protect citizens’ right 
to a democratically elected city council and effective representation within that city council. For a 
city council to effectively carry out their democratic function and effectively represent their 
constituents, however, further amendments would be required. These are discussed next. 
 
 7.1.2 Required Ancillary Amendments: A Limited Discussion 
 As stated by Mariana Valverde, civic democracy is more complex than just the right to 
vote.480 Many ancillary amendments to the Constitution would be required to allow cities to 
effectively operate as an autonomous and democratic level of government. Sufficient revenue 
raising powers and enumerated heads of power would also be required.  
 
 While my view is that ancillary amendments would be required, the democratic right to 
vote and be effectively represented by a city council could exist independently of these ancillary 
amendments. Without the ancillary amendments discussed in this subchapter, however, city 
councils would not be able to fully exercise their democratic legislative function as: (1) they may 
not have sufficient revenue raising powers to do so;481 and (2) they would still be susceptible to 
interference from upper levels of government.482 An argument could further be made that the 
 
480 See Valverde, supra note 43 at 38. 
481 See Meehan, Chiarelli & Major, supra note 31 at 31. 




removal of legislative or revenue raising powers may result in an infringement of effective 
representation, causing uncertainty for provincial legislatures in amending municipal legislation. 
Thus, entrenching the rights discussed in Chapter 7.2.1 is a laudable step in the right direction, but 
to fully operate as an independent and democratic level of government, the ancillary amendments 
discussed below would be necessary. 
 
   7.1.2.1  Enumerated Heads of Power 
 Should civic democracy be constitutionally recognized, city councils would require the 
necessary tools to exercise their democratic function properly and effectively as an autonomous 
level of government. To define these enumerated heads of power, all levels of government in 
Canada must engage in consultation and collaboration to find the right fit for each constitutionally 
recognized order of government. 
 
 Entrenching heads of legislative power for city councils within the Constitution provides 
certainty for city councils, citizens and provincial legislatures.483 If only the right to democratic 
civic elections is protected such as in the “delegatee approach”, effective representation would be 
protected as well since section 3 would apply to city councils. As the “delegatee approach” 
maintains the plenary power of provincial legislatures over municipal institutions pursuant to 
section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867, uncertainty may be created for provincial legislatures 
in amending the legislative powers codified in municipal legislation. For example, should a 
provincial legislature remove a legislative or revenue raising power contained in municipal 
legislation an argument could be made that removing that power infringes the right to effective 
representation by not providing city councils the necessary tools to effectively represent their 
constituents. In addition, this could open the floodgates to constitutional challenges in amending 
municipal legislation.  
 
 
483 While many heads of provincial legislative power in section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 have significance for 
cities and city councils, the common law has developed various doctrines to address overlap in legislative powers, 
such as: (1) the doctrine of paramountcy; (2) the double aspect doctrine; and (3) the principle of subsidiarity which, 




As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Electoral Boundaries Reference, 
effective representation provides voters with a voice in the deliberations of government,484 which 
in this case would be a city council. Therefore, an amendment or interpretation solely relating to 
democratic civic elections, may increase the potential for interference in city council matters as 
there would be an additional right that provincial legislatures may infringe – effective 
representation. For example, like all politicians, city councillors run based on a platform. Should 
a candidate be elected as a result of an election promise based on a specific legislative power 
granted to cities and subsequently, after that candidate is elected, the provincial legislature amends 
the relevant municipal legislation to remove that specific legislative power, an argument could be 
made that effective representation has been infringed as the impact of the expression, in voting 
and running as a candidate, has been defeated by the legislative amendment. If the legislative 
powers of city councils relating to election issues, or other civic issues, are removed from a cities 
legislative purview after a councillor is elected, it is difficult to argue that a citizen has a voice in 
the deliberations of a city council. 485 
 
In the alternative, effective representation within a city council may be interpreted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada as protecting certain legislative powers of city councils, without a formal 
amendment to the Constitution. This interpretation, however, would leave provincial legislatures 
in a state of uncertainty as to what legislative powers they may or may not abolish or amend 
without infringing effective representation. Thus, a wholesale amendment to codify heads of 
legislative power within the written text of the Constitution would provide legal certainty and 
predictability in the text of the Constitution.486 The division of legislative powers between 
Parliament, provincial legislatures and city councils would be subject to a “federalism” analysis, 
as opposed to constitutional challenges to determine whether an amendment to a city councils 
legislative powers set out in provincial legislation infringes effective representation. The latter 
lacks legal certainty and predictability as there would be no constitutional text to constrain 
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constitutional interpretation, rendering the constitutional protection of effective representation and 
the legislative powers of city councils uncertain.  
 
Entrenching enumerated heads of power for city councils in the Constitution allows all 
levels of government to redefine their obligations in areas of intergovernmental regulation and 
effectively utilize the financial resources of all levels of government. For example, Valverde and 
Levi point out that increased poverty and the lack of social housing in cities was caused or 
contributed to by all levels of government.487 Redefining the heads of powers could address the 
root problem of many of these issues, and make better use of taxpayer dollars. What these 
enumerated heads of power would look like is much larger discussion that is outside the scope of 
this analysis. It could involve merely taking the current jurisdiction of cities set out in the relevant 
legislation and entrenching it in the constitution or it may result in certain powers of the provincial 
legislature being curtailed or repealed and placed in a city councils legislative arena. The scope of 
this analysis is limited to acknowledging that defining enumerated heads of power for city councils 
would be a significant undertaking that could dissuade the upper levels of government from 
consenting to a formal amendment to the Constitution, while arguing that a formal amendment 
relating to legislative powers is required to meet the goal of constitutionally entrenched civic 
democracy and to provide legal certainty and predictability.  
 
In the further alternative, an argument could be made that the proposed provision discussed 
in 7.1.1 leaves it open for the court to reinterpret section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 in 
light of the new provision granting citizens democratic rights to vote for and be effectively 
represented in a city council. This was the gist of Justice Lebel’s reasons in R v Demers,488 where 
he stated “the scope of the criminal procedure power under s. 91(27) needs to be re-evaluated in 
light of the evolution in our constitutional culture since the entrenchment of the Charter.”489 
Section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 sets out Parliament’s power of criminal procedure 
and this section was re-evaluated after the Charter was promulgated in 1982. Thus, if the 
Constitution is amended to adopt the proposed provision discussed in 7.1.1, the Supreme Court of 
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Canada may re-evaluate section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 in light of that new provision. 
Such a re-evaluation would require section 92(8) to be interpreted in a manner that is consistent 
with the proposed provision discussed above, which arguably could remove the ability of 
provincial legislatures to interfere with the legislative function of elected city councillors. As 
mentioned previously, however, constitutionally entrenched legislative powers for city councils 
provide certainty and support effective representation within a city council as legislated heads of 
power could not be amended or abolished by provincial legislatures, which may lead to significant 
constitutional challenges, taxing judicial resources.  
 
   7.1.2.2  Revenue Raising Powers 
 While the revenue raising powers of Canadian cities differ slightly, most cities raise 
revenue through property taxes and user fees.490 In contrast, section 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 
1867 grants Parliament the legislative authority to raise revenue by “any Mode or System of 
Taxation”. Section 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 grants provincial legislatures with the 
legislative authority to raise revenue by “Direct Taxation within the Province” for provincial 
purposes and section 92(9) permits provinces to raise revenue for provincial, local or municipal 
purposes through licenses.  
 
Without sufficient revenue raising powers, city councils would continue to be vulnerable 
to interference from upper levels of government and potentially unable to effectively represent 
their constituents.491 Provincial actors or the legislature could hang funding over city councils 
head, so to speak, in an effect to influence city council discussions or decision making. As a result, 
a formal amendment entrenching revenue raising powers for city councils in the Constitution 
provides the legal certainty and predictability contemplated in the Secession Reference and allows 
city councils to effectively represent their constituents.  
 
 
490 Slack & Kitchen, “New Finance Options”, supra note 69 at 2224 where the authors note “[p]roperty taxes and user 
fees have been the backbone of municipal finance in Canada for many decades, but the past few years have seen 
increasing concern and growing skepticism about the ability of the municipal sector to continue to meets its 
expenditure requirements with existing revenues.” See also pages 38-39, above, for a brief discussion on the current 
revenue raising powers cities possess.  




 Determining the sufficient magnitude or scope of revenue raising powers of city councils 
would depend on the enumerated heads of legislative power granted to cities. This discussion must 
begin with the upper levels of government recognizing cities as legally, economically and socially 
distinct from their smaller counterparts.492 Thus, the appropriate revenue raising powers for cities, 
and all levels of government, are contingent on the redistribution of legislative powers. In other 
jurisdictions, where municipal institutions are constitutionally recognized, cities have significant 
revenue raising powers.  
 
 In Scandinavia, municipal institutions are constitutionally recognized, which provides 
them with significant political and financial autonomy.493 Cities in these jurisdictions levy income 
taxes, on top of a federal income tax. Despite the higher taxes in Scandinavia, citizens are generally 
much more satisfied with their governments than Canadian citizens. For example, Sweden has one 
of the highest tax rates in the world, and the Swedish Tax Agency has the ninth best reputation out 
of 40 major polities in Scandinavia.494 While Scandinavia’s culture is substantially different than 
North America’s, the Sweden example shows how a formal amendment to the Constitution could 
grant cities an income or sales taxation power to allow them to exercise as an autonomous and 
democratic level of government while maintaining satisfaction of its citizens. 
 
As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, enhancing city revenue raising powers is part 
of a much larger discussion which may involve the redistribution of legislative and revenue raising 
powers for all levels of government.495 It is not as simple as merely adding additional city taxation 
powers on top of the current taxation powers of upper levels of government. A redistribution of 
taxation powers may involve a “give and take” where upper levels of government may forego 
certain taxation income in light of new city revenue raising or legislative powers, or providing 
abatements to those paying similar taxes to multiple levels of government, such as corporate 
 
492 See Levi & Valverde, supra note 27 at 415. 
493 See John Loughlin, Anders Lidstrom & Chris Hudson, “The Politics of Local Income Tax in Sweden: Reform and 
Continuity” (June 2005) 31:3 Local Government Studies 351 at 352. 
494 See Toivo Sjoren & Johan Orbe “Anseendet For Svenska Myndigheter 2019” (1 July 2019) Online (pdf): Kantar 
Sifo <www.kantarsifo.se> at 4. 




taxes,496 to multiple levels of government. Such a redistributive undertaking, in my view, would 
allow all levels of government to collaboratively determine the best use of taxpayer dollars and 
enhance effective representation of Canadian citizens in all levels of government. 
 
Higher tax rates in cities, however, may result in citizens moving to municipalities to avoid 
the higher tax rates. New York City, while not constitutionally recognized, has the legislated ability 
to charge an income tax on its residents.497 New York City imposes a local income tax on its 
residents with progressive rates from 3.078% to 3.876% on top of State and Federal Income tax.498 
Therefore, cities with a sufficient population may be able to impose a local income tax without 
having to worry about a population decrease, whereas as their smaller counterparts may not.  
 
 Providing city councils with enumerated legislative powers and revenue raising powers 
within the Constitution is supported by the principle of subsidiarity and the contentions of Meehan, 
Chiarelli and Major who explain that: 
 
Modern municipalities are much more than agents of service provision – they also 
play an essential role in meeting the needs, concerns and aspirations of the citizens 
who live within their boundaries. For many individuals, local government is the 
most important level of government, dealing with matters of direct and immediate 
concern, and providing the most direct and accountable political institution. 
Municipal governments are truly agents of democracy – they are the level of 
government closest to the people and most able to represent local aspirations and 
needs.499 
 
Thus, enumerated heads of legislative and revenue raising powers, in conjunction with the 
principle of subsidiarity, allows city councils to effectively represent their constituents as the most 
 
496 See e.g. The Income Tax Act, (RSC, 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp)) at s 124 which allows a corporation to deduct “from the 
tax otherwise payable by the corporation under this Part [Part 1: Income Tax] for a taxation year in an amount equal 
to 10% of the corporations taxable income earned in the year in a province”. A similar arrangement could be employed 
if cities are given income taxation powers.  
497 See New York State’s Consolidated Tax Law, art 30 s. 1301.  
498 See “Instructions for Form IT-201, Full-Year Resident Income Tax Return” (2019) Online (pdf): New York State 
Tax Website <tax.ny.gov> at 69. 
499 Supra note 31 at 12-13. Meehan, Chiarelli & Major also state that “because the results of local decisions are readily 
apparent in the local community, citizens can actually evaluate the effectiveness of their government and the degree 
to which their representative actually fulfill their obligations/pledges. Through their elected local representatives, 
citizens of a municipality are provided with the power to influence and determine the range of services made available 
in their community (ibid at 11-12). This provides for a more accountable local government or city council which 




accountable level of government. Given the constraints on constitutional interpretation, however, 
the only way for a city council to effectively represent its constituents as a constitutionally 
recognized order of government, and to provide legal certainty and predictability, is through a 
formal amendment to the Constitution.  
 
What revenue raising powers are appropriate for cities will depend on the division of 
powers amendment, or lack thereof. As mentioned, the scope of this analysis is limited to 
acknowledging that constitutionally entrenched revenue raising powers for city councils are 
required for civic democracy to truly exist. The redistribution of tax dollars and government 
financing is outside the scope of this analysis; however, other jurisdictions such as Scandinavia 
and New York may be a starting point for this discussion. 
 
7.2 A Formal Amendment is Unlikely 
As previously discussed, the Constitution of Canada is one of the most difficult to amend 
in the world and a formal amendment to the Constitution to recognize civic democracy is 
unlikely.500 There are two main reasons why obtaining the requisite consent to formally amend the 
Constitution is unlikely. First, the provincial legislatures must consent and second, entrenching 
civic democracy into the Constitution requires several amendments to various provisions of the 
Constitution, which may increase the difficulty of obtaining the required consent.  
 
 7.2.1 Obtaining Provincial Consent 
First, obtaining provincial consent would be a significant hurdle. As mentioned previously, 
the general amendment procedure in the Constitution Act, 1982 requires the consent of all 
provincial legislatures and the Parliamentary House of Commons and Senate. Mariana Valverde 
explains: 
 
Amending The Constitution Acts to recognize not only the municipal right to vote 
but also the general right of communities to govern themselves for many, if limited, 
purposes would certainly be desirable. Such a legal modernization is of course 
highly unlikely, not at least because the constitutional amendment process is 
 




monopolized by the very entities whose powers would be affected, perhaps 
negatively, by any change.501 
 
Further, Dewing, Young and Tolley explain: 
 
The provinces will jealously guard the constitutional arrangements that give them 
exclusive control over their municipalities. Any injection of the municipal question 
into the national constitutional discussions has, in the past, provoked a reaction that 
has jeopardized even the ad hoc relationship between federal and municipal 
governments. 502  
 
In Toronto v Ontario and East York, the provincial government caused the interference complained 
of and the Ontario government has defended its interferential actions all the way up to the Supreme 
Court of Canada on both occasions. This supports Dewing, Young and Tolley’s assertion that 
provinces will jealously guard their plenary power over municipal institutions.503 This alone 
demonstrates the unlikeliness that the Ontario legislature would consent to an amendment granting 
constitutional protection for civic democracy. As a result of the Regional Veto Law Ontario alone 
could veto the amendment before it is proposed, and it would be left to cities to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Regional Veto Law. The same can be said for other provinces that have 
reserved the legislative power to remove elected city councillors or to limit the powers of cities if 
it not in the provincial interest. Therefore, constitutional status through the general amendment 
procedure is unlikely as it requires provincial consent and the conduct of provinces, as discussed 
above, leads to the inevitable conclusion that they will not consent.  
 
 7.2.2 Obtaining Consent for Multiple Amendments 
Assuming provincial legislatures were interested in granting cities democratic rights, an 
omnibus amendment proposal may increase the difficulty of obtaining the unanimous consent 
required to satisfy the general amendment procedure. Richard Albert explains that: 
 
[t]he failure of both the Meech lake and Charlottetown Accord is attributable in 
large part to the choice of political actors to present their proposed amendments in 
an omnibus package for wholesale constitutional renewal. The many components 
 
501 Supra note 43 at 38. See also, page 73-74, above, for more information on this topic.  





in each of the Accords made it difficult to secure widespread agreement across the 
country from the various political actors whose support was required under the rules 
of formal amendment.504 
 
Thus, a proposed amendment to entrench democratic civic elections, parliamentary privilege, 
heads of power and sufficient revenue raising powers for cities, would increase the difficulty of 
securing the re quired consent. In Canada, the majority of the debate around constitutional status 
for cities has stemmed from limited revenue raising powers.505 Thus, a comprehensive proposal to 
amend the Constitution to recognize civic democracy has not been attempted. 506 In other countries, 
such as Australia, constitutional amendments to recognize cities have been attempted.  
 
 In 2010 Australia’s commonwealth government proposed the third attempt to grant local 
governments recognition in Australia’s federal constitution.507 AJ Brown and Paul Kildea explain 
that “amending the constitution to recognize local governments …should only be pursued as a part 
of a more holistic package of reform and renovation to the federal system as a whole. Local 
governments function and financial position in the federal system remains a fundamental question 
for Australian intergovernmental relations”.508 While more difficult than a narrow amendment 
relating solely to democratic civic elections, constitutional status for cities would not be fully 
effective without further amendments relating to the financial and legislative position of cities 
within Canada’s existing governmental structure.  
 
Realistically, the proper recognition of cities within the Constitution requires “wholesale 
constitutional renewal” to borrow Richard Albert’s term.509 For city councils in Canada to properly 
exercise their democratic function and effectively represent their constituents, many issues must 
be addressed. The proper fit of city councils within the Constitution must be determined. It is not 
as simple as entrenching city councils into section 3 of the Charter or adopting a different 
 
504 Albert, “Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment”, supra note 345 at page 96, footnote 84. See also AJ Brown & 
Paul Kildea, The Referendum that Wasn’t: Constitutional Recognition of Local Government and the Australian 
Federal Reform Dilemma, (2016) 44:1 Federal L Rev 143 at 144-145 for the contrary position.   
505 Supra note 8 at 1. 
506 Ibid where the authors take the position that “the municipalities have never formulated a specific set of 
constitutional proposals, and their demands have not dealt with the need to differentiate between constitutional 
recognition and constitutional powers.” 
507 See Brown & Kildea, supra note 504 at 143 
508 Ibid at 144 to 145. See also Valverde, supra note 43 at 38. 




alternative approach as discussed in Chapter 5. Other issues such as the lack of sufficient revenue 
raising powers and provincial control over the legislative powers of city councils must be 
addressed.  
 
 7.2.3 Conclusion: Obtaining Consent 
Granting citizens constitutionally entrenched democratic rights to vote for and be 
effectively represented by a city council, without providing city councils the tools to properly 
exercise their democratic function, would not sufficiently protect civic democracy. Leaving cities 
at the plenary power of provinces creates significant uncertainty and limits the ability of cities to 
effectively represent their constituents. Further, cities will have to formulate a comprehensive and 
specific set of constitutional proposals, which would amend the Constitution in several aspects, 
which may lead to difficulty securing provincial consent. This leads to a discussion of what a 
formal amendment to the Constitution might look like and, acknowledging the difficulty of a 
formal amendment, the potential benefits that may stem from a failed amendment proposal.  
 
7.3 Why Advocate for a Formal Amendment? 
As stated by Justice Major, “in a constitutional democracy such as ours, protection from 
legislation that some might view as unjust or unfair properly lies not in amorphous underlying 
principles of our Constitution, but in its text and the ballot box.”510 As a result, advocating for a 
formal amendment to the Constitution may result in civic democracy becoming an election issue, 
providing citizens the ability to vote for MPs or MLAs who incorporate a formal amendment to 
protect civic democracy in their election platform. In turn, electing officials who expressly support 
constitutional protection for civic democracy would increase the potential of proposing an 
amendment to the Constitution, which, in the absence of a formal amendment, may increase the 
likelihood of influencing constitutional interpretation through a partial constitutional amendment.  
 
As mentioned, even if a formal constitutional amendment is unsuccessful, granting 
democratic rights to citizens could change the interpretation of the provision that renders municipal 
institutions “creatures of the province”.511 As explained by Rosalind Dixon, even a partially 
 
510 Imperial Tobacco, supra note 241 at para 66 [emphasis added]. 




complete or failed amendment proposal may provide relevant information about democratic 
constitutional understandings relating to the division of legislative powers. 512 Thus, there is merit 
in advocating for formal amendments to the Constitution. On the other hand, a failed constitutional 
amendment may also weigh against the interpretation that the formal amendment is advocating 
for.513 As mentioned, this was the gist of Justice Lamer’s decision in Demers, where section 91(27) 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 was revisited in light of the Charter.514 
 
In the United State of America, the Supreme Court nearly unanimously agreed that 
proposed, partially complete or failed amendments “provide relevant information about 
democratic constitutional understandings”, but “disagreed sharply as to whether such information 
should be treated as weighing in favour of – or against – a decision to interpret the Constitution in 
a parallel direction.”515 Referring to the United States Supreme Court decision in Frontiero v 
Richardson,516 Rosalind Dixon explains that :  
 
Justice Brennan held for four Justices that the ERA [Equal Rights Amendment of 
1972] provided clear affirmative support for a decision by the Court to apply struct 
scrutiny to sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause… Justice 
Powell, by contrast, held for three Justices that an amendment not yet ratified by the 
states, at least for some period, the ERA pointed in exactly the opposite direction – 
namely, against, rather than in favor, of a decision by the Court to apply any form 
of heightened scrutiny to based on sex or gender.517 
 
Thus, the Equal Rights Amendment of 1972, which was partially complete at the time Fronterio 
was heard as it was passed by the House and Senate but failed to be ratified by three-fourths of the 
states, was held to be relevant to the democratic understandings of that time period. 518 The debate, 
however, centred around whether a proposed, partially complete, or failed amendment ought to 
weight in favour or against a certain interpretation. As noted by Dixon, a proposed amendment is 
likely to carry the least positive weight, whereas a partially complete amendment or an amendment 
 
512 Supra note 341 at 1.  
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that passed through the House and the Senate, but failed to be ratified, would carry more positive 
significance surrounding the democratic understandings at a given time.519 
 
In Canada, it has been suggested that failed constitutional amendment proposals have 
influenced constitutional interpretation. For example, the Meech Lake accord was ultimately 
unsuccessful; however, Sujit Choudhry and Jean-Francois Gaudreault-DesBiens explain that the 
Meech Lake Accord may have influenced the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the Secession 
Reference:  
 
Toward the end of our interview, Iacobucci suggested in passing that the failure of 
Meech led to a string of events that included the Secession Reference. The comment 
was highly suggestive. Iacobuci was a member of the Court that heard the Secession 
Reference. There is no doubt that his first-hand experiences gave him a deepened 
awareness of the political-legal context within which the case arose. But what we 
want to suggest by way of conclusion is that they may have shaped the Court's 
judgment.520 
 
Thus, while not stated definitively in the Secession Reference, it is entirely possible that failed 
amendment proposals such as the Meech Lake Accord may influence constitutional interpretation. 
Such themes and understandings not only influence constitutional interpretation but, may influence 
the conduct of provincial legislatures and actors. Should provincial legislatures or actors continue 
to interfere with civic elections and elected city councillors, a formal amendment may become 
increasingly politically desirable, causing concern that provincial legislatures may lose their 
 
519 Ibid at 14 where the author notes “[b]y varying the level of positive weight given to particular proposed 
amendments, according to the degree of support they receive at a state level, a principle of partial constitutional 
amendment also further helps promote the role of state legislatures in the overall process of constitutional change and 
dialogue.” And that “A proposed amendment would clearly have weakest force, under such a principle, where it 
enjoyed only majority support in Congress. In cases of actual super-majority support, or support at a state level, it 
would enjoy increased significance” (ibid at 2). 
520 Sujit Choudhry & Jean-Francois Gaudreault-DesBiens, "Frank Iacobucci as Constitution Maker: From the Quebec 
Veto Reference to the Meech Lake Accord and the Quebec Secession Reference" (2007) 57:2 U Toronto LJ 165.  
at 187. Choudhry & Gaudreault-DesBiens further explain that “For nearly a decade - from the Patriation Round 
through the Quebec Round and the Meech Lake Accord, and the Canada Round and the Charlottetown Accord - 
Canada was consumed by a debate over the constitutive question of what the basic terms of the Canadian political 
community should be. As Iacobucci himself said to us in an interview for this article, the failure of Meech led 'to a 
string of consequences' including the 1995 Referendum and the Secession Reference itself. So situating the Secession 
Reference against the backdrop of the constitutional politics that gave rise to it should advance our understanding of 
the judgment. Given Iacobucci's central role in both episodes, his personal experience in the Meech process must have 
affected how he understood the politics that set the stage for the Secession Reference and, indeed, may have shaped 




plenary power over city councils. Therefore, seeking such an amendment may still promote civic 
democracy by way of the common law similar to a partial constitutional amendment by providing 
relevant information or evidence relating to the democratic understandings at a given time. While 
I am critical of protecting civic democracy through constitutional interpretation,521 the difficulty 
of formal amendment in Canada may render this the only realistic method to protect civic 
democracy other than the ballot box. 
 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has accepted that international norms can 
influence constitutional interpretation as part of the historical context of the relevant provision as 
long as the court recognizes the non-binding nature of these norms.522 Since international norms 
may influence constitutional interpretation in Canada, there is no principled reason why the 
democratic understandings relating to civic democracy in Canada could not. Regarding 
international sources, the Supreme Court of Canada has noted that their “role has properly been to 
support or confirm an interpretation arrived at through the Big M Drug Mart approach; the Court 
has never relied on such tools to define the scope of Charter rights.”523 Applying this reasoning to 
a domestic source, such as a failed constitutional amendment, would render the constraints on 
constitutional interpretation applicable to partial or failed constitutional amendments. Thus, while 
a failed or partially complete amendment proposal may influence judicial interpretation, it does 
not appear to be a standalone basis to provide constitutional protection outside of the text of the 
Constitution. As mentioned, however, the text of the Constitution is the first, but not only, factor 
to be considered in the purposive approach.524 
 
Regarding the expressive function of formal constitutional amendments, Richard Albert 
explains that formal amendment rules express constitutional values,525 transform constitutional 
 
521 See Dixon, supra note 341 at 3 where the author acknowledges that “[t]here are, of course, a number of potential 
objections to a principle of partial constitutional amendment – most notably that it ignores the text”. In Fronterio, 
supra note 516 at 692, Justice Powell held “[t]here are times when this Court, under our system, cannot avoid a 
constitutional decision on issues which normally should be resolved by the elected representatives of the people. But 
democratic institutions are weakened, and confidence in the restraint of the Court is impaired, when we appear 
unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and political importance at the very time they are under 
consideration within the prescribed constitutional processes”.  
522 See 9147 Quebec, supra note 202 at paras 102-104.   
523 Ibid at para 28. 
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values526 and promote democracy.527 While a successful formal amendment to the Constitution 
would clearly express the same values, I further argue that a proposed constitutional amendment, 
even if it is ultimately unsuccessful, also expresses important societal values and democratic 
understandings, similar to a partial constitutional amendment. As previously mentioned, it has 
been speculated by Choudhry and Gaudreault-DesBiens that failed constitutional amendments 
have influenced constitutional interpretation in Canada.528 Therefore, there is no principled reason 
why advocating for a formal constitutional amendment to protect civic democracy could not 
influence constitutional interpretation. The concern would not be whether a failed or proposed 
amendment is relevant, it would be whether the proposed amendment is interpreted as supporting 
constitutional recognition of civic democracy or not.  
 
In my view, advocating for a formal amendment would be increasingly important if 
Toronto is unsuccessful in Toronto v Ontario (SCC), as, should the issue of democratic civic 
elections reach the Supreme Court of Canada subsequently, the same conclusion is likely unless 
there is evidence that the democratic understandings have changed with the time. Therefore, 
advocating for a formal amendment may support or influence a juridical finding that the 
Constitution of Canada protects democratic civic elections in a subsequent constitutional challenge 
if constitutional protection is not identified in Toronto v Ontario (SCC), or alternatively, to prevent 
such constitutional protection from being overturned in subsequent cases.  
 
For example, in Christie, the Supreme Court of Canada did not interpret the unwritten 
principle of the rule of law to include a general right to counsel. However, the Supreme Court of 
Canada further held that the constraints on constitutional interpretation may support the opposite 
interpretation in subsequent constitutional challenges.529 Thus, in future challenges, the constraints 
on constitutional interpretation may allow for an interpretation protecting mid-election 
interference, even if they do not in Toronto v Ontario (SCC). In the alternative, if the Supreme 
Court of Canada identifies constitutional protection for democratic civic elections within the 
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Constitution, continuing to advocate for a formal amendment may prevent such interpretation from 
being overruled in the future.  
 
Further, and in my view, living constitutionalism supports the application of partial 
constitutional amendments as long as the purpose of the written provision of the Constitution, and 
other constraints on constitutional interpretation are respected.530 In this regard, it would be 
difficult to determine what provision of the Constitution would protect civic democracy as there 
are no provisions within the Constitution that prima facie aim to do so. That being said, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has demonstrated a willingness to flexibly interpret the provisions of 
the Constitution and despite the criticisms of accepting alternative approaches to a formal 
amendment set out in this Chapter, it is impossible to predict whether the Supreme Court of Canada 
will accept one of the alternatives raised by the parties in Toronto v Ontario. Should the Supreme 
Court of Canada accept an alternative approach, it would be a result of unconstrained constitutional 
interpretation. However, the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation is as supreme as the text of 
the Constitution,531 which would effectively grant constitutional protection, or limited 
constitutional protection, to civic democracy.  
 
Thus, continuing to advocate for a formal amendment to the Constitution may influence 
constitutional interpretation to provide protection, or limited protection, for civic democracy 
should the Supreme Court of Canada ignore the constrains on living constitutionalism. While I am 
critical of the alternative approaches discussed in Chapter 5, the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
interpretation of the Constitution is binding. As a result, an informal amendment to the 
Constitution may be the only viable option to constitutionally protect civic democracy, despite the 
concerns I have raised in this thesis, other than civic democracy becoming an issue for the ballot 
box, which may lead to a formal amendment to the Constitution to protect civic democracy. 
Further, and as mentioned, if constitutional protection for democratic civic elections is not 
identified in Toronto v Ontario (SCC), advocating for a formal amendment may influence judicial 
interpretation in subsequent constitutional challenges related to civic democracy, or, in the 
alternative that such constitutional protection is identified, continuing to advocate for a formal 
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amendment to protect civic democracy, as opposed to merely democratic civic elections, may 
prevent Toronto v Ontario (SCC) from being overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada in a 
future case.  
 
7.4 Conclusion: Chapter 7  
 While a formal amendment to the Constitution is difficult and unlikely, it is the only 
method that, in my view, can provide adequate constitutional protection for civic democracy. A 
formal amendment to the Constitution limits the ability of the judiciary to scale back civic 
democracy and provides certainty for the future of civic democracy. Section 96 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 and the drafting characteristics of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 provide an 
example of what a formal amendment may look like; however, ancillary amendments would also 
be required to truly protect civic democracy.  
 
 To prevent interference with civic democracy, city councils require constitutionally 
entrenched heads of legislative power and revenue raising powers. Without these amendments, 
provincial actors or legislatures could continue to use the threat to revoke funding as a method to 
align city council’s decisions with the province. Further, without constitutionally entrenched heads 
of power, provinces could arguably abolish or limit a city council’s legislative function, defeating 
the purpose of a formal amendment to the Constitution to recognize civic democracy. In the 
alternative, constitutional protection of effective representation within a city council may lead to 
an increase in interference, as the repeal or limitation of a legislative power may amount to an 
infringement of effective representation, especially in the context of an election promise which 
relies on a specific legislative power. 
 
Despite the difficulty of formal amendment, there is merit in continuing to advocate for a 
formal amendment to the Constitution to protect civic democracy for three reasons. First, there is 
a small chance it may be successful. Second, if a formal amendment to protect the democratic right 
to vote for and be effectively represented within a city council is successful, the Supreme Court of 
Canada may revisit section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 in light of the formal amendment 
and scale back the provinces plenary power over cities based on Demers. Lastly, and in my 




interpretation based on the democratic understandings at a given time. While a formal amendment 
to the Constitution is ideal, it is admittedly unlikely and an informal amendment through judicial 
interpretation is likely the only realistic method to provide constitutional protection of civic 
democracy, other than civic democracy becoming an issue for the ballot box and leading to a 






Attempts have been made by provincial legislatures to accommodate the distinct and 
nationally significant legislative role of city councils in Canada through city charters or city-
specific litigation. The consensus is that these attempts have failed. Cities remain subject to the 
plenary power of provincial legislatures and as a result, remain creatures of the province. However, 
city councils do and will continue to legislate in areas of national significance and this legislative 
role has been recognized by the upper levels of government and the judiciary. Although cities were 
not originally designed to be democratically accountable, modern provincial legislation has 
codified democratic election processes and broad legislative powers for city councils. Further, 
provincial legislatures have codified provisions granting significant deference to the policy 
decisions of city councils and the judiciary has upheld these provisions. Despite this dilution of 
Dillon’s rule, provincial interference with civic democracy continues to occur. 
 
As cities remain creatures of the province pursuant to section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 
1867, their constituents lack democratic rights and city councils lack constitutionally protected 
rights, such as parliamentary privilege, enumerated heads of legislative power and revenue raising 
powers. This lack of constitutional protection allows upper levels of government to interfere in 
civic democracy in two ways. First, provincial legislatures have codified the ability to remove 
elected city councillors from office and limit the powers of city councils if they are not in the 
public interest. In addition, provincial actors can hang their plenary power over cities like a sword 
and threaten to reduce or remove city funding to force city councillors to align their views with 
the province. Second, provincial legislatures have interfered with the election process, by altering 
or destroying ward boundaries outside of election periods and more recently, in the middle of an 
election period. As a result of the provincial interference in the 2018 Toronto Election, academics 
and legal professionals have proposed numerous interpretations of the current Constitution to 
protect democratic civic elections.  
 
Many alternatives to a formal amendment to the Constitution have been proposed, such as, 
in various ways, “reading-in” democratic civic elections into the current text of the Constitution 
and amending provincial constitutions. The “reading-in approaches” rely on unconstrained 




written Constitution ensures, and that civic democracy requires. Further, such unconstrained 
interpretations grant the Supreme Court of Canada complete interpretative authority over the right 
to civic democracy, and the Constitution generally, which could limit or abolish constitutional 
protection for civic democracy in the future. Further, provincial constitutions in Canada are not 
well-developed and amending provincial constitutions to protect civic democracy leaves the rights 
of citizens and city councils with the plenary power of the provincial legislatures. While “manner 
and form” provisions have been proposed to protect provisions within a provincial constitution, 
their effectiveness is not free from doubt. Should the Supreme Court of Canada accept an 
alternative approach, the provisions of the Constitution will effectively become “empty vessels” 
for the Supreme Court of Canada to fill with meaning or purpose as they see fit, contrary to 
Supreme Court of Canada’s own decision in the Public Service Employee Reference. 
 
Whether or not a formal amendment will be required is not dependent on the forthcoming 
decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Toronto v Ontario, as any alternative approach would 
not adequately protect civic democracy as the alternative approaches only address one aspect of 
civic democracy – democratic civic elections. Ancillary constitutional amendments would also be 
required to ensure interference with civic democracy does not persist. These ancillary amendments 
include constitutionally protected legislative powers for city councils and the appropriate revenue 
raising tools to allow city councils to exercise their legislative function autonomously. While an 
argument could be made that protection of effective representation may provide protection for 
certain legislative powers possessed by city councils, this remains uncertain and may lead to 
increased infringements and constitutional challenges as the level of protection that effective 
representation might provide for legislative powers is neither certain, nor predictable.   
 
Section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
provide examples of what a formal amendment to the Constitution may look like. Regarding this, 
a provision similar to section 96, using the drafting characteristics of section 35, would protect 
democratic civic elections and effective representation in the same manner that section 96 protects 
the inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts and allow room for judicial interpretation to 
accommodate the complexities of civic democracy. While a separate amendment would be 




examples of how the Constitution may be amended to protect civic democracy. Although the 
provision proposed in Chapter 7.2.1, like all constitutional provisions, are subject to judicial 
interpretation, living constitutionalism requires the judiciary to protect the fundamental purpose of 
the provision. Thus, while there may be some pragmatic and realistic limitations, the fundamental 
right to civic democracy would be protected assuming the constraints on constitutional 
interpretation are respected. As city councils are structured differently than Parliament or 
legislative assemblies, in the sense that there is no opposition government to provide a check and 
balance, the proposal in Chapter 7.2.1 allows limited provincial control over civic elections, to 
ensure city councils do not pass legislation or bylaws in their self-interest.  
 
Despite the difficulty of formal constitutional amendment in Canada, there continues to be 
merit in advocating for a formal amendment to the Constitution to protect civic democracy. 
Partially complete or failed amendment proposals provide relevant information relating to 
democratic understandings and, while not the ideal, may influence the judiciary to adopt one of 
the alternative approaches discussed in Chapter 5. Should the Supreme Court of Canada accept an 
alternative approach, it would be the result of unconstrained constitutional interpretation, creating 
significant future uncertainty; however, the Supreme Court Reference renders the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s interpretation as binding as supreme as the text of the Constitution. Thus, the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s interpretation could invalidate laws that infringe democratic civic elections, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
While I have been critical of the alternative approaches to a formal amendment to the 
Constitution of Canada as they rely on unconstrained constitutional interpretation, they may be the 
only realistic method to provide constitutional protection for civic democracy in Canada, other 
than through the ballot box. Should formally amending the Constitution to protect civic democracy 
become an election issue, it has the added benefit of potentially influencing judicial interpretation, 
even if a formal amendment is unsuccessful. As a result, advocating for a formal amendment to 
the Constitution to protect civic democracy remains crucial to advancing constitutional protection 
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